



# **CPUC Public Agenda 3288**

**Wednesday, February 1, 2012, 9:00 a.m.**  
**505 Van Ness Ave, San Francisco**



**Commissioners:**  
**Michael R. Peevey**  
**Timothy Alan Simon**  
**Michel Peter Florio**  
**Catherine J.K. Sandoval**  
**Mark J. Ferron**

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# 2011 Wind Event Outages

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California Public Utilities Commission





# CPSD - Investigation

- The CPSD is investigating the 2011 wind event to determine what happened, what can be learned and did any violations contribute to the severity of the outages. CPSD is specifically looking at the following:
  - Causes of Outages
  - Communications During Event and After Event
  - Restoration





# Wind Event Outages

Utility	Total Customers Affected	Percent of Total Customers	Average Outage Duration
SCE	439,000	8.9%	1173 minutes
<b>LADWP</b>	220,000	14.1%	580 minutes
GWP	30,500	34.7%	173 minutes
PWP	6,330	9.9%	TBD






# SCE: Wind Event Outages

- The San Gabriel Valley was the hardest hit area of SCE's service territory. A total of 205,000 SCE customers in the San Gabriel Valley lost power during the wind event.
- In total 439,000 SCE customers lost power during the wind event. This represents 8.9% of SCE's total customers.
- The maximum number of SCE customers that were simultaneously without power was 226,000. This represents 4.6% of SCE's total customers.





# SCE: Outage Causes During the Wind Event





# SCE: Communications

- Governments
  - SCE's Local Public Affairs contact for cities in the San Gabriel Valley retired the day before the Wind Event
  - Dedicated phone line for Governments did not provide much more information than General Public Line
- General Public
  - General public reported 4,000 "downed lines"
  - SCE underestimated the time needed to restore power
  - 13.8% of Medical Baseline Customers and Critical Care Customers receive Automatic Outage Communications from SCE





# Restoration

- SCE's initial interpretation of Smart Meter data directed restoration efforts inefficiently
- After SCE realized this problem, it revised its interpretation of Smart Meter data, which expedited restoration efforts
- SCE cancelled a majority of pre-planned work, and reassigned those resources to help with restoration efforts
- SCE did utilize contractors
- SCE did not utilize mutual assistance





# CPSD's Findings

- Preliminary calculations indicate that 13.4% of the SCE poles involved were overloaded, in violation of General Order 95, Rule 44.3.
- Portions of SCE's Emergency Plan contain antiquated CPUC contact information.





# CPSD's Findings



- SCE did not preserve all evidence as required by General Order 95, Rule 19.
  - Only 60 pole butts out of 200 were maintained
  - Some poles were cut into 8 inch long pieces
  - Numerous poles were missing pole numbers
  - Only five poles could be reconstructed

