## 8 FRONTIER CORPORATE AND CALIFORNIA FINANCIALS AND ILEC INVESTMENT POLICIES

## Principal observations and takeaways

- Having grossly overpaid Verizon for the 2016 California-Texas-Florida ("CTF") acquisition, Frontier assumed a massive debt burden that cannot be sustained.
- Most of that overpayment had been carried as "Goodwill" or "Other Intangibles" on Frontier's corporate balance sheet; by the end of 2019, all of that Goodwill and most of the Other Intangibles have been written off.
- By the end of 2019, Frontier's total debt was more than \$18.3-billion, and the Company's total debt service (interest and amortization) payments in 2019 were more than \$3.5-billion.
- Frontier's California customer base continued to dwindle, to the point where it has lost foughly $50 \%$ of the POTS access line customers it had acquired in the 2016 purchase.
- Frontier's net income declined following each successive acquisition, to the point where it has now been negative for seven consecutive quarters.
- Frontier's melt-down and ultimate Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing confirms the inescapable fact that Frontier had grossly overpaid Verizon for the CTF assets.
- Unlike AT\&T, which had raised its legacy flat-rate residential POTS rates by $152 \%$ since the onset of URF, Verizon's rates for this service had risen by only $31 \%$ as of the date of the sale to Frontier, and Frontier had not effected any rate increase since the acquisition throgh the end of 2019.
- Since acquiring the California ILEC from Verizon in 2016, Frontier continued to invest less in Gross Plant Additions than it took in retirements and depreciation accruals, resulting in a net disinvestment of $\$ 469.5$-million.


# FRONTIER CORPORATE AND CALIFORNIA FINANCIALS <br> AND ILEC INVESTMENT POLICIES 

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## A lot has happened to Frontier since our Phase 1 Report

In our April 2019 Report on Phase 1 of this Network Examination, we expressed serious concerns as to Frontier's near-term and ongoing ability to maintain and modernize its California wireline ILEC network so as to provide reliable service to California consumers. We noted that Frontier has been hemorrhaging customers in all major service categories across all of its 29state footprint since its last major acquisition in 2016, as summarized in Table 8.1 below:

Table 8.1
FRONTIER COMMUNICATIONS CORP. CUSTOMER COUNTS BY SERVICE CATEGORY, 2016-2019

| Voice |  | Broadband | Video |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1Q2016 (pre-CTF) | $3,372,000$ | $2,487,000$ | 238,000 |
| 2Q2016 | $5,771,000$ | $4,570,000$ | $1,628,000$ |
| 3Q2016 | $5,551,000$ | $4,362,000$ | $1,222,000$ |
| 4Q2016 | $5,393,000$ | $4,271,000$ | $1,145,000$ |
| 1Q2017 | $5,220,000$ | $4,164,000$ | $1,065,000$ |
| 2Q2017 | $5,058,000$ | $4,063,000$ | $1,007,000$ |
| 3Q2017 | $4,949,000$ | $4,000,000$ | 961,000 |
| 4Q2017 | $4,850,000$ | $3,938,000$ | 981,000 |
| 2Q2018 | $4,667,000$ | $3,863,000$ | 902,000 |
| 3Q2018 | $4,574,000$ | $3,802,000$ | 873,000 |
| 4Q2018 | $4,471,000$ | $3,735,000$ | 838,000 |
| 1Q2019 | $4,395,000$ | $3,698,000$ | 784,000 |
| 2Q2019 | $4,292,000$ | $3,626,000$ | 738,000 |
| 3Q2019 | $4,193,000$ | $3,555,000$ | 698,000 |
| 4Q2019 | $4,118,000$ | $3,513,000$ | 660,000 |
| Source: Frontier Communications Corp. Forms 10-Qs; $10-$ Ks |  |  |  |

On April 1, 2016, Frontier Communications Corp. completed its acquisition of what is now Frontier California under a three-state ILEC purchase from Verizon that also included Verizon ILEC operations in Florida and Texas (the "CTF acquisition"). Frontier paid Verizon \$10.54billion in cash for the three ILECs, and financed the purchase primarily through the issuance of new debt. Even before Frontier took over control of these three Verizon ILECs, its stock had fallen by around $33 \%$ from the (equivalent of) $\$ 125.70$, where it had been February 9, 2015, shortly after the deal with Verizon had been announced. On July 10, 2017, Frontier implemented a 1 -for- 15 share reverse split so as to avoid de-listing of its stock. On December 16, 2020. Frontier stock was trading at $10.8 \notin$ per share, down $99.91 \%$ from its February 2015 high (see Figure 8.1 below).

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Figure 8.1. Frontier Communications Corp. Common Stock share prices, 5-year history.(Source: Google Finance, as of December 16, 2020)

Frontier's 2019 Form 10-K filing puts the extreme distress under which the company has been operating in graphic perspective, by highlighting the cumulative return experienced by its shareholders relative to the concurrent performance of the S\&P 500 index and the S\&P Communications Sector index (see Figure 8.2 below):


Figure 8.2. Frontier's cumulative five-year total return in comparison to the five-year total return for all S\&P 500 Index stocks and for all S\&P Telecommunications Services Index stocks. (Source: Frontier Communications Corp. 2019 Form 10-K, at p. 30)

Following the 2016 CTF purchases, Frontier became the nation's fourth largest ILEC with roughly 5.77 -million residential and business customers (roughly corresponding to about 8.77million switched access lines) across 28 states, ${ }^{58}$ but in making these various acquisitions, the company had assumed $\$ 11.9$-billion in new debt, bringing its total debt as of the end of 2017 to around $\$ 17$-billion. By the end of 2019, Frontier's ILEC access lines had eroded by $28.6 \%$ to approximately 6.33 -million. Its total long-term debt was only slightly lower than in 2017, at \$18.3-billion.

[^0]

Figure 8.3. Frontier has financed its succession of ILEC acquisitions primarily through the issuance of debt. (Source: Frontier Communications Corp. Forms 10-K, 10-Q)

Frontier's growth strategy has, in each case, involved the absorption of large, multi-state operations, some of which had been larger in size than the pre-acquisition Frontier. Notably, and as illustrated on Figure 8.4 below, each of these acquisitions produced a large, one-time revenue spike followed in each instance by revenue erosion from the new immediate post-acquisition level - producing a sort of "sawtooth" effect. In the first quarter of 2016 - the last 3-month period immediately preceding the Verizon acquisition - Frontier companywide revenue was running at an annual rate of roughly $\$ 5.4$-billion. In the second quarter of 2016 - immediately following the Verizon acquisition - Frontier revenue had nearly doubled, jumping to an annual rate of around $\$ 10.4$-billion. But by the final quarter of 2019, Frontier's total revenue was running at an annual rate of less than $\$ 7.8$-billion. In other words, in less than four years, Frontier had given up more than half of the $\$ 5$-billion revenue gain that had resulted from its 2016 CTF acquisition. Note that this revenue erosion was not confined to those three states, but occurred across all of Frontier's operating areas. But the company had acquired that additional $\$ 5$-billion in operating revenues by incurring more than $\$ 11$-billion in new debt, and while its revenue gain had been cut in half, its total debt remained only slightly below its 2016 postacquisition level.



Figure 8.4. Frontier Communications Corp. Revenues, 2005-2019.
(Source: Frontier Communications Corp. Forms 10-K, 10-Q).

Most of that overpayment had been carried as "Goodwill" or "Other Intangibles" on Frontier's corporate balance sheet; by the end of 2019, all of that Goodwill and most of the Other Intangibles have been written off.

The same type of "sawtooth" effect - but even more pronounced - can be seen in the demand for access lines (Figure 8.5). As these "sawtooth" graphs suggest, Frontier was pursuing massive acquisitions into a market - wireline circuit-switched voice telephony - that was already in a steep decline.


Figure 8.5. Frontier Communications Corp. Switched Access Lines in Service, 2005-2019. (Source: Frontier Communications Corp. Forms 10-K, 10-Q)


Frontier's spate of acquisitions dating back to 2006 were accomplished at a total cost of $\$ 22.4$-billion, financed by $\$ 10.5$-billion in new equity and some $\$ 14.1$-billion in new debt. ${ }^{59}$ As shown in Figure 8.3 above, by the end of 2019, Frontier's total debt was more than \$16.3-billion, and the Company's total debt service (interest and amortization) payments in 2019 were more than $\$ 3.5$-billion. ${ }^{60}$ Together with the persistent drop-off in customers and revenues, this resulted in severe cash flow challenges and major earnings erosion despite the revenue growth overall. At year-end 2019, Frontier's debt-to-revenue ratio was 2.01 , up from 1.86 as of yearend 2017. Frontier's cost of debt is now well into the junk bond range. Thus, some \$1.53billion out of the total 2019 debt service of $\$ 3.54$-billion represents interest on that debt.

As we discussed in the Phase 1 Report, in its purchase of Verizon's three ILECs in April 2016, the price that Frontier paid to Verizon was well in excess of the amount that Verizon had
59. Frontier 10-K reports, 2007-2019. In mid-2006, Frontier carried about $\$ 3.95$-billion in total long-term debt. At year-end 2016, immediately following the CTF acquisition, Frontier's long-term debt sat at just under \$18.2billion.
60. Frontier 2019 Form 10-K, at F-5 (Consolidated Balance Sheets); F-6 (Consolidated Statements of Operations); F-8 (Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows).
been carrying on its books for these assets. That excess over book value is carried as "Goodwill" on parent company Frontier Communications, Corp.'s balance sheet. Frontier explained the basis for this treatment as follows: "Goodwill represents the excess of purchase price over the fair value of identifiable tangible and intangible net assets acquired." ${ }^{\circ 1}$ Goodwill would not be includable as a rate base asset under RORR, yet its acquisition created a real cost to Frontier in terms of cost of capital (debt and equity) plus any periodical amortization of the premium amount that Frontier may deem it necessary to make. Indeed, it is even possible that the California ILEC could be earning a satisfactory rate of return under traditional RORR standards while sustaining losses on a financial basis, which necessarily includes any premium above book value that it had paid to Verizon for the CTF acquisition

Out of the $\$ 10.54$-billion that Frontier paid Verizon when the deal closed in April 2016, it allocated some $\$ 2.5$-billion to "Goodwill" and another $\$ 2.16$-billion to "Other Intangibles," which it attributed primarily to the value of Verizon's 3-state "Customer Base" that was included in the acquisition. ${ }^{62}$ In the case of the Frontier California ILEC entity, Frontier recorded \$517.1million of Goodwill at the time of acquisition. ${ }^{63}$ In 2017, Frontier California Goodwill was increased by $\$ 93.97$-million to $\$ 611.1$-million. ${ }^{64}$ In 2019, the entire $\$ 611.1$-million in Goodwill was written-off Frontier California's regulatory accounting books. ${ }^{65}$ Since Goodwill of this type would never be accepted as a rate base asset for regulatory purposes, it is entirely unclear as to why it was even recorded at all on Frontier's regulatory accounting records. Only $\$ 6.24$-billion out of the total CTF purchase price was associated with "Property, Plant and Equipment." ${ }^{,{ }^{66}}$ At year-end 2016, some \$12-34-billion out of Frontier Communications Corp.'s \$29-billion of Total Assets was associated with Goodwill and Other Intangibles; ${ }^{67}$ at year-end 2019, all of Frontier's Goodwill had been written off, and its "Other Intangibles" had eroded to just over \$1-billion. ${ }^{68}$

In its 2019 Form 10-K, Frontier explained that it had "recorded aggregate Goodwill Impairments totaling $\$ 5,725$ million, $\$ 641$ million and $\$ 2,748$ million for 2019, 2018 and 2017, respectively. In the third quarter of 2019, [Frontier\} impaired the $\$ 276$ million remaining balance of [its] goodwill. This impairment and the write down of the balance of [its] goodwill was largely driven by a lower enterprise valuation utilized in [its] testing which reflected, among

[^1]other things, pressures on [Frontier's] business resulting in a continued deterioration in revenue, challenges in achieving improvements in revenue and customer trends, the long-term sustainability of [its] capital structure, and the lower outlook for [its] industry as a whole." ${ }^{69}$

These write-downs of intangibles resulted in a net 2019 Operating Loss of \$4.87-billion. However, since the write-downs do not affect cash, when the write-downs are ignored, Frontier's 2019 Operating Income (before the intangible write-downs) was a positive $\$ 852$-million. But total 2019 debt service payments (principal repayments plus interest) were \$3.54-billion, well in excess of the company's cash income for that year. ${ }^{70}$


Figure 8.6. Frontier corporate net earnings have plummeted in the years since the 2016 California, Texas and Florida acquisitions from Verizon.

Frontier's 2019 Form 10-K gives end-of-year long-term debt at \$16.31-billion, with total long-term and current liabilities at $\$ 19.1$-billion. Total assets are shown as $\$ 17.49$-billion, and total shareholder equity is given as a negative $\$ 4.39$-billion. Frontier's spate of major acquisitions, while expanding its overall revenue base, has had precisely the opposite effect upon its overall profitability. As shown in Figure 8.6, the company's profits, which had peaked in 2006 at over $\$ 350$-million, had turned into losses of $\$ 1.8$-million in $2017 .{ }^{71}$ These decreases in profit
69. Is., at 22.
70. Frontier 2019 Form 10-K, at F-6.
71. Frontier 2017 Form 10-K, at 27.
are driven largely by two main factors - the steady and continuing erosion of its core wireline customer base, and a cost structure that has a large, volume- and traffic-insensitive component. At this point, Frontier has no realistic ability to raise equity capital, and whatever new debt capital that might be available to the company would almost certainly involve massive costs.

Frontier's net income declined following each successive acquisition, to the point where it has now been negative for seven consecutive quarters.

Notably, Verizon had no amount for "Goodwill" shown on its regulatory accounting balance sheet, as reflected on its ARMIS Form 43-02 submissions. However, Frontier California had included a portion of the "Goodwill" resulting from the premium over book value that it had paid for the Verizon California assets on its 2016 and 2017 ARMIS Forms 43-02 filed with the CPUC. In 2016, Frontier California recorded as a gross addition a Goodwill amount of \$511.12million. For 2017, Goodwill gross additions are shown as $\$ 93.97$-million, for a total end-of-year 2017 value of $\$ 611.09$-million. To put these amounts in context, consider that, according to Frontier California's Form 43-02 for 2017, the Company's total net assets as of the end of 2017 were $\$ 3.42$-billion. Thus, the $\$ 611.09$-million of Goodwill resulting from the excessive purchase price of the Verizon assets represents $17.9 \%$ of the Company's total net assets. As of year-end 2019, the entire remaining $\$ 611.09$-million in Verizon California Goodwill was writren off, resulting in total Verizon California net assets of \$3.21-billion

Figure 8.7 compares Frontier's Operating Income with its debt service (debt repayment plus interest) obligations over the 2005-2019 period.


Figure 8.7. Frontier's corporate debt service continued to increase while its operating revenues have plummeted. (Source: Frontier Communications Corp. Forms 10-K, 10-Q)

In addition to its overall leverage increases resulting from the succession of new debt as reflected in Figure 8.7 above, Frontier's cost of debt had also been pushed skyward due to a series of downgrades by Moody's to the company's credit rating since the CTF acquisition. Moody's has downgraded Frontier's credit rating three separate times, from Ba3 to B1 in November 2016, from B1 to B2 in May 2018 and again, from B2 to B3, in November 2018. ${ }^{72}$ Having filed for Chapter 11 protection, Frontier's access to additional debt or equity financiing at this point is all but nonexistent.

## Verizon California had been experiencing customer drop-offs for years preceding the Frontier acquisition

Prior to its 2016 sale to Frontier, Verizon California had been experiencing a steady decline in its legacy switched access lines in service for a number of years. Between January 2010 and March 31, 2016, the last day that Verizon owned the company, its switched access lines decreased by about $56.2 \%$, from $2,778,584$ to $1,216,829$. In fact, between February 5, 2015,

[^2]when the Securities Purchase Agreement for the CTF deal was signed by the two companies, ${ }^{73}$ and the April 1, 2016 closing date, Verizon California switched access lines in service had fallen by $16.3 \%$ from about $1,453,444$ (as of the end of January 2015) to $1,216,829$. We don't have corresponding figures for Texas or Florida, but it's safe to assume that the results there were similar. Incredibly, the Securities Purchase Agreement did not include any provision for an adjustment in the purchase price to reflect any change in the size of the three ILECs' customer base as of the final closing date. The downward trend in the number of legacy circuit-switched access lines persisted into the post-transaction era. By 2019, average circuit-switched access lines in service had fallen by $82.8 \%$ relative to the 2010 level. Table 8.2 below extends the average number of switched access lines into the 2016-19 period:

| Table 8.2 <br> VERIZON/FRONTIER CALIFORNIA <br> AVERAGE LEGACY SWITCHED ACCESS LINES IN SERVICE 2010-2019 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 |
|  | VERIZON |  |  |  |  | FRONTIER |  |  |  |  |
| VZIFTRCA | 2,641,467 | 2,322,926 | 1,991,862 | 1,706,402 | 1,507,460 | 1,368,589 | 1,154,018 | 951,351 | 746,975 | 615,964 |
| \% of 2010 |  | 87.9\% | 75.4\% | 64.6\% | 57.1\% | 56.1\% | 43.7\% | 36.0\% | 28.3\% | 23.3\% |
| \% of FTR acquisition |  |  |  |  |  |  | 94.8\% | 78.2\$ | 61.4\%. | 50.6\% |
| Source: CA POTS lines in service derived from GO 133-C/D § 3.3 and 3.4 Trouble Reports per 100 Lines (TRPH) quarterly filings, 2010-2019. Switched access lines are average over each year. "\% of FTR Acquisition" is based upon 1,216,829 FTR Access Lines in Service as of 4/1/16. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Verizon California financial data for 2010 has not been provided. Between 2011 and 2015, Verizon saw a 41.1\% drop in average legacy switched access lines over the 2010-2015 period, Notably, despite this, Verizon California gross revenues remained relatively constant through 2015. However, following Frontier's takeover of the company, the California ILEC's revenues went into a steep decline, as summarized on Table 8.3 below:

[^3]
## Table 8.3

| VERIZON/FRONTIER OPERATING REVENUES HAVE DECREASED, BUT BY FAR LESS THAN THE DECREASE IN LEGACY SWITCHED ACCESS LINES, 2011-2019 (\$000) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 |
|  | VERIZON |  |  |  |  |  | FRO | NTIER |  |
| Revenues | \$3,128,706 | \$2,757,563 | \$2,728,855 | \$3,285,034 | \$3,121,477 | \$2,252,145 | \$2,054,289 | \$1,916,500 | \$1,817,655 |
| \% of 2011 |  | 100.0\% | 87.2\% | 119.1\% | 113.2\% | 81.7\% | 65.7\% | 61.3\% | 58.1\% |
| Avg. Switched access lines | 2,322,926 | 1,991,862 | 1,706,402 | 1,507,460 | 1,368,589 | 1,154,018 | 951,351 | 746,975 | 615,964 |
| \% of 2011 |  | 85.7\% | 73.5\% | 64.9\% | 58.9\% | 49.7\% | 40.9\% | 32.2\% | 26.5\% |
| Avg. Op. <br> Rev. Per <br> Switched <br> Access Line | \$1,347 | \$1,384 | \$1,599 | \$2,179 | \$2,281 | \$1,951 | \$2,159 | \$2,565 | \$2,951 |

NOTE DATA FOR 2010 IS NOT AVAILABLE, SO ANALYSIS IS BASED ON 2011-2015. Source: Verizon/ Frontier CA ARMIS Form 43-01 as filed with CPUC; POTS lines in service derived from GO 133-C/D § 3.3 and 3.4 Trouble Reports per 100 Lines (TRPH) quarterly filings, 2010-2019. Switched access lines are average over each year.

Of course, a portion of the Verizon/Frontier California operating revenues come from services other than legacy POTS lines. It is thus instructive to compare the decrease in switched access lines more directly with the principal revenue sources associated with these services. Fortunately, more detailed revenue data is provided in the annual financial reports, ARMIS Forms 4301, 43-02 and 43-03, that were filed by Verizon and Frontier with the CPUC. However, this breakdown is only available for the period of Verizon ownership (2011-2015) and for the former GTE California (U-1002) entity, as summarized in Table 8.4 below.

As these data demonstrate, when confined to only those revenue sources directly attributable to legacy switched access line services - specifically, USOA Account 5001 (Basic Area Revenue), USOA Account 5081 (End User Common Line revenue), and USOA Account 5082 (Switched Access revenue) - Verizon California legacy access line-related revenues decreased by about $38.8 \%$, only slightly less than the $42 \%$ drop in switched access line demand, over the 2011-2015 period. Switched access rates, which remain subject to tariff at both the state and federal levels, had remained unchanged over the 2010-2017 period.

## Table 8.4

## VERIZON/FRONTIER CALIFORNIA (U-1002) LEGACY SWITCHED ACCESS LINE REVENUES HAVE DECREASED ROUGHLY IN PROPORTION TO THE DECREASE IN LEGACY SWITCHED ACCESS LINES, 2011-2019 (\$000)

|  | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | VERIZON |  |  |  |  |  | FRONTIER |  |  |
| USOA Acct 5001 Basic Area Rev | \$670,218 | \$566,696 | \$591,229 | \$429,960 | \$389,036 | \$282,413 | \$219,314 | \$199,756 | \$182,426 |
| USOA Acct 5081 EUCL Revenue | \$220,551 | \$198,073 | \$191,186 | \$186,869 | \$171,415 | \$123,579 | \$97,175 | \$83,601 | \$76,615 |
| USOA Acct 5082 Switched Access | \$174,462 | \$44,270 | \$42,549 | \$114,878 | \$91,143 | \$88,246 | \$79,357 | \$71,691 | \$66,513 |
| Total switched access line rev | \$1,065,231 | \$809,039 | \$824,964 | \$731,707 | \$651,594 | \$494,238 | \$395,846 | \$355,048 | \$325,554 |
| \% of 2011 |  | 75.95\% | 77.44\% | 68.69\% | 61.17\% | 46.40\% | 37.16\% | 33.33\% | 30.56\% |
| Avg. Switched access lines (000) | 2,322,926 | 1,991,862 | 1,706,402 | 1,507,460 | 1,368,589 | 1,154,018 | 951,351 | 746,975 | 615,964 |
| \% of 2011 |  | 85.75\% | 73.46\% | 64.89\% | 58.92\% | 49.68\% | 40.95\% | 32.16\% | 26.52\% |
| \$ per switched access line | \$458.57 | \$406.17 | \$483.45 | \$485.39 | \$476.11 | \$428.28 | \$416.09 | \$475.31 | \$528.53 |

NOTE DATA FOR 2010 IS NOT AVAILABLE. ANALYSIS IS BASED ON 2011-2015. Source: Verizon CA ARMIS Form 43-01 as filed with CPUC; POTS lines in service derived from GO 133-C/D § 3.3 and 3.4 Trouble Reports per 100 Lines (TRPH) quarterly filings, 2011-2015. Switched access lines are average over each year.

However, local switched POTS access line rates other than California LifeLine ${ }^{74}$ have been detariffed and have been subject to modest rate increases - substantially less than those implemented by AT\&T California - over the 2010-2017 period, as shown in Table 8.5 below:

[^4]|  |  |  |  | Table 8.5 |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | VERIZON/FR SIDENTIAL ATE INCREAS | ONTIER CAL POTS) ACCE E HISTORY | FORNIA SS LINE S 2006-2020 | ERVICE |  |
|  |  | Flat-r | ate Residenc | (1FR) | Measure | -rate Resid | nce (1MR) |
| Year | Eff date | Monthly Rate | \% incr since onset of URF | \% incr relative to 1/1/10 | Monthly Rate | \% incr since onset of URF | $\%$ incr relative to 1/1/10 |
| 2006 | 9/1/2006 | \$16.85 | - |  | \$10.00 |  |  |
| 2008 | 1/1/2008 | \$17.25 | 2.37\% |  | \$10.24 | 2.40\% |  |
| 2009 | 1/1/2009 | \$19.50 | 15.73\% |  | \$11.80 | 18.00\% |  |
| 2010 | 1/1/2010 | \$19.50 | 15.73\% | - | \$11.80 | 18.00\% |  |
| 2011 | 1/1/2011 | \$20.50 | 21.66\% | 5.13\% | \$12.39 | 23.90\% | 5.00\% |
| 2012 | 3/1/2012 | \$20.50 | 21.66\% | 5.13\% | \$12.39 | 23.90\% | 5.00\% |
| 2013 | 1/1/2013 | \$20.50 | 21.66\% | 5.13\% | \$12.39 | 23.90\% | 5.00\% |
| 2014 | 1/1/2014 | \$22.00 | 30.56\% | 12.82\% | \$13.40 | 34.00\% | 13.56\% |
| 2015 | 1/1/2015 | \$22.00 | 30.56\% | 12.82\% | \$13.40 | 34.00\% | 13.56\% |
| 2016 | 1/1/2016 | \$22.00 | 30.56\% | 12.82\% | \$13.40 | 34.00\% | 13.56\% |
| 2017 | 1/1/2017 | \$22.00 | 30.56\% | 12.82\% | \$13.40 | 34.00\% | 13.56\% |
| 2018 | 1/1/2018 | \$22.00 | 30.56\% | 12.82\% | \$13.40 | 34.00\% | 13.56\% |
| 2019 | 1/1/2019 | \$22.00 | 30.56\% | 12.82\% | \$13.40 | 34.00\% | 13.56\% |
| 2020 | 1/1/2020 | \$22.50 | 33.53\% | 15.38\% | \$15.00 | 50.00\% | 27.12\% |
| Source: CPUC Communications Division Staff. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

It is instructive to compare the history of Verizon California rate increases to those imposed by AT\&T California as summarized on Table 4A. 10 (and referenced in Chapter 7). Historically, Verizon (and its predecessor GTE) basic local residential service rates were always higher than those of AT\&T (Pacific Bell). However, that relationship changed in 2012, when AT\&T raised its flat-rate residential service rate to $\$ 21.00$. Since the onset of URF, AT\&T California has increased the price for its flat-rate residential POTS service by $152.57 \%$ vs. Verizon's $30.56 \%$ increase over the comparable time frame. Looking only at the 2010-2019 period under examination in this study, AT\&T has raised its flat-rate residence rate by $64.13 \%$ vs. $12.82 \%$ for Verizon/Frontier.

Unlike AT\&T, which had raised its legacy flat-rate residential POTS rates by $152 \%$ since the onset of URF, Verizon's rates for this service had risen by only $31 \%$ as of the date of the sale to Frontier, and Frontier had not effected any rate increase since the acquisition throgh the end of 2019.

## Verizon California had been consistently disinvesting in its California local network infrastructure, and Frontier has been pursuing a similar strategy.

As we noted in our Phase 1 Report, Verizon California would typically pay dividends to its parent company that exceeded its net operating income. We view such practices as constituting disinvestment, in that by paying dividends in excess of earnings, the subsidiary (Verizon California) is effectively transferring a portion of its capital base to its parent. Since taking over the company in April 2016, Frontier California has issued no dividends to its parent, Frontier Communications Corporation. However, Frontier's total net income was actually a loss of \$476million. Frontier California did have positive net income in 2017, but paid no dividend to its parent.

Disinvestment also arises when retirements and depreciation accruals exceed the gross plant additions in any given year or cumulatively over time. This has the effect of reducing Net Plant in Service, a condition that has prevailed under Frontier ownership of the company. Since taking over the company, Frontier has invested $\$ 914.7$-million (net of adjustments) in gross plant additions, but has recorded $\$ 188.3$-million in retirements and has taken $\$ 1.74$-billion in depreciation accruals - a net disinvestment of just over \$1-billion.

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Table 8.6
FRONTIER CALIFORNIA (U-1002) PATTERN OF INVESTMENT, 2016-2019 (\$000)

|  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 7}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 8}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 9}$ | TOTAL |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| BOY Gross Telecom Plant in Service <br> (TPIS) | $13,496,895$ | $13,392,504$ | $13,689,509$ | $13,973,021$ |  |
| Gross Plant Additions | 80,373 | 428,559 | 301,398 | 261,783 | $1,072,113$ |
| Retirements | 190 | $(135,489)$ | $(19,406)$ | $(33,199)$ | $(188,284)$ |
| Transfers/Adjustments | $(164,574)$ | 3,934 | 1,521 | 1,800 | $(157,319)$ |
| EOY Gross Telecom Plant in Service | $13,392,504$ | $13,689,508$ | $13,973,022$ | $14,203,405$ |  |
| Annual TPIS depreciation accruals <br> (acct 6561) | 316,101 | 428,639 | 534,449 | 466,099 | $1,745,288$ |
| Cumulative depreciation reserve | $11,229,881$ | $11,229,881$ | $12,116,741$ | $12,560,117$ |  |
| Net EOY TPIS | $2,162,623$ | $2,459,627$ | $1,856,281$ | $1,643,288$ |  |
| Net/Gross TPIS | $16.15 \%$ | $17.07 \%$ | $13.28 \%$ | $11.57 \%$ |  |
| Change in Net Telecommunications Plant in Service since FTR takeover | $(469,557)$ |  |  |  |  |
| Change in Net Telecommunications Plant in Service since Network Exam Phase 1 | $(816,339)$ |  |  |  |  |

NOTE: In response to a Communications Division data request, Frontier prepared Forms 43-02 for 2016 and 2017 that included both the former GTE and former Continental study areas. The figures shown here for 2016 and 2017 thus include both the GTE and Contel results. The accounting treatment that Frontier had adopted reflects the pre-acquisition condition of Frontier's books as of January 1, 2016. The TPIS from Verizon California that was transferred to Frontier on April 1, 2016 had been included in the 2016 "Transfer/Adjustment" on Frontier's 2016 Form 43-02. As submitted, Frontier had reported the beginning-of-year 2016 amount for TPIS as 0 and showed a positive adjustment of $\$ 13,332,321$. For consistency, the BOY TPIS for 2016 is shown on this Table is the EOY 2015 amount as carried on Verizon California's books, and the 2016 "Adjustment" has been modified to reflect only the net adjustment to TPIS, a negative $\$ 164,574$. The "Change in Net TPIS Since FTR takeover" is calculated relative to Verizon California's EOY 2015 Net TPIS of \$ 2,112,845.

Verizon/Frontier California's Gross Telecommunications Plant in Service ("TPIS") increased over the 2016-2019 period. Total Gross Plant Additions - $\$ 1.07$-billion - were exceeded by the total depreciation accruals taken over the corresponding period - \$1.75-billion - which, together with a negative $\$ 157$-million in net Transfers and Adjustments, resulted in a net disinvestment (change in net TPIS) of a negative $\$ 469.5$-million. In fact, in the two years following the time period of Phase 1 of this Network Examination, Frontier-California's net TPIS decreased from \$2.46-billion at end-of-year 2017 to $\$ 1.64$-billion as of the end of 2019, a decrease of \$816million.

Since acquiring the California ILEC from Verizon in 2016, Frontier continued to invest less in Gross Plant Additions than it took in retirements and depreciation accruals, resulting in a net disinvestment of 469.5-million..

Frontier California's nominally reported revenues, expenses and net income cannot by themselves provide a complete or accurate picture of the ILEC entity's financial performance, because they do not fully account for the extensive nature and amount of inter-affiliate transactions that take place on an ongoing basis between the Frontier California ILEC entity and numerous other affiliates that are themselves, directly or indirectly, wholly owned by the parent company. These transactions involve both purchases made by the ILEC from other Frontier affiliates as well as sales made by the ILEC to other Frontier affiliates. ${ }^{75}$ Table 8.7 below provides a summary of these transactions and their relationship to Frontier California's overall revenues and operating expenses. Frontier advises that it "is not selling any services to affiliates ${ }^{176}$ and its ARMIS filings show zero revenue from such sales.

[^5]76. Frontier Response to DR 12-F-10(d).


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Table 8.7
FRONTIER CALIFORNIA
AFFILIATE TRANSACTIONS WITH OTHER FRONTIER UNITS, 2016-2019
(\$000)

|  | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Frontier California operating revenue ${ }^{77}$ | 819,948 | 2,054,287 | 1,916,501 | 1,817,555 |
| Sales to other FTR affiliates | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Pct of revenues from sales to other FTR affiliates | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% |
| FTR CA pre-tax OpEx excl depr/amort ${ }^{78}$ | 863,814 | 1,213,774 | 1,160,941 | 1,116,584 |
| Services Purchased from FTR affiliates | 394,290 | 490,169 | 488,602 | 506,213 |
| Pct of total OpEx paid to FTR affiliates | 45.65\% | 40.38\% | 42.09\% | 45.34\% |

Source: Frontier CA ARMIS Form 43-02, Table I-1, I-2, Form 43-03, as filed annually with CPUC.

With the exception of tariffed switched and special access services that were (presumably) being purchased from Frontier California by various other Frontier affiliates, the specific transfer prices at which these transactions are recorded can hardly be viewed as being set on the basis of arm's length negotiations. Since both the seller and buyer in each instance are wholly-owned by the same parent company, the nominal transfer price has little or no effect upon the parent company's bottom line. However, if it is the parent company's goal to extract cash from the ILEC entity, setting an inflated transfer price can accomplish this as effectively as making a dividend payment to the parent, but with far less exposure as to the precise purpose of the policy. As Table 8.7 demonstrates, from 2016 onward, in the range of $40 \%$ to $45 \%$ of Frontier California total operating expenses net of depreciation and amortization were paid over to other Frontier affiliates for services rendered.
77. ARMIS Form 43-02, Table I-1, for 2016-2019. Revenue and expense figures for the nine months of Frontier ownership during 2016 was derived by subtracting the Verizon account records as of the April 1, 2016 closing date, provided in response to DR 12-F-3, "Attachment 12-F-3 - Confidential Verizon provided income statement data (Frontier CA).xlsx".
78. Amounts shown are calculated as Total Operating Expenses (Form 43-03 Line 720) - Depreciation/
Amortization expenses (Form 43-03 Line 6560), which represents current cash operating expenses. The source data
for this calculation is as follows:

|  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Line 720 Total Operating Exp | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 7}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 8}$ |  |
| Line 6560 Depre/Amort | $1,704,838$ | $1,642,411$ | $1,695,390$ | $1,817,555$ |

> Because so much of Frontier California's operating expenses involved payments to other Frontier affiliates via inter-affiliate transactions, its nominally reported expenses and net income cannot by themselves provide a complete or accurate picture of the ILEC entity's financial performance.

Prior to the sale of the three CTF ILECs to Frontier, Verizon had also provided an extensive array of services to these (and to all of its other) ILECs out of centralized service affiliates and other entities. Notably, Frontier had expressly stated - to investors and in testimony before this Commission in support of its assessment as to the financial merit of the 2016 Verizon ILEC acquisition - that it had concluded that the payments allocated by the three CTF ILECs to the parent Verizon Communications, Inc. for centralized and other affiliate services were excessive and that these could be accomplished at considerably lower cost by Frontier. ${ }^{79}$

Frontier's assessment as to the economic merit of the 2016 Verizon ILEC acquisition was heavily influenced by its belief that Verizon affiliate charges for centralized services were much higher than the cost that Frontier would incur to provide comparable services to these ILECs.

## The focus of Frontier California's capital investments over the 2016-2019 period

Frontier has provided accounting data at the wire center level for the 2018-2019 Phase 2 period. Account-level gross plant additions provide an indication as as to both the type and geographic locations of Frontier's capital spending in California. ${ }^{80}$ Table 8.8 below summarizes the types of capital expenditures that Frontier California has made during the 2018-2019 Phase 2 study period.

[^6]80. See Frontier California Responses to CD DR 11-F-8 through 11-F-12.

| FRONTIER CALIFORNIA GROSS PLANT ADDITIONS 2018-2019 BY PLANT ACCOUNT |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Account | Description | 2018 | 2019 | TOTAL |
| 2116 | Tools and Other Work Equipment | 224,934 | 47,939 | 272,873 |
| 2121 | Buildings. | 10,763,182 | 3,152,049 | 13,915,231 |
| 2124 | General purpose computers. | 9,237 | 95,602 | 104,839 |
| 2212 | Digital electronic switching. | 2,231,119 | 4,801,573 | 7,032,691 |
| 2231 | Radio systems. | 19,239 |  | 19,239 |
| 2232 | Circuit equipment. | 43,384,030 | 31,218,537 | 74,602,568 |
| 2362 | Other terminal equipment. | 12,748,829 | 6,577,281 | 19,326,111 |
| 2411 | Poles. | 68,354,060 | 74,805,934 | 143,159,993 |
| 2421 | Aerial cable. | 33,084,879 | 30,325,783 | 63,410,662 |
| 2422 | Underground cable. | 37,897,251 | 39,655,345 | 77,552,596 |
| 2423 | Buried cable. | 85,072,885 | 60,635,943 | 145,708,827 |
| 2426 | Intrabuilding network cable. |  | 391,545 | 391,545 |
| 2441 | Conduit systems. | 7,175,708 | 9,670,698 | 16,846,406 |
| 2681 | Capital leases. | 432,764 |  | 432,764 |
| 2712 | NON-REG INTERNET EQUIPMENT |  | 102,916 | 102,916 |
| 2732 | NON-REG INTERNET EQUIPMENT | 46,755 | 8,828 | 55,583 |
| 2744 | NON-REG INTERNET EQUIPMENT | 238,519 |  | 238,519 |
| 2745 | NON-REG INTERNET EQUIPMENT | 38,142 | 586,083 | 624,224 |
| 2746 | NON-REG INTERNET EQUIPMENT | 10,662 | 36,603 | 47,265 |
| 2792 | NON-REG INTERNET EQUIPMENT | 370,054 |  | 370,054 |
|  | TOTAL ALL ACCOUNTS | 302,102,248 | 262,112,658 | 564,214,905 |
|  | TOTAL REG ACCOUNTS | 301,398,116 | 261,378,229 | 562,776,345 |
|  | CENTRAL OFFICE PLANT | 45,634,388 | 36,020,110 | 81,654,498 |
|  | OUTSIDE PLANT | 231,584,781 | 215,485,247 | 447,070,029 |
|  | OTHER REGULATORY PLANT | 24,178,946 | 9,872,871 | 34,051,818 |
|  | TOTAL NON-REG ACCOUNTS | 704,132 | 734,429 | 1,438,561 |
|  | \% NON-REG | 0.23\% | 0.28\% | 0.25\% |

Frontier has provided annual data for 2016 through 2019 by account and by wire center in response to DR-03F, DR-04F and, for 2018-2019, in its response to DR 11F. Frontier was also asked to provide annual 2018-2019 data on construction and rehabilitation expenditures for outside plant and for central office plant.

Overall, Frontier California (both the former GTE California and Continental Telephone components) made gross plant additions totaling \$946.9-million over the 45 months from April 2016 (when Frontier acquired the company) through December 2019. As shown in Table 8.9 below, \$176.3-million was spent on central office equipment (COE) (including both switches and circuit equipment), and $\$ 717.8$-million was spend on outside plant (OSP).

|  |  | Table 8.9 |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | RIBUTION | NTIER CAL OF GROSS 2016-201 | RNIA <br> ANT ADDI |  |  |
|  | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | TOTAL |
| Gross Plant Additions | 60,503,799 | 323,586,362 | 301,398,116 | 261,378,229 | 946,866,506 |
| COE | 16,910,928 | 77,728,183 | 45,634,388 | 36,020,110 | 176,293,609 |
| OSP | 41,953,891 | 228,765,798 | 231,584,781 | 215,485,247 | 717,789,717 |
| Other | 1,638,980 | 17,092,381 | 24,178,947 | 9,872,872 | 52,783,180 |
| Source: Frontier Response to DR-03F. The COE and OSP categories combined are slightly less than the total gross additions, which also include several minor asset categories. |  |  |  |  |  |

Since taking over the Company in April 2016, Frontier has directed some $75.8 \%$ of total gross additions toward outside plant, with another $18.6 \%$ gong to central office equipment. Focusing specifically upon 2018-2019, Frontier has provided account level plant additions by wire center, as well as Forms 43-02 for those same years.

Frontier's 2018-19 plant additions were spread across 247 wire centers, and ranged in magnitude from a few thousand dollars to $\$ 52.6$-million. However, roughly $63.8 \%$ of the total 4 year spend was directed toward only 30 individual wire centers, as summarized in Table 8.10.

Tables 8.11 and 8.12 provide more details on Frontier California's capital spending by individual wire center and by plant accout. Table 8.11 provides this data for each of Frontier's 247 California wire centers, sorted alphabetically by wire center name. Table 8.12 provides the same data, sorted by total gross plant addition spending, from highest to lowest.

| FRONTIER CALIFORNIA <br> GROSS PLANT ADDITIONS 30 WIRE CENTERS WITH LARGEST SPEND 2018-2018 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Wire Center | Gross Plant Additions | Pct of Total |
| ANZA | 52,653,317 | 9.33\% |
| TORRANCE | 49,517,144 | 8.78\% |
| SAN BERNARDINO | 47,793,287 | 8.47\% |
| LA VERNE | 44,244,163 | 7.84\% |
| MALIBU | 29,632,161 | 5.25\% |
| LONG BEACH | 11,624,434 | 2.06\% |
| ADELANTO | 10,092,536 | 1.79\% |
| LA PUENTE | 9,158,605 | 1.62\% |
| ONTARIO | 8,921,361 | 1.58\% |
| WHITTIER | 8,824,810 | 1.56\% |
| Huntington Beach | 7,169,619 | 1.27\% |
| WESTMINSTER | 6,858,353 | 1.22\% |
| HESPERIA | 5,546,481 | 0.98\% |
| LANCASTER | 5,081,545 | 0.90\% |
| WILLOW CREEK | 4,911,000 | 0.87\% |
| Santa Monica | 4,600,613 | 0.82\% |
| VICTORVILLE | 4,536,395 | 0.80\% |
| BIG BEAR LAKE | 4,380,012 | 0.78\% |
| COVINA | 4,310,449 | 0.76\% |
| APPLE VALLEY | 4,210,201 | 0.75\% |
| SANTA BARBARA | 4,152,509 | 0.74\% |
| HEMET | 3,987,089 | 0.71\% |
| NOVATO | 3,926,776 | 0.70\% |
| REDLANDS | 3,849,081 | 0.68\% |
| PERRIS | 3,791,804 | 0.67\% |
| NORWALK | 3,586,445 | 0.64\% |
| DOWNEY | 3,262,674 | 0.58\% |
| SANTA MARIA | 3,090,196 | 0.55\% |
| PALM SPRINGS | $3,031,956$ | 0.54\% |
| INDIO | 3,018,409 | 0.53\% |
| Total -- Highest 30 wire centers | 359,763,423 | 63.76\% |
| Total Gross plant additions | 564,214,905 | 100.00\% |


|  | $\qquad$ $\qquad$ $\qquad$ $\qquad$ <br>  $\qquad$ <br>  <br>  <br>  <br>  <br>  <br>  $\qquad$ <br>  $\qquad$ <br>  $\qquad$ <br>  <br>  |
| :---: | :---: |







## Maintenance and rehabilitation expenses 2018-19

In CD Data Request 11-F-13, Frontier California was asked to "provide the Operating Expense charges as recorded on each of the following USOA expense accounts separately for each central office building and its associated wire center serving area, for each of the six-month periods between January 1, 2018 and December 31, 2019 ..." Frontier provided only summary, company-wide amounts, but has not provided this information "accounts separately for each central office building and its associated wire center serving area." The response also provided a breakdown of expenses as between regulated and non-regulated services. Table 8.13 below, which was prepared based upon data provided by Frontier California in response to DR 11-F-13, summarizes the information that was provided. Over the 2018-2019 period, Frontier California incurred a total of $\$ 1.02$-billion in central office and outside plant operating costs. Of this amount, approximately $\$ 904.5$-million, about $88.42 \%$, was spent in support of regulated services, while the remaining $\$ 118.5$-million, roughly $11.58 \%$, was spent in support of nonregulated services.

Frontier California also provided operating expenses incurred in support of non-regulated services in its response to DR 12-F-5, which is summarized on Table 8.15. Table 8.14 is limited to outside plant expense accounts, whereas Table 8.13 includes central office expense accounts as well. Overall, both of these table put nonregulated operating expenses in the range of $11 \%$ of total OpEx.

Table 8.15, on the other hand, provides a breakdown of regulated and non-regulated revenues and operating expenses as provided by Frontier California in response to DR 5F-12. The Table includes a number of expense accounts in the 9XXX series that, when aggregated and compared with the total of regulated services expense accounts 6 XXX series) produce a considerably higher non-regulated expense component overall. Table 8.15 also provides total and nonregulated revenues. The table provides calculations of the percentages of total revenues and total costs that are associated with non-regulated services; overall, these percentages, while not exactly the same for both revenues and expenses, are fairly close when viewed for each of the four years.


;

| Table 8.14 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| FRONTIER CALIFORNIA OUTSIDE PLANT MAINTENANCE EXPENSES 2016-2019 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Account Description | 2016 | 2016 | 2018 | 2019 | 2018-18 TOTAL | TOTAL |
| REGULATED SERVICES OUTSIDE PLANT MAINTENANCE EXPENSES |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6421 Aerial Cable | 29,009,338 | 43,123,060 | 39,024,617 | 41,793,600 | 80,818,217 | 152,950,615 |
| 6422 Underground Cable | 11,791,084 | 13,010,315 | 15,878,145 | 16,054,392 | 31,932,537 | 56,733,936 |
| 6423 Buried Cable | 33,389,710 | 46,177,738 | 49,876,817 | 51,692,489 | 101,569,305 | 181,136,753 |
| 6424 Submarine Cable | 8,312 | 155,066 | 92,418 | 116,993 | 209,411 | 372,789 |
| 6426 Intrabuilding Network | 100,656 | $(15,829)$ | 9,719 | 581 | 10,300 | 95,127 |
| 6431 Aerial Wire | 1,638,866 | 2,802,085 | 757,981 | 213,737 | 971,717 | 5,412,668 |
| 6441 Conduit | 345,625 | 366,839 | 370,984 | 963,301 | 1,334,285 | 2,046,749 |
| TOTAL REGULATED SERVICES EXPENSE | 76,283,591 | 105,619,274 | 106,010,680 | 110,835,092 | 216,845,772 | 398,748,637 |
| NON-REGULATED SERVICES OUTSIDE PLANT MAINTENANCE EXPENSES |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9421 Aerial Cable | 5,249,955 | 4,200,725 | 6,355,782 | 7,146,025 | 13,501,807 | 22,952,487 |
| 9423 Buried Cable | 6,624,484 | 4,579,832 | 6,288,366 | 7,067,534 | 13,355,900 | 24,560,216 |
| TOTAL NON-REGULATED SERVICES EXPENSE | 11,874,439 | 8,780,557 | 12,644,148 | 14,213,559 | 26,857,707 | 47,512,703 |
| TOTAL ALL OUTSIDE PLANT MAINTENANCE COST PERCENT NON-REGULATED | 88,158,030 | 114,399,831 | 118,654,828 | 125,048,651 | 243,703,479 | 446,261,340 |
|  | 13.47\% | 7.68\% | 10.66\% | 11.37\% | 11.02\% | 10.65\% |



## GO 133-D §9.7 Alternative Investments

As we discussed in our Phase 1 Report, in August 2016, the Commission issued a revised GO 133-D that imposes financial penalties upon ILECs that persistently fail to meet minimal POTS service quality standards. GO-133-D §§9.3, 9.4 and 9.5 provide for escalating daily fines where a carrier's failure to meet the required service standards persists for an extended period of time. ${ }^{81}$ A total of $\$ 3.35$-million in fines was assessed against Frontier California since this provision became effective. ${ }^{82} \S 9.7$ allows offending carriers the opportunity to submit an "Alternative Proposal for Mandatory Corrective Action" whereby carriers can avoid the fine by agreeing to invest an amount of at least double the fine if such an investment will be effective in remedying the service problem for which the fine had been imposed. This "alternative" opportunity is initiated by the carrier by submitting "a request to suspend the fine." Under this provision,
... carriers may propose, in their annual fine filing, to invest no less than twice the amount of their annual fine in a project (s) which improves service quality in a measurable way within 2 years. The proposal must demonstrate that 1) twice the amount of the fine is being spent, 2) the project ( s ) is an incremental expenditure with supporting financials (e.g. expenditure is in excess of the existing construction budget and/or staffing base), 3) the project (s) is designed to address a service quality deficiency and, 4) upon the project (s) completion, the carrier shall demonstrate the results for the purpose proposed. ${ }^{83}$

Carriers can avoid fines either by meeting the GO-133-D §3 performance standards or by investing in network upgrades that will result in improved service quality overall. These investments must, however, be directed specifically at services that fall within the scope of GO 133-D, i.e., legacy circuit-switched voice lines. Frontier California has sought approval of alternative proposals for mandatory corrective action under § 9.7 in lieu of paying the assessed fines in 2017, 2018 and 2019. ${ }^{84}$ The company's "alternative investment" proposals for 2017 and 2018 amounted to $\$ 4.14$-million, in liew of paying $\$ 2.07$-million in fines for the two years. The Commission approved these requests for 2017 and 2018. For 2019, Frontier calculated its fine at $\$ 1.28$-million and sought CPUC approval for its "alternative investment" proposal amounting to \$2.56-million. However, CD staff recommended that the Commission deny Frontier's "alternative investment" proposal:

[^7]This, however, is not the first time that Frontier CA has proposed a corrective action plan, pursuant to Section 9.7, in lieu of paying fines for failure to comply with the Commission's service quality standards. Its past corrective action plans have thus far not resulted in sustained improvement in its service quality performance, as demonstrated by Frontier CA's need to file this advice letter, which is its third consecutive Section 9.7 corrective action plan. As a result, it is unclear to Staff whether the project Frontier CA describes in its AL 12828 proposed corrective action plan would result in the necessary sustained performance results that are consistent with the Commission's long-term goals for service quality. ${ }^{85}$

CD has been tracking the effectiveness of such "alternative investments" in improving service quality and, in Frontier's case, has found them wanting.

As background, from April 2016 (when Frontier CA acquired Verizon California) through the 4th Quarter of 2019, Frontier CA has repeatedly failed to meet the minimum Out of Service Repair Interval and Answer Time standards. For those past years, Frontier CA similarly proposed Section 9.7 corrective action plans in lieu of paying fines for its sub-standard service quality performance and non-compliance with the GO 133-D minimum standards in years 2017 and 2018, which CD approved in November 201813 and May 2019, respectively. Despite proposing to spend a total of $\$ 4,849,913$ in those two previous GO 133-D corrective action plans, Frontier CA did not demonstrate significant improvement in its Out of Service Repair Interval standard through December 2019. Considering Frontier CA's past unsuccessful performances with its corrective action plans, CD found it unreasonable to similarly approve Frontier CA's third consecutive Section 9.6 corrective action plan proposed in AL 12828. ${ }^{86}$

As we noted above, during 2018-2019, Frontier California invested \$562.8-million in Gross Plant Additions, primarily in central office equipment ( $\$ 301.4$-million) and outside plant ( $\$ 261.4$-million). Had it simply paid the fine, Frontier would have been out $\$ 2.07$-million. That extra $\$ 2.07$-million that Frontier had offered to invest (over and above the $\$ 2.07$-million it would have paid anyway) amounts to less that 0.37\$ of Frontier's total 2018-2019 plant additions - a truly de minimis sum, little more than a rounding error. There is no indication that, absent its acceptance of the $\S 9.7$ Alternative Investments option, the same total amount would not have been invested anyway. In our Phase 1 Report, we had concluded that the GO 133-D fines were insufficient to offer a financial inducement for ILEC compliance with the Commission's service quality minimum performance standards because the cost of the fine represented a minuscule fraction of the cost that the ILEC would need to incur to improve its service quality. We reiterate that observation here, as well as our recommendation that the level of these fines be significantly increased. We certainly concur with the Staff's recommendation and the
85. Draft Resolution T-17724, at 4.
86. Id., citations omitted.

Commission’s March 4, 2021 ruling that Frontier's $\S 9.7$ Alternative Investment proposal for 2019 be denied. ${ }^{87}$

## Summary and conclusions

Frontier California represents a major component of its new parent, Frontier Communications Corp. But with the parent company's financial condition at a crisis stage, Frontier California's financial condition and investment policies will be dictated by conditions that are largely beyond the CPUC's control. The California ILEC entity has virtually no ability to raise equity or debt capital on its own. If the parent company successfully emerges from bankruptcy, its ability to raise capital may improve, and at this point that is speculative at best

Since taking over the company in 2016, Frontier has made gross infrastructure investments totalling some $\$ 946$-million, the vast majority of which ( $\$ 718$-million) have been directed toward new outside plant. Although only a relatively small portion of that investment has been identified officially as supporting "non-regulated" services, it seems highly likely that the bulk of these projects have involved extending fiber optic distribution facilities to individual customer premises primarily to facilitate deployment of high-speed broadband Internet access and video services. While such undertakings also have the potential to improve the reliability of basic voice telephone service, such outlays could not be economically justified for that alone. Indeed, Frontier did not even offer standalone VoIP telephone services to customers who do not also take broadband Internet access before July 2019, and does not track the number of such customers: "The number of interconnected VoIP subscriptions on a standalone basis is not tracked and Frontier is investigating whether this data is available. ${ }^{88}$ For those customers who continue to take legacy basic voice telephone services, such investments have limited benefit. As we noted in Chapter 4F above, with respect to such legacy services, Frontier California has seen deterioration in almost all of the GO 133 service quality metrics in most of the company's wire centers over the 2018-2019 period. With Frontier having invested nearly a billion dollars in California since acquiring the company, this is not the outcome that one would expect to see.
87. CPUC Resolution T-17731, issued March 4, 2021.
88. Frontier response to CD DR 13-F-03(d).


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[^0]:    58. "Frontier Communications to Acquire Verizon's Wireline Operations in California, Florida and Texas, Doubling Frontier’s Size and Driving Shareholder Value," Press Release, February 5, 2015 http://investor.frontier.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID $=895055$ [accessed on July 15, 2015].
[^1]:    61. Frontier 2016 Annual Report and Proxy Statement, at p. F-11.
    62. Frontier 2016 Annual Report, at F-15.
    63. Frontier California 2016 ARMIS Form 43-02, at Table B-1.
    64. Frontier California 2017 ARMIS Form 43-02, at Table B-1.
    65. Frontier California 2019 ARMIS Form 43-02, at Table B-1.
    66. Id.
    67. Id., at F-5.
    68. Frontier 2019 Form 10-K, at F-5.
[^2]:    72. Moody's Investors Service, November 2nd, 2017: "Moody's downgrades Frontier to B3, outlook remains negative."
[^3]:    73. I/M/O Joint Application of Frontier Communications Corporation, Frontier Communications of America, Inc. (U 5429 C), Verizon California Inc. (U 1002 C), Verizon Long Distance, LLC (U 5732 C, and Newco West Holdings LLC for Approval of Transfer of Control Over Verizon California Inc. and Related Approval of Transfer of Assets and Certifications, A.15-03-005, filed March 18, 2015, Exhibit 1.
[^4]:    74. PU Code $\S 871.5(\mathrm{a})$ caps LifeLine rates at one-half of the 1 FR rate for flat-rate basic residential service.
[^5]:    75. See Frontier California's response to CD DR 12-F-10. Frontier states that it """ Response to CD DR 12-F10(d).
[^6]:    79. I/M/O Joint Application of Frontier Communications Corporation, Frontier Communications of America, Inc. (U5429C), Verizon California, Inc. (U1002C), Verizon Long Distance LLC (U5732C), and Newco West Holdings LLC for Approval of Transfer of Control Over Verizon California, Inc. and Related Approval of Transfer of Assets and Certifications, A.15-03-005, Direct Testimony of John M. Jureller, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, Frontier Communications Corporation, May 11, 2015, at 30 ("The Company estimates $\$ 700$ million in annualized corporate consolidated cost efficiencies for the pro forma combined company primarily through costs that do not transfer to Frontier at the closing of the transaction."), 25 ("While noting that [Standard \& Poor's] eventual rating will depend on the specific funding for the Transaction, the agency explained that its current ratings affirmation reflects a view that 'the acquisition offers some business benefits and significant potential cost synergies' arising to a great extent from avoided expenses previously allocated by Verizon to the acquired assets.'). Citations omitted.
[^7]:    81. D.16-08-021 (R.11-12-001), Adopted Aug. 18, 2016; Effective Aug. 18, 2016; Except Section 9 on fines, which is effective Jan. 1, 2017.
    82. CPUC Resolution T-17631, issued November 8, 2018; CPUC Resolution T-17652, issued May 30, 2019; CPUC Resolution T-17731, issued March 4, 2021.
    83. GO 133-D, §9.7.
    84. See Resolutions T-17631, Resolution T-17652, Resolution T-17731.
