Docket:<br>: R.22-07-005<br>Exhibit Number : Cal Advocates-01-E<br>Commissioner : Alice Reynolds<br>Admin. Law Judge : Stephanie Wang<br>Public Advocates Office<br>: Nathan Chau/Otto Nichols

PUBLIC ADVOCATES OFFICE
California Public Utilities Commission

# Errata On Prepared Testimony <br> On <br> Rulemaking to Advance Demand Flexibility <br> Through Electric Rates Income Graduated Fixed Charge Rate Design 

## REDLINE VERSION

San Francisco, California
April 7, 2023 May 1, 2023

## Errata Note

This is Public Advocates Office's amended testimony that responds to the updated E3 tool. The redline version of errata shows all changes. All edits in red are made in response to the E3 tool updates. All edits in blue are errata. Website links shown in blue are not errata.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
CHAPTER 1 INCOME GRADUATED FIXED RATE DESIGN ..... 1-1
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS. ..... 1-1
II. DISCUSSION OF RECOMMENDATIONS ..... 1-3
A. Retail Rates Increased At A Rate Far Outpacing Inflation Over The Last Decade And This Trajectory Is Expected To Continue. ..... 1-3
B. Collecting costs entirely in volumetric rates hinders vital electrification efforts ..... 1-6
C. Cal Advocates' IGFC Proposal ..... 1-7

1. Fixed charges should, at minimum, collect the cost of grid connection. ..... 1-8
2. Fixed charges should collect non-bypassable charges ..... 1-10
3. Cal Advocates' proposal of three income brackets and flatter differentiation of fixed charges between income brackets will facilitate implementation of IGFCs and ease rate pressures for the most vulnerable customers. ..... 1-12
a. The first income bracket of less than $\$ 50,000 /$ customer/year sufficiently captures the most vulnerable Californians. ..... 1-12
b. The determination of income thresholds for Brackets 2 and 3 considers consistency between IOUs and potential initial income verification challenges. ..... 1-14
D. Bill impacts. ..... 1-17
E. Reallocation of the California Climate Credit to offset low-income customers' fixed charge will provide rate relief for the most vulnerable customers. ..... 1-23
F. Any fixed charge proposal adopted in this proceeding must be applied to all residential rates. ..... 1-24
G. Fixed charge over/undercollections should be allocated volumetrically. 1-24
Appendix A. 1 - Inputs and Outputs
Appendix A. 2 - Tiered Rates Heat Maps
Appendix A. 3 - EV Rates Heat Maps
Appendix A. 4 - Electrification Rates Heat Maps
Appendix B - Witness Statement of Qualifications

# CHAPTER 1 INCOME GRADUATED FIXED RATE DESIGN 

(Witnesses: Nathan Chau and Otto Nichols)

## I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter provides the Public Advocates Office at the California Public
Utilities Commission's (Cal Advocates) recommendations for Phase 1, Track A of the Demand Flexibility Rulemaking on income graduated fixed charge (IGFC) design. Cal Advocates proposes an IGFC framework that promotes affordability and encourages electrification by reducing volumetric rates, provides additional bill discounts for lowincome customers, and recovers the electric utility's cost to serve in a more equitable manner than current rates. Absent an IGFC, persistently high volumetric rates will continue to exacerbate affordability issues over time and discourage electrification. $\mathbf{1}$

Electricity rates have become increasingly less affordable for all households in California. Utility bills increasingly erode what little disposable income low- income customers have, making them particularly vulnerable to these trends. Even small movements in income and housing costs can have an outsized impact on a household's ability to pay for electric service when disposable income levels are low. $\mathbf{\underline { 2 }}$

High volumetric rates also hinder California's ability to meet greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction goals. If volumetric electricity rates are too high, the customer may not realize fuel cost savings when switching from fossil fuels like natural gas and gasoline to electricity. Achievement of California's GHG reduction goals increasingly require more

[^0]electricity consumption via building electrification and electric vehicle (EV) adoption. It is imperative that the Commission takes steps to reduce volumetric rates. IGFCs can reduce volumetric rates in a manner that eases affordability pressures on low-income customers and improve access to electrification, when done correctly.

Cal Advocates recommends the Commission adopt an IGFC based on Cal Advocates' proposed structure presented in Table 1 for all residential default and optional rate schedules. This structure consists of progressively higher fixed charges across three identical income brackets for California Alternative Rates for Energy (CARE) and nonCARE residential customers. The differentials (i.e., the difference in fixed charge levels between income brackets) are set higher between the second (i.e., customers making between $\$ 50,000 /$ year and $\$ 100,000 / \mathrm{year}$ ) and first (i.e., customers making less than $\$ 50,000 /$ year) income brackets to provide more reductions to low-income customers whereas the differential is set lower between the third (i.e., customers making more than $\$ 100,000 /$ year ) and second brackets to facilitate implementation of the IGFC. Cal Advocates estimates that this proposal will reduce overall volumetric rates by $16 \%-22 \%$ depending on the investor-owned utility (IOU) compared to the same rate absent such a fixed charge. ${ }^{3}$

Finally, to mitigate impacts on low-income customers, Cal Advocates also proposes to redeploy the California Climate Credit (CCC) to offset fixed charges to the greatest extent possible for customers in the first income bracket. This is discussed in more detail in section II.E.

[^1]| CARE | Income Bracket | Annual Income | Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG\&E) | Southern <br> California <br> Edison <br> Company (SCE) | San Diego Gas \& Electric Company (SDG\&E) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| NonCARE | 1 | < \$50,000 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \$ 0.00 \\ & (\$ 22.79 \end{aligned}$ <br> without the CCC) | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 0.00 \\ & (\$ 21.82 \text { without } \\ & \text { the } C C C) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 0.00 \\ & (\$ 26.70 \$ 26.49 \\ & \text { without the } \\ & \text { CCC }) \end{aligned}$ |
|  | 2 | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 50,000- \\ & \$ 100,000 \end{aligned}$ | \$31.91 | \$30.55 | \$36.42 \$37.09 |
|  | 3 | $\begin{aligned} & > \\ & \$ 100,000 \end{aligned}$ | \$36.69 | \$35.14 | \$41.88 \$42.66 |
| CARE | 1 | < \$50,000 | \$0.00 <br> (\$10.20 <br> without the CCC) | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 0.00 \\ & (\$ 10.83 \text { without } \\ & \text { the } C C C) \end{aligned}$ | $\$ 0.00$ <br> ( $\$ 13.70$ without the CCC) |
|  | 2 | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 50,000- \\ & \$ 100,000 \end{aligned}$ | \$14.27 | \$15.17 | \$19.18 |
|  | 3 | $\begin{aligned} & > \\ & \$ 100,000 \end{aligned}$ | \$16.41 | \$17.44 | \$22.06 |

Table 1: Cal Advocates' Proposed Income-Based Fixed Charge Utilizing the California Climate Credit

## II. DISCUSSION OF RECOMMENDATIONS

## A. Retail rates increased at a rate far outpacing inflation over the

 last decade and this trajectory is expected to continue.Between January 2009 and January 2023, average residential rates have outpaced inflation over the same period. Over this period, residential average rates for PG\&E, SCE, and SDG\&E have increased by $95 \%, 107 \%$, and $137 \%$ respectively, with no sign of slowing down, whereas inflation only increased by $42 \%$. $\frac{4}{}$ In fact, the Commission's sponsored whitepaper, "Utility Costs and Affordability of The Grid of The Future" (the

[^2]Whitepaper) predicts that rates will continue to increase between $3.5 \%$ and $4.7 \%$ annually over this decade. $\underline{5}$ The Whitepaper posits that the growth in rates can be largely attributed to increases in capital additions driven by rising investments in transmission by PG\&E and distribution by SCE and SDG\&E. Further causes of rapidly increasing electric rates include the major financial commitments utilities have made for wildfire mitigation and transportation electrification. ${ }^{\mathbf{6}}$

The increases in overall residential average rates even in just over the last 5 years is staggering. Since 2017, the average residential rate for California's IOUs have increased by $7 \%-9 \%$ annually. .

Moreover, the latest data shows that forecasted rate increases are underestimated. In 2023, rates for PG\&E, SCE and SDG\&E are already at the levels the Whitepaper forecasted for 2028, 2030, and 2029 respectively. $\underline{8}$

[^3]Figure 1: Change in Residential Average Rates Compared to Inflation - All IOUs


In the foreseeable future, electric rates are expected to continue increasing. Simplistically, average electric rates are calculated by dividing the revenue requirement ${ }^{-}$ by electric sales. In the average rate calculation, the revenue requirement is expected to increase, because utility fixed costs increase over time, while the sales base over which these increasing costs are recovered have either remained stagnant or are steadily decreasing. The combined effect of increasing revenue requirements and decreasing sales exacerbates upward rate pressures resulting in the equity concerns Cal Advocates proposes to mitigate with an IGFC. Furthermore, low-income customers, who are the most harmed by increasing rates and are financially unable to install rooftop solar or distributed energy resources (DERs) to lessen the burden, are forced to endure the continuously increasing utility rates. Pricing reform via an IGFC that better aligns cost

[^4]recovery with cost causation will provide much needed rate relief to the most financially vulnerable customers. The bill impacts of Cal Advocates' IGFC on low-income customers are discussed in further detail in section II.D.

## B. Collecting costs entirely in volumetric rates hinders vital electrification efforts.

High volumetric electricity rates pose challenges to achieving California's aggressive GHG reduction targets. To promote California's decarbonization goals, it will be necessary to encourage customers to switch from carbon-intensive fuels to electric devices which have a lower GHG intensity, especially as electricity production becomes increasingly supplied by renewable energy.

Widespread transportation electrification is crucial to reduce emissions of statewide GHGs "to 40 percent below 1990 levels by 2030 and to 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050." ${ }^{10}$ As part of these goals, the state has set a target of five million zero emission vehicles on the road in California by 2030.11 Widespread transportation electrification requires electrical corporations to increase access to the use of electricity as a fuel. $\underline{12}$

But as the cost of electricity increases relative to the price of natural gas and gasoline, the financial incentive to adopt electrification becomes less favorable. For the widespread adoption required to reach the State's climate goals, at a minimum, volumetric electricity rates need to remain low to reduce the costs of electrification. A 2018 survey of diverse stakeholders in the commercial EV sector conducted by the

[^5]Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) found that the overall level of electric rates for fueling will be a key factor in commercial customers' EV adoption decisions over the next decade: "A common viewpoint was that when there is parity cost of vehicle, energy cost and operating/maintenance cost, electric rates will be a key determinant of long term EV viability." $\underline{13}$ Additionally, at the Commission's February 24, 2021 "En Banc on Energy Rates and Costs," David Rapson, Director of the Davis Energy Economic Program at the University of California, Davis, presented that "[e]ach $\$ 0.10 / \mathrm{kWh}$ increase in electricity prices [results in a] 15\% decrease in EV demand" (in terms of EV miles driven). $\underline{14}^{\mathbf{4}}$ Thus, lower volumetric rates produced by IGFCs are crucial in achieving GHG reductions via electrification adoption.

## C. Cal Advocates' IGFC Proposal

Cal Advocates' income-based approach will provide bill reduction benefits to customers in the lowest income bracket when combined with Cal Advocates' proposal to offset fixed charges for these customers with a reallocation of the CA climate credit. This will allow customers who are not enrolled or eligible for CARE to benefit from the proposal. Additionally, CARE customers will receive a lower fixed charge across each income bracket compared to non-CARE customers.

As shown in Table 4, Cal Advocates proposes that fixed charges collect between \$27-\$35 from all residential customers in a progressive manner spanning three income brackets. In terms of overall size, it is also comparable to other electrical existing fixed charges in California. $\underline{15}$ The fixed charge amounts are collected across three income

[^6]brackets for each IOU with a differential of $40 \%$ between the second and first (middle and lowest) income brackets and a differential of $15 \%$ between the third and second (highest and middle) income brackets. Across the entire ratepayer population for each IOU, these fixed charges will collect an amount that roughly covers the cost of grid access and non-bypassable charges. $\mathbf{1 6}$ Because these costs do not vary depending on a customer's usage, they should be recovered through the IGFC instead of volumetric rates. This method of cost recovery will provide more accurate price signals by reflecting true cost of service and provide rate relief for lower income customers.

## 1. Fixed charges should, at minimum, collect the cost of grid connection.

Cal Advocate's proposed fixed charge is designed to collect the cost of grid access. The cost of grid access is captured by marginal customer access costs (MCAC) which are typically modelled in a utility's General Rate Case Phase 2 (GRC 2) proceeding where marginal costs are developed to inform rate design and revenue allocation decisions. 17 MCAC represent the incremental cost of providing grid access to customers including ongoing costs associated with billing and customer services along with capital costs associated with physical connection equipment like meters, service drops and final line transformers (also known as hook up equipment). Since these costs have little correlation with kWh usage, they are more appropriately recovered in fixed charges.

Cal Advocates also proposes to scale MCAC by its equal percent marginal cost (EPMC) scaler. The EPMC scaler is used to bridge the numerical gap between marginal costs and the utilities' revenue requirement. It is derived by taking the revenue

[^7]requirement divided by the marginal cost revenues (revenues that would result if the IOU were to charge its services at marginal costs only). The most recent PG\&E 2020 GRC 2 ruled that any prior restrictions concerning the use of the EPMC scaler for determining a fixed charge is no longer binding. 18

Inclusion of this EPMC scaler will also increase the reductions to volumetric rates from the IGFC and provide greater benefit to lower income customers under Cal Advocates' proposal. Table 2 shows the MCAC values used to construct Cal Advocates' IGFC. The EPMC scaler is used to determine the non-marginal distribution costs (i.e. EPMC-scaled MCAC) based on the share of total marginal cost revenues comprised by the MCAC revenues in the public Energy+Environmental Economics (E3) IGFC tool.19 For example, if PG\&E's MCAC revenues make up $32.5 \%$ of total marginal distribution revenues, then $32.5 \%$ of non-marginal distribution revenues would be included in the average residential fixed charge amount for PG\&E. In the short-term for this IGFC proposal, Cal Advocates does not propose including all "non-marginal distribution costs ${ }^{\prime 2} \underline{\underline{0}}$ for recovery in the IGFC even if such costs may not be related to usage. In the meantime, Cal Advocates proposes including only a portion of such costs in an IGFC so that fixed charge levels are not too high for initial implementation. The Commission could consider proposals for additional non-marginal distribution costs for inclusion in an IGFC in a future proceeding.

[^8]| IOU | MCAC <br> \$/Customer/Month | EPMC-Scaled <br> MCAC <br> \$/Customer/Month |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| PGE | $\$ 7.59$ | $\$ 17.53$ |
| SCE | $\$ 7.88$ | $\$ 15.88$ |
| SDGE | $\$ 11.26$ | $\$ 24.84$ |

Table 2: MCAC Estimates by IOU ${ }^{21}$

## 2. Fixed charges should collect non-bypassable charges

Non-bypassable Charges (NBC) should be included in the implemented IGFC.
NBCs such as the public purpose program (PPP), the Wildfire Fund Charge, and the Wildfire Hardening Charge are products of policy initiatives. ${ }^{22}$ These costs are not directly correlated to a customer's decision to use more or less electricity. The PPP charge includes, among other budget items, funds for electric rate discounts to lowincome program participants, $\underline{\underline{23}}$ and technological research related to CA's energy and climate goals. ${ }^{24}$ The Wildfire Fund revenues pays liability claims submitted by victims of utility-caused wildfires. $\underline{25}$ Similarly, Wildfire Hardening costs include capital expenditures and other costs related to preventing and mitigating catastrophic wildfires. $\mathbf{}^{26}$

[^9]These costs do not directly increase nor decrease because of changes to consumption levels. Thus, including such NBCs in volumetric rates would send the wrong price signal that a customer's consumption decision influences such costs. A customer who reduces consumption for example, would avoid paying such "nonbypassable" charges despite the fact that such costs have not actually decreased as a result of the customer's reduced usage. Consequently, because this amount of cost is avoided by the reduction in consumption and no longer collected from this customer, it would need to be collected from other customers in the form of rate increases the following year. Therefore, inclusion of such charges in the IGFC would ensure that a customer would not be able to avoid such charges by reducing usage and these costs would be truly non-bypassable.

The following table converts the current non-bypassable charges to a fixed dollar per customer per month charge. Cal Advocates understands that securitized costs like those related to Wildfire Hardening may not be collected in a fixed charge under securitization agreements. 27 To the extent these terms may not be amended, Cal Advocates recommends increasing the amount of distribution costs collected in a fixed charge by an amount equal to total securitized costs. This will produce the same overall IGFC that would result if such costs were collected in a fixed charge. Securitization does not change the fact that such costs are not incurred to meet changes in demand.

[^10]Table 3: Non-Bypassable Charges Converted to Monthly Fixed Charge (\$/Customer-Month)

|  | PG\&E | SCE | SDG\&E |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Public Purpose Program | $\$ 9.13$ | $\$ 9.67$ | $\$ 8.01$ |
| Wildfire Fund | $\$ 1.05$ | $\$ 1.91$ | $\$ 1.79$ |
| Wildfire Hardening | $\$ 1.15$ | $\$ 0.32$ | $\$ 0.00$ |
| Total | $\$ 11.33$ | $\$ 11.90$ | $\$ 9.80$ |

Table 4 combines the MCAC and non-bypassable charges to form the basis for Cal Advocates' proposed fixed charges. The amounts listed in the "Total" row represent the average "cost-based" amounts to be collected from all customers.

Table 4: Proposed Average Fixed Charge (\$/Customer-Month) by IOU

| Component | PG\&E | SCE | SDG\&E |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| EPMC-Scaled MCAC | $\$ 17.53$ | $\$ 15.88$ | $\$ 24.84$ |
| Non Bypassable Charges | $\$ 11.33$ | $\$ 11.90$ | $\$ 9.80$ |
| Total | $\$ 28.86$ | $\$ 27.78$ | $\$ 34.64$ |

3. Cal Advocates' proposal of three income brackets and flatter differentiation of fixed charges between income brackets will facilitate implementation of IGFCs and ease rate pressures for the most vulnerable customers.
a. The first income bracket of less than $\$ 50,000 /$ customer/year sufficiently captures the most vulnerable Californians.
Cal Advocates proposes that the lowest income bracket (i.e., Bracket 1) captures customers with annual incomes up to $\$ 50,000$, representing about a third of the population for each of the IOUs. $\underline{28}$ The $\$ 50,000$ annual customer income threshold represents the average incomes of the most vulnerable census tracks as ranked by the CalEnviroScreen. The CalEnviroScreen ranks census tracks in different levels of vulnerability taking into consideration pollution exposure and its effects, as well as health

[^11]and socioeconomic status (e.g., household income). ${ }^{\underline{9}}$ The test combines these elements to compute a composite score representing each community's vulnerability and exposure to environmental risks, with the most impacted and vulnerable tracts receiving higher scores. Because the data relies on household income data, there is a strong positive linear correlation between household income and cumulative risks to environmental stressors, as shown in Figure 2. Based on this data, the most vulnerable census tracks (i.e., " $95 \%$ $100 \%$ highest scores" or the census tracks scoring in the top $5 \%$ ) have average annual household incomes of $\$ 43,000$. $\mathbf{3 0} \mathrm{Cal}$ Advocates considers this $95 \%-100 \%$ score a starting point on which to build income brackets for assessing the IGFC. Since the IGFC tool does not include a function to set income thresholds at $\$ 43,000, \mathrm{Cal}$ Advocates recommends a threshold of $\$ 50,000$, which is the closest available income threshold included in the public tool, to facilitate easy comparison with other party proposals based on the IGFC tool. As shown in the following chart, a low-income bracket of less than $\$ 50,000$ would include additional communities with CalEnviroScreen scores between $85 \%$ and $95 \%$.

[^12]Figure 2: Average Income By CalEnviroScreen Census Track

b. The determination of income thresholds for Brackets 2 and 3 considers consistency between IOUs and potential initial income verification challenges.

Fewer tiers and flatter differentials, like those in Cal Advocates' IGFC proposal, should make the IGFC proposal easier to implement and minimize the consequences of income verification errors during the earlier years of the IGFC roll out. These concerns are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. Cal Advocates anticipates that as the Commission and the IOUs gain more experience with implementing an IGFC, more tiers and differentiation could be introduced over time. Having more tiers and scaling in the early years could lead to revenue shortfalls if income verification is inaccurate. Further, steeper scaling between such tiers could increase the size of this undercollection if income verification errors are committed at a large enough scale.

Cal Advocates selected income thresholds for Brackets 2 and 3 (middle and highest-income brackets) with the aim of assigning the remaining customers (i.e., all customers not in Bracket 1) equally to Brackets 2 and 3 within the limitations of the IGFC tool. The second "middle-income" bracket (i.e., Bracket 2) captures customers with annual incomes between $\$ 50,000$ and $\$ 100,000$. This bracket captures between $26 \%$ and $30 \%$ of customers depending on the utility. Finally, Cal Advocates proposes a final third "high-income" bracket (i.e., Bracket 3) which captures customers with annual incomes above $\$ 100,000$, comprising approximately $38 \%-43 \%$ of all customers depending on the utility. Perfectly assigning an equal number of customers to Brackets 2 and 3 was not possible given capabilities of the IGFC tool. Specifically, the IGFC tool income increments are not narrow and numerous enough to allow for more precise development of income brackets. Finally, Cal Advocates opted to implement the same thresholds for each IOU to achieve administrative consistency.

Cal Advocates established the income brackets so that the level of fixed charges in each would collect the equivalent amount of revenue to the amount that would be collected if all customers were charged the fixed charge amounts displayed in Table 4. Cal Advocates proposes a sizeable $40 \%$ differential between the Brackets 1 and 2 (lowest and middle-income brackets) to provide lower income customers more cost savings. Additionally, a flatter $15 \%$ differential between Brackets 2 and 3 (middle and highestincome brackets) would ease administration of the IGFC. Cal Advocates anticipates technical limitations on income verification processes, particularly in the early stages of IGFC roll out. ${ }^{31}$ Given this, flatter differentiation between Brackets 2 and 3 will allow for a default of customers who do not qualify for Bracket 1 to initially default to Bracket 3 without the financial burdens that could result under higher differentiation. This process and other implementation details of the IGFC are discussed in greater detail in

[^13]Chapter 2. The fixed charge levels resulting from these criteria are presented in Table 6 below.

Table 5: Illustrative Fixed Charge with Distribution of Customers by Income Tier

| Distribution of Customers by Income Bracket |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Income Bracket | Annual Income | PG\&E | SCE | SDG\&E |  |
| 1 | $<\$ 50,000$ | $32 \%$ | $32 \%$ | $28 \%$ |  |
| 2 | $\$ 50,000-$ | $26 \%$ | $30 \%$ | $29 \%$ |  |
| 3 | $\$ 100,000$ | 20000 | $42 \%$ | $38 \%$ |  |
| $\$ 100,000$ | $43 \%$ |  |  |  |  |

Table 6: Resulting Income Graduated Fixed Charges

| CARE | Income Bracket | Annual Income | PG\&E | SCE | SDG\&E |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Non-CARE | 1 | < \$50,000 | \$22.79 | \$21.82 | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 26.70 \\ & \$ 26.49 \end{aligned}$ |
|  | 2 | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 50,000- \\ & \$ 100,000 \end{aligned}$ | \$31.91 | \$30.55 | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 36.42 \\ & \$ 37.09 \end{aligned}$ |
|  | 3 | > \$100,000 | \$36.69 | \$35.14 | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 41.88 \\ & \$ 42.66 \end{aligned}$ |
| CARE | 1 | < \$50,000 | \$10.20 | \$10.83 | \$13.70 |
|  | 2 | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 50,000- \\ & \$ 100,000 \end{aligned}$ | \$14.27 | \$15.17 | \$19.18 |
|  | 3 | > \$100,000 | \$16.41 | \$17.44 | \$22.06 |

In Table 6, the fixed charge amounts for both CARE and non-CARE customers in Bracket 1 (lowest-income) do not reflect Cal Advocates' proposal to use the CA climate credit (CCC) to offset such fixed charges, discussed further below. Thus, the amounts listed for such customers merely reflect the amounts that would apply absent such an offset. Under Cal Advocates' proposal to apply the CCC offset, such customers would still see the fixed charge amount on their bills accompanied by an additional "California Climate Credit" line item to reduce the fixed charge.

Finally, the size of the Cal Advocates' IGFCs for CARE customers are discounted to ensure compliance with Assembly Bill (AB) 205 which states that "the average effective discount determined by the Commission shall not reflect any charges for which

CARE customers are exempted, discounts to fixed charges or other rates paid by nonCARE customers." Therefore, Cal Advocates utilized the option in the IGFC model whereby the CARE exemptions are first removed prior to applying the CARE discount of 30-35\%.

## D. Bill impacts

Cal Advocates' proposal properly strikes a balance between conveying economically efficient price signals and providing low-income and high-usage customers with bill reductions, without exorbitantly high bill increases for other customers. The bill and rate impacts provided results from internal analysis (Tables 7-10) and from the IGFC tool outputs (Tables 11-12). Internal analysis uses data the IOU's have received from $3^{\text {rd }}$ party vendors and provided to Cal Advocates. The data includes population distributions on 2021 usage levels and household incomes, from a sample of 5,000 customers per IOU. The IGFC tool also uses disparate IOU provided customer usage data and Haas (UC Berkeley) provided customer counts by income bracket, all of which is also from 2021.․․ While the data Cal Advocates used for internal analysis and the input data used in the IGFC tool result in different income distributions, the internal analysis allows for additional results. These results provide a sense of the distribution of bill impacts within income groups and by usage intervals. All bill impact results use the same IGFC inputs, which are calculated from the proposed cost allocation inputs, ${ }^{33}$ and are then fed into the IGFC tool at default settings. Additionally, the IGFC tool's calculated Non-CARE and CARE IGFCs for customers making $\$ 50,000$ or less are zeroed out to account for Cal Advocates' proposed CCC offset covering income-based fixed charges for all lowincome customers ${ }^{34}$ (Table 11). This step is already assumed in bill impact results from internal analysis (Tables 7-10).

[^14]Tables 7-9 detail the bill impact distribution for the various income brackets between CARE and non-CARE customers for each of the IOUs. These tables show that Cal Advocates' proposal guarantees that all ratepayers placed in the first, and lowest, income bracket will see a decrease in monthly bills. Additionally, different subgroups (shown in the tables as CARE status and by income bracket with inputs from varying usage levels) see different bill decreases across each IOU. For example, in Table 7, 45\% of non-CARE middle-income customers (i.e., placed in Bracket 2) for PG\&E see average bill decreases from Cal Advocates' proposal, with $73 \%$ of those customers saving more than $\$ 10 /$ month. 35 Around $44 \%$ of SCE's and $48 \% 32 \%$ of SDG\&E's same group of Bracket 2 customers also see bill reductions, with $52 \%$ and $50 \% 56 \%$ of those customers, respectively, saving more than $\$ 10 /$ month. Further, $27 \% 34 \%-52 \%$ of high-income customers (i.e., placed in Bracket 3) see bill reductions as well across the IOUs, with $30 \%-78 \%$ of those customers saving more than $\$ 10 /$ month.

Bill impact Table 10 shows the average bill impacts for each IOU by income group. Additionally, Table 10 further breaks down the bill impacts by usage levels, grouping Bracket 2 and Bracket 3 customers using less than 500 kWh per month on average as low usage and those using more than 500 kWh per month on average as high usage. The Table 10 column entitled "All Customers $<\$ 50$ " shows that all (CARE and non-CARE) Bracket 1 customers $(<\$ 50,000)$ have a California Climate Credit (CCC) covering their fixed charge resulting in a $\$ 17 \$ 20-\$ 25$, or approximately $16 \%$, bill reduction across the IOUs. All low-income customers, regardless of usage, see similar bill reductions on a percentage basis. Low-income and high usage customers will see the largest bill reductions on a dollar basis due to having a larger counterfactual bill and by realizing more savings through the proposed reduced volumetric rate.

[^15]Bill impact tables 11-12 display results from the E3 IGFC tool. Table 11 shows bill impact results similar to Table 10 across income and customer groups but instead of usage intervals, it provides results from the IGFC tool using its assumption of an averageusage customer. ${ }^{36}$ Table 11 shows similar and significant average bill decreases for all Bracket 1 (lowest income) customers across each IOU, with \$29-\$37 and \$15-\$19 monthly bill reductions for non-CARE and CARE average-usage low-income customers, respectively. These significant bill reductions are realized by removing the non-CARE and CARE fixed charges to Bracket 1 customers from the Tool's bill impacts based on Cal Advocates proposal to use the CCC to offset the fixed charge for these customers. Additionally, Table 11 shows the relatively mild bill increases (about \$1-\$9/month) to higher-income customers resulting from the proposed IGFC.

Finally, Table 12 details the important average volumetric rate reduction gained from this proposal. New rates calculated with the proposed IGFC are $16 \%-22 \%$ lower than existing rates across all IOUs. Lastly, some universal bill impacts include:

1) average bill decreases for all low-income and all high-usage customers, and 2 ) average bill increases for all middle-to-high income customers with low usage accounts. On a dollar basis, Cal Advocates' bill impact tables show that these expected bill increases are reasonable. Thus, Cal Advocates' proposal equitably provides savings to the most vulnerable customers and improves the financial case for electrification compared to the status quo. Full results from the IGFC tool are available in Appendix A.
[^16]|  | CARE |  |  | Non-CARE |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Fixed Charge Income Bracket (\$000) | $<50$ | 50-100 | $>100$ | $<50$ | 50-100 | $>100$ |
| Share of Population | 18\% | 16\% | 3\% | 17\% | 30\% | 16\% |
| Bill Impact Distribution by Income Bracket |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| >\$10 decrease | 66\% | 16\% | 16\% | 90\% | 23\% | 35\% |
| \$5 to \$10 decrease | 27\% | 7\% | 17\% | 7\% | 9\% | 10\% |
| \$0 to \$5 decrease | 8\% | 20\% | 12\% | 2\% | 12\% | 0\% |
| Subtotal (decrease) | 100\% | 43\% | 45\% | 100\% | 44\% | 45\% |
| \$0 to \$5 increase | 0\% | 15\% | 29\% | 0\% | 15\% | 15\% |
| \$5-\$10 increase | 0\% | 30\% | 14\% | 0\% | 16\% | 14\% |
| >\$10 increase | 0\% | 12\% | 12\% | 0\% | 25\% | 26\% |
| Subtotal (increase) | 0\% | 57\% | 55\% | 0\% | 56\% | 55\% |

Table 7: Bill Impacts Resulting from Cal Advocates' Proposed Income Graduated Fixed Charge for PG\&E Based on Internal Analysis Using IOU Population and Usage Data

|  | CARE |  |  | Non-CARE |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Fixed Charge Income Bracket (\$000) | $<50$ | 50-100 | >100 | $<50$ | 50-100 | $>100$ |
| Share of Population | 20\% | 15\% | 10\% | 12\% | 17\% | 27\% |
| Bill Impact Distribution by Income Bracket |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $>$ \$10 decrease | 68\% | 28\% | 22\% | 79\% | 33\% | 25\% |
| \$5 to \$10 decrease | 24\% | 12\% | 20\% | 15\% | 0\% | 8\% |
| \$0 to \$5 decrease | 8\% | 26\% | 10\% | 7\% | 12\% | 0\% |
| Subtotal (decrease) | 100\% | 65\% | 52\% | 100\% | 45\% | 34\% |
| \$0 to \$5 increase | 0\% | 24\% | 24\% | 0\% | 13\% | 11\% |
| \$5-\$10 increase | 0\% | 6\% | 19\% | 0\% | 13\% | 14\% |
| >\$10 increase | 0\% | 4\% | 6\% | 0\% | 29\% | 40\% |
| Subtotal (increase) | 0\% | 35\% | 48\% | 0\% | 55\% | 66\% |

Table 8: Bill Impacts Resulting from Cal Advocates' Proposed Income Graduated Fixed Charge for SCE Based on Internal Analysis Using IOU Population and Usage Data

| - | CARE |  |  | Non-CARE |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Fixed-Charge Ineome Bracket (\$000) | $<50$ | 50-100 | $>100$ | $<50$ | 50-100 | $>100$ |
| Share of Population | 33\% | 12\% | 5\% | 12\% | 17\% | 22\% |
| Bill Impact Distribution by Income Bracket |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\geq$ \$10 deerease | 49\% | 8\% | 8\% | 99\% | 9\% | 23\% |
| \$5 to \$10 decrease | 49\% | 5\% | 6\% | 1\% | 9\% | $0 \%$ |
| \$0 to \$5 decrease | 3\% | 10\% | 13\% | 0\% | 0\% | 13\% |
| Subtotal (decrease) | 100\% | 23\% | 27\% | 100\% | 18\% | 36\% |
| \$0 to \$5 increase | 0\% | 38\% | 20\% | 0\% | 14\% | $0 \%$ |
| \$5-\$10 increase | 0\% | 24\% | 23\% | 0\% | 24\% | 18\% |
| $>\$ 10$ increase | 0\% | 16\% | 22\% | $0 \%$ | 44\% | 46\% |
| Subtotal (increase) | 0\% | $77 \%$ | 65\% | $0 \%$ | 82\% | 64\% |

Table 9: Bill Impacts Resulting from Cal Advocates' Proposed Income Graduated Fixed Charge for SDG\&E Based on Internal Analysis Using IOU Population and Usage Data

|  | CARE |  |  | Non-CARE |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Fixed Charge Income Bracket (\$000) | <50 | 50-100 | >100 | $<50$ | 50-100 | $>100$ |
| Share of Population | 33\% | 12\% | 5\% | 12\% | 17\% | 22\% |
| Bill Impact Distribution by Income Bracket |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| >\$10 decrease | 76\% | 13\% | 14\% | 99\% | 18\% | 36\% |
| \$5 to \$10 decrease | 21\% | 10\% | 13\% | 1\% | 14\% | 0\% |
| \$0 to \$5 decrease | 3\% | 16\% | 20\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| Subtotal (decrease) | 100\% | 39\% | 46\% | 100\% | 32\% | 36\% |
| \$0 to \$5 increase | 0\% | 22\% | 23\% | 0\% | 24\% | 18\% |
| \$5-\$10 increase | 0\% | 24\% | 22\% | 0\% | 0\% | 21\% |
| >\$10 increase | 0\% | 16\% | 0\% | 0\% | 44\% | 25\% |
| Subtotal (increase) | 0\% | 61\% | 45\% | 0\% | 68\% | 64\% |


| Bill Impact <br> (\$/mo) | PG\&E |  | SCE |  | SDG\&E |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Income Bracket <br> Upper Bound <br> $(1000 \$)$Non- <br> CARE | CARE | Non- <br> CARE | CARE | Non- <br> CARE | CARE |  |
| $\$ 0-\$ 25,000$ | -29 | -16 | -32 | -16 | -37 | -19 |
| $\$ 25,000-$ <br> $\$ 50,000$ | -33 | -17 | -33 | -15 | -37 | -19 |
| $\$ 50,000-$ <br> $\$ 75,000$ | -1 | -2 | -3 | -0 | -0 | +1 |
| $\$ 75,000-$ <br> $\$ 100,000$ | -1 | -2 | -2 | -0 | -0 | +1 |
| $\$ 100,00-$ <br> $\$ 150,000$ | +5 | +1 | +3 | +2 | +6 | +4 |
| $\$ 150,000-$ <br> $\$ 200,000$ | +6 | +1 | +4 | +3 | +7 | +7 |
| $\$ 200,000+$ | +8 | +2 | +5 | +3 | +9 | N/A |

Table 10: Bill Impacts (\$) for Each IOU by Income Group (\$000) and Usage Levels ${ }^{37}$ Based on Internal Analysis Using IOU Population and Usage Data

| IOUs | All Customers | CARE <br> $\mathbf{\$ 5 0 - 1 0 0}$ <br> Low <br> Usage | CARE <br> $>\mathbf{\$ 5 0}$ <br> High <br> Usage | Non- <br> CARE <br> $\mathbf{\$ 5 0 - 1 0 0}$ <br> Low <br> Usage | Non- <br> CARE <br> $\mathbf{\$ 1 0 0}$ <br> Low <br> Usage | Non- <br> CARE <br> $>\$ 50$ <br> High <br> Usage |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| PG\&E | -22 | $5+5$ | -10 | $13+13$ | $17+17$ | -21 |
| SCE | -25 | $6+6$ | -9 | $12+12$ | $15+15$ | -16 |
| SDG\&E | $-17-20$ | $7+4$ | $-14-17$ | $14+10$ | $16+12$ | $-20-30$ |

Table 11: Average Monthly Customer Bill Impact for each IOU by Income Group from the E3 IGFC Tool ${ }^{38}$
${ }^{37}$ Bracket 2 and Bracket 3 customers using less than 500 kWh per month on average are categorized as low usage and those using more than 500 kWh per month on average as high usage.
${ }^{38}$ Bill impacts for Bracket 1 customers making less than $\$ 50,000$ are modified from the IGFC tool's results by removing the Non-CARE and CARE fixed charges to reflect offsetting of such charges with the CCC.

Table 12: Average Volumetric Rate Reduction (\%) Comparing Existing and New Average non-TOU Rates (Non-CARE) [\$/kWh] from the E3 IGFC Tool

| IOUs (Rate Schedule) | Existing Average Rate | New Average <br> Rate | Rate Reduction <br> $(\%)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| PG\&E (E-1) | 0.36 | 0.28 | $22 \%$ |
| SCE (D) | 0.35 | 0.29 | $17 \%$ |
| SDG\&E (DR) | 0.48 | 0.40 | $16 \%$ |

## E. Reallocation of the California Climate Credit to offset lowincome customers' fixed charge will provide rate relief for the most vulnerable customers.

To mitigate the impact of IGFCs on low-income customers, Cal Advocates proposes to offset to the greatest extent possible the fixed charge for low-income customers using the CCC. This will result in a more progressive allocation of the climate credit such that lower income customers will receive more of it per year than their higherincome counterparts. The climate credit is typically distributed to customers twice a year and represents the revenues the IOUs gain from GHG auctions. ${ }^{39}$ Cal Advocates’ proposal reallocates a larger share of it to low-income customers who disproportionately suffer from the effects of climate change and environmental degradation more than their higher-income counterparts.

Table 13 below shows that there is enough required climate credit funding to fully offset Cal Advocates' proposed fixed charges for Bracket 1 non-CARE and CARE customers for each IOU. To the extent that required revenues are higher than available climate credit, the full amount of climate credit would be exhausted to offset as much of the Bracket 1 fixed charge as possible.

[^17]|  | PGE | SCE | SDGE |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2022 Climate Credit | $\$ 79$ | $\$ 118$ | $\$ 128$ |
| Total Climate Credit 2022 | $\$ 392,476,052$ | $\$ 533,294,972$ | $\$ 173,884,208$ |
| Climate Credit Required for Bracket <br> 1 Non-CARE | $\$ 136,554,835$ | $\$ 165,703,007$ | $\$ 30,387,058$ |
| Climate Credit Required for Bracket <br> 1 CARE | $\$ 134,397,987$ | $\$ 105,761,469$ | $\$ 46,775,584$ |
| Credit Climate (Shortfall) | $\$ 121,523,231$ | $\$ 261,830,496$ | $\$ 96,721,567$ |

Table 13: Climate Credit Funding Availability

At some point the quantity of GHG allowances will decrease as the grid becomes more decarbonized. Discussion on how to reduce this offset or how to phase it out over time can be considered in future proceedings.

## F. Any fixed charge proposal adopted in this proceeding must be applied to all residential rates.

Cal Advocates recommends that any IGFC adopted in this proceeding be applied to all default and optional residential rate schedules. Synchronization of fixed charges across all rate schedules is required to prevent fixed charge arbitrage. This will preclude wealthier customers from avoiding higher fixed charges by opting into rates without IGFCs. Over time, if IGFCs are not applied to optional rates, it could erode the income graduation attribute of the schedules that have IGFCs as there would be fewer customers left to pay the higher fixed charge amounts. This undercollection would inevitably lead to escalating fixed charges on lower income customers who have fewer financial incentives to opt-in to rates without income graduation.

## G. Fixed charge over/undercollections should be allocated volumetrically.

Cal Advocates recommends that any fixed charge over/undercollections be allocated to volumetric rates, at least during the initial roll out of IGFCs. IGFCs will be challenging enough to implement given the substantial undertaking of income verification as discussed in Chapter 2. Having unexpected fluctuations in IGFC levels may cause customer confusion. Thus, by assigning revenue over and undercollections to
the volumetric rates, the expected fixed charge levels would be retained during the initial roll out of IGFCs. Once the IGFCs are rolled out en masse, parties may propose changes to annual rate adjustment policy and to costs recovered in the IGFCs in future GRCs.

## APPENDIX A. 1

Fixed Charge Tool Inputs and Outputs

## Fixed Charge Tool Outputs - Cover Sheet

## Purpose:

This section of the tool is formatted to be easily printed or saved as a PDF and filed as a part of testimony.

## Instructions:

This worksheet automatically draws values from the rest of the tool.
This worksheet displays both rate design details and bill impacts for all three IOUs.
Please run the macro (button above) to re-generate model results using current inputs to ensure that the rate design details and bill impacts are aligned.
This macro can also be run from the Rate Design Dashboard worksheet. Please see the Rate Design Dashboard worksheet for further details.

## How to Save as PDF:

Click "File", then "Print", then select "Microsoft Print to PDF". Click the large "Print" button to choose a file location and name.

## How to Print:

Click "File", then "Print", then select your choice of printer.

## Table of Contents

| Section | Sub-Section | Page |
| :--- | :--- | :---: |
| Cover | -- | 1 |
| Revenue Requirement Allocations | PG\&E | 2 |
|  | SDG\&E | 3 |
| Rate Design Inputs | SCE | 4 |
| Revenue Requirement Components | -- | 5 |
| New Rates | -- | 6 |
|  | -- | 7 |
| Bill Impacts | -- | 8 |
|  | -- | 9 |
|  | PG\&E | 10 |
|  | SDG\&E | 11 |
|  | SCE | 12 |

## 5 Energy+Environmental Economics

Energy and Environmental Economics, Inc.
44 Montgomery Street, Suite 1500
San Francisco, CA 94104
Phone: 415-391-5100

Revenue Requirement Allocations
PG\&E

| Cost <br> Category | Cost Component (See "Glossary" tab for descriptions) | Residential Revenue Requirement |  | CARE-Exempt | Bundled Generation | Percent to Include in Customer Charge | Percent to Include in Demand Charge | Percent to Include in Volumetric Charge |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | \$ | T/F | T/F | \% | \% | \% |
| Generation | PCIA | \$ | 183,408,243 | FALSE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Generation | Marginal Energy Cost | \$ | 538,263,216 | FALSE | TRUE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Generation | Marginal Generation Capacity Cost | \$ | 218,481,550 | FALSE | TRUE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Generation | Non-Marginal Generation | \$ | 865,996,766 | FALSE | TRUE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Distribution | Marginal Customer Access | \$ | 454,792,861 | FALSE | FALSE | 100.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% |
| Distribution | Marginal Distribution Capacity Cost - Primary | \$ | 439,382,040 | FALSE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Distribution | Marginal Distribution Capacity Cost - New Business | \$ | 476,043,853 | FALSE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Distribution | Marginal Distribution Capacity Cost - Secondary | \$ | 29,945,145 | FALSE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Distribution | Non-Marginal Distribution | \$ | 1,833,578,625 | FALSE | FALSE | 32.48\% | 0.00\% | 67.52\% |
| Transmissio | Transmission | \$ | 1,447,654,612 | FALSE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Line Items | Public Purpose Programs - SGIP | \$ | 58,854,252 | TRUE | FALSE | 100.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% |
| Line Items | Wildfire Fund Charge | \$ | 63,120,120 | true | FALSE | 100.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% |
| Line Items | Wildfire Hardening Charge | \$ | 68,921,008 | TRUE | FALSE | 100.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% |
| Line Items | Recovery Bond Charge | \$ | 215,256,658 | TRUE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Line Items | Recovery Bond Credit | \$ | $(215,256,658)$ | TRUE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Line Items | Public Purpose Programs - Not CARE Exempt | \$ | 230,732,710 | FALSE | FALSE | 100.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% |
| Line Items | Nuclear Decommissioning | \$ | 37,938,712 | FALSE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Line Items | New System Generation Charge | \$ | 96,956,158 | FALSE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Line Items | Competition Transition Charge | \$ | 8,518,646 | FALSE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Line Items | Energy Cost Recovery Account | \$ | $(19,846,861)$ | FALSE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Line Items | Residential CARE Contribution |  |  | TRUE | FALSE | 100.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% |
|  | See "New Rates" Section (pg. 7-9) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Line Items | 2023 Total Estimated CARE Discount | \$ | (891,914,356) |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Note: included for comparison to model-calculated |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Delivery RR - Before CARE Bill Discount | \$ | 7,032,741,656 |  |  |  |  |  |

SCE

| Cost <br> Category | Cost Component (See "Glossary" tab for descriptions) | Residential Revenue Requirement |  | CARE-Exempt | Bundled Generation | Percent to Include in Customer Charge | Percent to Include in Demand Charge | Percent to Include in Volumetric Charge |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | \$ | T/F | T/F | \% | \% | \% |
| Generation | PCIA | \$ | 18,066,203 | FALSE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Generation | Marginal Energy Cost | \$ | 606,708,166 | FALSE | TRUE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Generation | Marginal Generation Capacity Cost | \$ | 584,831,167 | FALSE | TRUE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Generation | Non-Marginal Generation | \$ | 1,378,829,544 | FALSE | TRUE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Distribution | Marginal - Customer | \$ | 427,567,610 | FALSE | FALSE | 100.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% |
| Distribution | Marginal - Grid | \$ | 888,543,196 | FALSE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Distribution | Marginal - Peak | \$ | 503,372,326 | FALSE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Distribution | Non-Marginal Distribution | \$ | 1,845,967,040 | FALSE | FALSE | 23.50\% | 0.00\% | 76.50\% |
| Transmission | Base Transmission | \$ | 599,320,433 | FALSE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Transmission | Transmission Balancing Accounts | \$ | $(1,839,212)$ | FALSE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Line Items | Public Purpose Programs - SGIP | \$ | 23,619,309 | TRUE | FALSE | 100.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% |
| Line Items | Wildfire Fund Charge | \$ | 103,390,404 | TRUE | FALSE | 100.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% |
| Line Items | Wildfire Hardening Charge | \$ | 17,556,861 | TRUE | FALSE | 100.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% |
| Line Items | Recovery Bond Charge | \$ | (40,575,85) | TRUE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Line Items | Recovery Bond Credit | \$ | $(40,575,857)$ | TRUE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Line Items | Public Purpose Programs - Not CARE Exempt | \$ | 313,291,510 | FALSE | FALSE | 100.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% |
| Line Items | Nuclear Decommissioning | \$ | 2,364,701 | FALSE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Line Items | New System Generation Charge | \$ | 148,976,188 | FALSE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Line Items | Residential CARE Contribution |  |  | TRUE | FALSE | 100.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% |
|  | See "New Rates" Section (pg. 7-9) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Line Items | 2023 Total Estimated CARE Discount | \$ | $(660,034,291)$ |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Note: included for comparison to model-calculate |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Delivery RR - Before CARE Bill Discount |  | 6,995,933,045 |  |  |  |  |  |


| Cost <br> Category | Cost Component (See "Glossary" tab for descriptions) | Residential Revenue Requirement |  | CARE-Exempt | Bundled Generation | Percent to Include in Customer Charge | Percent to Include in Demand Charge | Percent to Include in Volumetric Charge |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | \$ | T/F | T/F | \% | \% | \% |
| Generation | PCIA | \$ | 180,005,950 | FALSE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Generation | Marginal Energy Cost | \$ | 100,915,850 | FALSE | TRUE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Generation | Marginal Generation Capacity Cost | \$ | 57,547,258 | FALSE | TRUE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Generation | Non-Marginal Generation | \$ | 163,094,812 | FALSE | TRUE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Distribution | Marginal - Customer | \$ | 183,005,936 | FALSE | FALSE | 100.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% |
| Distribution | Marginal Demand - Non-Coincident Peak | \$ | 198,205,378 | FALSE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Distribution | Marginal Demand - Coincident Peak | \$ | 26,974,391 | FALSE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Distribution | Non-Marginal Distribution | \$ | 490,650,411 | FALSE | FALSE | 44.83\% | 0.00\% | 55.17\% |
| Transmission | Base Transmission | \$ | 537,401,722 | FALSE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Transmission | Transmission Balancing Accounts | \$ | $(111,012,377)$ | FALSE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Line Items | Public Purpose Programs - SGIP | \$ | 8,781,000 | TRUE | FALSE | 100.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% |
| Line Items | Wildfire Fund Charge | \$ | 29,143,070 | TRUE | FALSE | 100.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% |
| Line Items | Public Purpose Programs - Not CARE Exempt | \$ | 61,433,000 | FALSE | FALSE | 100.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% |
| Line Items | Nuclear Decommissioning | \$ | 526,530 | FALSE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Line Items | Local Generation Charge/New System Generation Cha | \$ | 81,949,029 | FALSE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Line Items | Competition Transition Charge | \$ | 11,052,908 | FALSE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Line Items | Total Rate Adjustment Component - Baseline adjustme | \$ | 1,000,000 | FALSE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Line Items | Reliability Services | \$ | 177,809 | FALSE | FALSE | 0.00\% | 0.00\% | 100.00\% |
| Line Items | Residential CARE Contribution |  |  | TRUE | FALSE | 100.00\% | 0.00\% | 0.00\% |
|  | See "New Rates" Section (pg. 7-9) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Line Items | 2023 Total Estimated CARE Discount |  | $(178,549,476)$ |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Note: included for comparison to model-calculated valu |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Delivery RR - Before CARE Bill Discount |  |  | 2,020,852,676 |  |  |  |  |  |

Rate Design Inputs

|  | PG\&E | SCE | SDG\&E |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Customer charge option | Uniform Weights | Uniform Weights | Uniform Weights |
| Customer Charge Weighting is used when Customer Charge Option is set to "Uniform Weights" |  |  |  |
| Customer Charge Weighting [0,25] | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 |
| [25,50] | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 |
| [50,75] | 1.4000 | 1.4000 | 1.4000 |
| [75,100] | 1.4000 | 1.4000 | 1.4000 |
| [100,150] | 1.6100 | 1.6100 | 1.6100 |
| [150,200] | 1.6100 | 1.6100 | 1.6100 |
| 200+ | 1.6100 | 1.6100 | 1.6100 |
| Customer Charge Weighting is used when Customer Charge Option is set to "User-Defined CARE Charges" |  |  |  |
| CARE Customer Charge (\$/mo) [0,25] | 5.0000 | 5.0000 | 5.0000 |
| [25,50] | 5.0000 | 5.0000 | 5.0000 |
| [50,75] | 5.0000 | 5.0000 | 5.0000 |
| [75,100] | 5.0000 | 5.0000 | 5.0000 |
| [100,150] | 5.0000 | 5.0000 | 5.0000 |
| [150,200] | 5.0000 | 5.0000 | 5.0000 |
| 200+ | 5.0000 | 5.0000 | 5.0000 |
| Non-CARE Customer Charge Weighting is used when Customer Charge Option is set to "User-Defined CARE Charges" |  |  |  |
| Non-CARE Customer Charge Weighting [0,25] | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 |
| [25,50] | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 |
| [50,75] | 1.0000 | 1.0000 | 1.0000 |
| [75,100] | 2.0000 | 2.0000 | 2.0000 |
| [100,150] | 2.0000 | 2.0000 | 2.0000 |
| [150,200] | 2.0000 | 2.0000 | 2.0000 |
| 200+ | 2.0000 | 2.0000 | 2.0000 |
| Average CARE Program Discount is used when Customer Charge Option is set to "User-Defined CARE Charges" |  |  |  |
| Average CARE Program Discount (\$/month) | \$ 5.0000 | \$ 5.0000 | \$ 5.0000 |
| Demand Charge Options | Billing Month | Billing Month | Billing Month |
|  | \$ 3.0000 | \$ 3.0000 | \$ 3.0000 |
| Adjustments to distribution rate | Equal Cents | Equal Cents | Equal Cents |
| Include baseline credit from existing rate (if applicable) | TRUE | TRUE | TRUE |

## PG\&E

| Based on CARE program size from E-TOU-C |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Delivery - CARE-exempt     <br> Rev Req - <br> Customer Rev Req - Demand Rev Req - <br> Volumetric   <br> $\$$ $448,078,821$ $\$$ - $\$$ |


| Delivery - excluding CARE-exempt |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | ---: |
| Volumetric Rev Req Breakdown |  |  |
| Distribution | $\$$ | $2,183,377,624$ |
| NBCs | $\$$ | $46,457,358$ |
| Non-Dist | $\$$ | $1,708,172,152$ |


| Delivery - CARE-exempt |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Volumetric Rev Req Breakdown |  |  |
| Distribution | $\$$ | - |
| NBCs | $\$$ | - |
| Non-Dist | $\$$ | - |

## SDG\&E

| Delivery - excluding CARE-exempt   <br> Rev Req - <br> Customer Rev Req - Demand Rev Req - <br> Volumetric <br> $\$$ $464,417,090$ $\$$$\quad-\quad \$ \quad 1,196,953,596$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |


| Delivery - CARE-exempt |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Rev Req - <br> Customer | Rev Req - Demand | Rev Req - <br> Volumetric |  |
| $\$ \quad 102,539,248$ | $\$$ | - | $\$$ |


| Delivery - excluding CARE-exempt |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | ---: |
| Volumetric Rev Req Breakdown |  |  |
| Distribution | $\$$ | $495,852,025$ |
| NBCs | $\$$ | $11,579,438$ |
| Non-Dist | $\$$ | $689,522,133$ |


| Delivery - CARE-exempt |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Volumetric Rev Req Breakdown | $\$$ | - |
| Distribution | $\$$ | - |
| NBCs | $\$$ | - |
| Non-Dist |  |  |

SCE


| Delivery - excluding CARE-exempt |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Volumetric Rev Req Breakdown |  |  |
| Distribution | \$ | 2,804,091,392 |
| NBCs | \$ | 2,364,701 |
| Non-Dist | \$ | 764,523,612 |



New Rates

|  | PG\&E |  | PG\&E |  | PG\&E |  | PG\&E |  | PG\&E |  | PG\&E |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | E-1 |  | E-1 |  | E-TOU-C |  | E-TOU-C |  | EV2-A |  | EV2-A |  |
|  | Non-CARE |  | CARE |  | Non-CARE |  | CARE |  | Non-CARE |  | CARE |  |
| Income Bracket (1000\$): |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| [0,25] | \$ | 22.7895 | \$ | 10.1953 | \$ | 22.7538 | \$ | 10.1953 | \$ | 22.7333 | \$ | 10.1953 |
| [25,50] | \$ | 22.7895 | \$ | 10.1953 | \$ | 22.7538 | \$ | 10.1953 | \$ | 22.7333 | \$ | 10.1953 |
| [50,75] | \$ | 31.9053 | \$ | 14.2734 | \$ | 31.8553 | \$ | 14.2734 | \$ | 31.8266 | \$ | 14.2734 |
| [75,100] | \$ | 31.9053 | \$ | 14.2734 | \$ | 31.8553 | \$ | 14.2734 | \$ | 31.8266 | \$ | 14.2734 |
| [100,150] | \$ | 36.6911 | \$ | 16.4144 | \$ | 36.6336 | \$ | 16.4144 | \$ | 36.6006 | \$ | 16.4144 |
| [150,200] | \$ | 36.6911 | \$ | 16.4144 | \$ | 36.6336 | \$ | 16.4144 | \$ | 36.6006 | \$ | 16.4144 |
| 200+ | \$ | 36.6911 | \$ | 16.4144 | \$ | 36.6336 | \$ | 16.4144 | \$ | 36.6006 | \$ | 16.4144 |
| Tier Credits/Charges (\$/kWh) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Baseline Credit | \$ | 0.0631 | \$ | 0.0410 | \$ | 0.0631 | \$ | 0.0410 | \$ | - | \$ | - |
| High Usage Charge | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - |
| Demand Charges (\$/kW) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Billing Determinant | Billing Month |  | Billing Month |  | Billing Month |  | Billing Month |  | Billing Month |  | Billing Month |  |
| No. of Highest Demand Months | \$ | 3.0000 | \$ | 3.0000 | \$ | 3.0000 | \$ | 3.0000 | \$ | 3.0000 | \$ | 3.0000 |
| Demand Charge (\$/kW-mo) | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - |
| Energy Charges (\$/kWh) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Summer - Peak | \$ | 0.3191 | \$ | 0.2074 | \$ | 0.4103 | \$ | 0.2667 | \$ | 0.4859 | \$ | 0.3159 |
| Summer - Part-Peak | \$ | 0.3191 | \$ | 0.2074 | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | 0.3755 | \$ | 0.2440 |
| Summer - Off-Peak | \$ | 0.3191 | \$ | 0.2074 | \$ | 0.3468 | \$ | 0.2254 | \$ | 0.1734 | \$ | 0.1127 |
| Winter - Peak | \$ | 0.3191 | \$ | 0.2074 | \$ | 0.3132 | \$ | 0.2036 | \$ | 0.3588 | \$ | 0.2332 |
| Winter - Part-Peak | \$ | 0.3191 | \$ | 0.2074 | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | 0.3421 | \$ | 0.2224 |
| Winter - Off-Peak | \$ | 0.3191 | \$ | 0.2074 | \$ | 0.2959 | \$ | 0.1923 | \$ | 0.1734 | \$ | 0.1127 |
| Total CARE Program Funding - Modeled |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Customer |  |  | \$ | $(100,396,401)$ |  |  |  | $(100,396,401)$ |  |  | \$ | $(100,396,401)$ |
| Demand |  |  | \$ | - |  |  | \$ | - |  |  | \$ | - |
| Volumetric - Delivery |  |  | \$ | $(424,645,758)$ |  |  |  | (424,645,758) |  |  | \$ | $(424,645,758)$ |
| Volumetric - Generation |  |  | \$ | $(431,894,113)$ |  |  |  | $(423,536,307)$ |  |  | \$ | $(418,748,960)$ |
| Total CARE Credits |  |  | \$ | $(956,936,272)$ |  |  |  | $(948,578,466)$ |  |  | \$ | (943,791,119) |
| Residential CARE Funding Non-Res CARE Funding |  |  | \$ | 259,449,452 |  |  |  | 257,183,441 |  |  | \$ | 255,885,471 |
|  |  |  | \$ | 697,486,820 |  |  |  | 691,395,026 |  |  | \$ | 687,905,648 |
| Total IOU forecast CARE program size |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2023 Forecast (Existing Rates) <br> Modeled Credits as \% of Forecast |  |  |  | (891,914,356) |  |  |  | (891,914,356) |  |  | \$ | (891,914,356) |
|  |  |  |  | 7\% |  |  |  | 6\% |  |  |  | 6\% |


| PG\&E | PG\&E | SCE | SCE | SCE | SCE | SCE | SCE |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| E-ELEC | E-ELEC | D | D | TOU-D-4-9 | TOU-D-4-9 | TOU-D-PRIME | TOU-D-PRIME |
| Non-CARE | CARE | Non-CARE | CARE | Non-CARE | CARE | Non-CARE | CARE |


| $\$$ | 22.6746 | $\$$ | 10.1953 | $\$$ | 21.8241 | $\$$ | 10.8340 | $\$$ | 21.8606 | $\$$ | 10.8340 | $\$$ | 21.8933 | $\$$ | 10.8340 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $\$$ | 22.6746 | $\$$ | 10.1953 | $\$$ | 21.8241 | $\$$ | 10.8340 | $\$$ | 21.8606 | $\$$ | 10.8340 | $\$$ | 21.8933 | $\$$ | 10.8340 |
| $\$$ | 31.7445 | $\$$ | 14.2734 | $\$$ | 30.5537 | $\$$ | 15.1676 | $\$$ | 30.6048 | $\$$ | 15.1676 | $\$$ | 30.6506 | $\$$ | 15.1676 |
| $\$$ | 31.7445 | $\$$ | 14.2734 | $\$$ | 30.5537 | $\$$ | 15.1676 | $\$$ | 30.6048 | $\$$ | 15.1676 | $\$$ | 30.6506 | $\$$ | 15.1676 |
| $\$$ | 36.5062 | $\$$ | 16.4144 | $\$$ | 35.1367 | $\$$ | 17.4427 | $\$$ | 35.1955 | $\$$ | 17.4427 | $\$$ | 35.2482 | $\$$ | 17.4427 |
| $\$$ | 36.5062 | $\$$ | 16.4144 | $\$$ | 35.1367 | $\$$ | 17.4427 | $\$$ | 35.1955 | $\$$ | 17.4427 | $\$$ | 35.2482 | $\$$ | 17.4427 |
| $\$$ | 36.5062 | $\$$ | 16.4144 | $\$$ | 35.1367 | $\$$ | 17.4427 | $\$$ | 35.1955 | $\$$ | 17.4427 | $\$$ | 35.2482 | $\$$ | 17.4427 |


| \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | 0.0739 | \$ | 0.0499 | \$ | 0.0809 | \$ | 0.0546 | \$ | - | \$ | - |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | 0.0832 | \$ | 0.0561 | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - |


| Billing Month |  | Billing Month |  | Billing Month |  | Billing Month |  | Billing Month |  | Billing Month |  | Billing Month |  | Billing Month |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| \$ | 3.0000 | \$ | 3.0000 | \$ | 3.0000 | \$ | 3.0000 | \$ | 3.0000 | \$ | 3.0000 | \$ | 3.0000 | \$ | 3.0000 |
| \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - |


| \$ | 0.4848 | \$ | 0.3151 | \$ | 0.3320 | \$ | 0.2255 | \$ | 0.5002 | \$ | 0.3390 | \$ | 0.5876 | \$ | 0.3980 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| \$ | 0.3229 | \$ | 0.2099 | \$ | 0.3320 | \$ | 0.2255 | \$ | 0.3918 | \$ | 0.2659 | \$ | 0.3298 | \$ | 0.2240 |
| \$ | 0.2662 | \$ | 0.1730 | \$ | 0.3320 | \$ | 0.2255 | \$ | 0.2851 | \$ | 0.1938 | \$ | 0.2075 | \$ | 0.1415 |
| \$ | 0.2533 | \$ | 0.1646 | \$ | 0.3320 | \$ | 0.2255 | \$ | 0.4323 | \$ | 0.2932 | \$ | 0.5301 | \$ | 0.3592 |
| \$ | 0.2312 | \$ | 0.1503 | \$ | 0.3320 | \$ | 0.2255 | \$ | 0.3098 | \$ | 0.2105 | \$ | 0.1867 | \$ | 0.1274 |
| \$ | 0.2173 | \$ | 0.1413 | \$ | 0.3320 | \$ | 0.2255 | \$ | 0.2745 | \$ | 0.1867 | \$ | 0.1867 | \$ | 0.1274 |


| $\$$ | $(100,396,401)$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| $\$$ | - |
| $\$$ | $(424,645,758)$ |
| $\$$ | $(405,034,979)$ |
| $\$$ | $(930,077,138)$ |


| $\$$ | $252,167,266$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| $\$$ | $677,909,872$ |


| $\$ \quad(891,914,356)$ |
| ---: |
| $4 \%$ |


| $\$$ | $(83,516,155)$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| $\$$ | - |
| $\$$ | $(298,897,740)$ |
| $\$$ | $(339,559,859)$ |
| $\$$ | $(721,973,754)$ |



| $\$$ | $(83,516,155)$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| $\$$ | - |
| $\$$ | $(298,897,740)$ |
| $\$$ | $(347,681,851)$ |
| $\$$ | $(730,095,746)$ |


| $\$$ | $187,632,512$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| $\$$ | $542,463,233$ |



| SDG\&E | SDG\&E | SDG\&E | SDG\&E | SDG\&E | SDG\&E | SDG\&E | SDG\&E |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| DR | DR | TOU-DR1 | TOU-DR1 | EV-TOU-5 | EV-TOU-5 | TOU-ELEC | TOU-ELEC |
| Non-CARE | CARE | Non-CARE | CARE | Non-CARE | CARE | Non-CARE | CARE |


| \$ | 26.4943 | \$ | 13.7014 | \$ | 26.4311 | \$ | 13.7014 | \$ | 26.4418 | \$ | 13.7014 | \$ | 26.3879 | \$ | 13.7014 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| \$ | 26.4943 | \$ | 13.7014 | \$ | 26.4311 | \$ | 13.7014 | \$ | 26.4418 | \$ | 13.7014 | \$ | 26.3879 | \$ | 13.7014 |
| \$ | 37.0920 | \$ | 19.1820 | \$ | 37.0035 | \$ | 19.1820 | \$ | 37.0185 | \$ | 19.1820 | \$ | 36.9431 | \$ | 19.1820 |
| \$ | 37.0920 | \$ | 19.1820 | \$ | 37.0035 | \$ | 19.1820 | \$ | 37.0185 | \$ | 19.1820 | \$ | 36.9431 | \$ | 19.1820 |
| \$ | 42.6558 | \$ | 22.0593 | \$ | 42.5541 | \$ | 22.0593 | \$ | 42.5713 | \$ | 22.0593 | \$ | 42.4846 | \$ | 22.0593 |
| \$ | 42.6558 | \$ | 22.0593 | \$ | 42.5541 | \$ | 22.0593 | \$ | 42.5713 | \$ | 22.0593 | \$ | 42.4846 | \$ | 22.0593 |
| \$ | 42.6558 | \$ | 22.0593 | \$ | 42.5541 | \$ | 22.0593 | \$ | 42.5713 | \$ | 22.0593 | \$ | 42.4846 | \$ | 22.0593 |


| \$ | 0.0987 | \$ | 0.0652 | \$ | 0.0987 | \$ | 0.0652 | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - |


|  |  | Billing Month |  | Billing Month |  | Billing Month |  | Billing Month |  | Billing Month |  | Billing Month |  | Billing Month |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| \$ | 3.0000 | \$ | 3.0000 | \$ | 3.0000 | \$ | 3.0000 | \$ | 3.0000 | \$ | 3.0000 | \$ | 3.0000 | \$ | 3.0000 |
| \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - |


| \$ | 0.4813 | \$ | 0.3176 | \$ | 0.7441 | \$ | 0.4911 | \$ | 0.7823 | \$ | 0.5163 | \$ | 0.7173 | \$ | 0.4734 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| \$ | 0.4813 | \$ | 0.3176 | \$ | 0.4306 | \$ | 0.2842 | \$ | 0.4473 | \$ | 0.2952 | \$ | 0.3480 | \$ | 0.2297 |
| \$ | 0.4813 | \$ | 0.3176 | \$ | 0.2660 | \$ | 0.1755 | \$ | 0.1929 | \$ | 0.1273 | \$ | 0.2995 | \$ | 0.1976 |
| \$ | 0.4813 | \$ | 0.3176 | \$ | 0.5473 | \$ | 0.3612 | \$ | 0.4775 | \$ | 0.3152 | \$ | 0.4762 | \$ | 0.3143 |
| \$ | 0.4813 | \$ | 0.3176 | \$ | 0.4627 | \$ | 0.3054 | \$ | 0.4138 | \$ | 0.2731 | \$ | 0.3348 | \$ | 0.2210 |
| \$ | 0.4813 | \$ | 0.3176 | \$ | 0.4382 | \$ | 0.2892 | \$ | 0.1846 | \$ | 0.1219 | \$ | 0.2907 | \$ | 0.1918 |


| $\$$ | $(30,285,306)$ |
| :--- | ---: |
| $\$$ | - |
| $\$$ | $(98,543,414)$ |
| $\$$ | $(100,157,376)$ |
| $\$$ | $(228,986,096)$ |


\$ $(178,549,476)$

| $\$$ | $(30,285,306)$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| $\$$ | - |
| $\$$ | $(98,543,414)$ |
| $\$$ | $(96,179,165)$ |
| $\$$ | $(225,007,885)$ |


| $\$$ | $64,615,178$ |
| :--- | ---: |
| $\$$ | $160,392,708$ |


| $\$$ | $(30,285,306)$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| $\$$ | - |
| $\$$ | $(98,543,414)$ |
| $\$$ | $(96,851,978)$ |
| $\$$ | $(225,680,698)$ |


| $\$$ | $64,808,388$ |
| :--- | ---: |
| $\$$ | $160,872,310$ |


| $\$$ | $63,834,860$ |
| :--- | ---: |
| $\$$ | $158,455,744$ |


| $\$$ | $(30,285,306)$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| $\$$ | - |
| $\$$ | $(98,543,414)$ |
| $\$$ | $(93,461,884)$ |
| $\$$ | $(222,290,604)$ |


| $\$ \quad(178,549,476)$ |
| ---: |
| $24 \%$ |

## PG\&E

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Income Bracket | Bill Discount |  | PG\&E |  |  |  | Q |  | R |  | S |  | T |  | V |  | W |  | X |  | Y |  | Z |  |
| \$0-\$25,000 | None | 1 | \$ | (6.31) | \$ | (20.85) | \$ | (17.47) | \$ | (20.63) | \$ | (17.65) | \$ | 0.15 | \$ | (11.17) | \$ | (18.31) | \$ | (8.69) | \$ | (9.37) | \$ | 4.12 |
| \$25,000-\$50,000 | None | 2 | \$ | (9.96) | \$ | (20.57) | \$ | (17.45) | \$ | (20.73) | \$ | (17.47) | \$ | 0.22 | \$ | (11.29) | \$ | (18.57) | \$ | (8.70) | \$ | (9.37) | \$ | 4.14 |
| \$50,000-\$75,000 | None | 3 | \$ | (1.27) | \$ | (11.21) | \$ | (8.23) | \$ | (10.76) | \$ | (7.75) | \$ | 9.40 | \$ | (2.18) | \$ | (8.36) | \$ | 0.53 | \$ | (0.27) | \$ | 13.21 |
| \$75,000-\$100,000 | None | 4 | \$ | (0.55) | \$ | (10.75) | \$ | (8.26) | \$ | (9.63) | \$ | (6.84) | \$ | 9.46 | \$ | (2.07) | \$ | (6.77) | \$ | 0.63 | \$ | (0.26) | \$ | 13.22 |
| \$100,00-\$150,000 | None | 5 | \$ | 5.15 | \$ | (5.45) | \$ | (3.18) | \$ | (3.52) | \$ | (1.06) | \$ | 14.30 | \$ | 2.81 | \$ | (0.10) | \$ | 5.59 | \$ | 4.53 | \$ | 18.02 |
| \$150,000-\$200,000 | None | 6 | \$ | 6.32 | \$ | (4.41) | \$ | (2.95) | \$ | (2.01) | \$ | 0.22 | \$ | 14.35 | \$ | 2.96 | \$ | 2.03 | \$ | 5.83 | \$ | 4.54 | \$ | 17.96 |
| \$200,000+ | None | 7 | \$ | 7.92 | \$ | (3.09) | \$ | (2.20) | \$ | 0.30 | \$ | 2.06 | \$ | 14.46 | \$ | 2.99 | \$ | 4.51 | \$ | 6.53 | \$ | 4.57 | \$ | 17.96 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \$0-\$25,000 | CARE | 1 | \$ | (6.06) | \$ | (12.99) | \$ | (9.41) | \$ | (10.22) | \$ | (8.55) | \$ | (0.32) | \$ | (3.56) | \$ | (9.69) | \$ | (3.58) | \$ | (10.55) | \$ | (5.65) |
| \$25,000-\$50,000 | CARE | 2 | \$ | (6.40) |  | (12.92) | \$ | (9.40) | \$ | (9.89) | \$ | (8.33) | \$ | (0.28) | \$ | (3.58) | \$ | (9.20) | \$ | (3.50) | \$ | (10.54) | \$ | (5.77) |
| \$50,000-\$75,000 | CARE | 3 | \$ | (1.82) | \$ | (8.70) | \$ | (5.02) | \$ | (5.47) | \$ | (4.07) | \$ | 3.82 | \$ | 0.60 | \$ | (4.57) | \$ | 0.61 | \$ | (6.45) | \$ | (1.75) |
| \$75,000-\$100,000 | CARE | 4 | \$ | (1.63) |  | (8.68) | \$ | (4.44) | \$ | (5.34) | \$ | (3.83) | \$ | 3.85 | \$ | 0.69 | \$ | (4.05) | \$ | 0.61 | \$ | (6.45) | \$ | (1.78) |
| \$100,00-\$150,000 | CARE | 5 | \$ | 0.80 | \$ | (6.45) | \$ | (3.08) | \$ | (2.79) | \$ | (1.46) | \$ | 6.00 | \$ | 2.68 | \$ | (1.60) | \$ | 2.84 | \$ | (4.30) | \$ | 0.31 |
| \$150,000-\$200,000 | CARE | 6 | \$ | 1.31 | \$ | (6.28) | \$ | (3.32) | \$ | (2.53) | \$ | (1.25) | \$ | 5.99 | \$ | 2.67 | \$ | (0.84) | \$ | 2.86 | \$ | (4.30) | \$ | 0.51 |
| \$200,000+ | CARE | 7 | \$ | 2.07 | \$ | (5.75) | \$ | (3.32) | \$ | (2.04) | \$ | (0.90) | \$ | 6.00 | \$ | 2.84 | \$ | (0.53) | \$ | 2.95 | \$ | (4.30) | \$ | (2.85) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \$0-\$25,000 | FERA | 1 | \$ | (10.64) | \$ | (24.37) | \$ | (17.61) | \$ | (18.54) | \$ | (15.80) | \$ | (0.87) | \$ | (6.81) | \$ | (17.49) | \$ | (6.79) | \$ | (20.07) | \$ | (10.76) |
| \$25,000-\$50,000 | FERA | 2 | \$ | (11.01) |  | (24.24) | \$ | (17.59) | \$ | (17.57) | \$ | (15.23) | \$ | (0.79) | \$ | (6.83) | \$ | (16.17) | \$ | (6.63) | \$ | (20.07) | \$ | (11.45) |
| \$50,000-\$75,000 | FERA | 3 | \$ | (2.72) |  | (16.55) | \$ | (9.43) | \$ | (9.19) | \$ | (7.35) | \$ | 6.72 | \$ | 0.81 | \$ | (7.33) | \$ | 0.91 | \$ | (12.59) | \$ | (4.26) |
| \$75,000-\$100,000 | FERA | 4 | \$ | (2.43) |  | (16.52) | \$ | (8.14) | \$ | (8.85) | \$ | (6.78) | \$ | 6.78 | \$ | 0.98 | \$ | (6.17) | \$ | 0.90 | \$ | (12.59) | \$ | (4.41) |
| \$100,00-\$150,000 | FERA | 5 | \$ | 1.91 |  | (12.45) | \$ | (5.97) | \$ | (3.96) | \$ | (2.35) | \$ | 10.74 | \$ | 4.62 | \$ | (1.61) | \$ | 5.01 | \$ | (8.67) | \$ | (0.69) |
| \$150,000-\$200,000 | FERA | 6 | \$ | 2.68 |  | (12.18) | \$ | (6.55) | \$ | (3.40) | \$ | (1.91) | \$ | 10.71 | \$ | 4.59 | \$ | (0.17) | \$ | 5.05 | \$ | (8.67) | \$ | 0.26 |
| \$200,000+ | FERA | 7 | \$ | 3.80 | \$ | (11.34) | \$ | (6.55) | \$ | (2.41) | \$ | (1.19) | \$ | 10.73 | \$ | 4.91 | \$ | 0.38 | \$ | 5.23 | \$ | (8.66) | \$ | (3.55) |

## New rate option Counterfactual rate option

 Use model-calculated counterfactual rates

## Select single new rate (if applicable) Select single counterfactual rate (if applicable)

| E-TOU-C |
| :--- |
| E-TOU-C |


|  |  | Customer Average Bill Impact (\$/mo) |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Income Bracket | Bill Discount |  | SDG\&E | Inland | Coastal | Desert | Mountain |
| \$0-\$25,000 | None | 1 | \$ (10.12) | \$ (12.06) | \$ (9.04) | \$ (13.21) | \$ (28.48) |
| \$25,000-\$50,000 | None | 2 | \$ (10.31) | \$ (12.67) | \$ (9.05) | \$ (13.68) | \$ (26.69) |
| \$50,000-\$75,000 | None | 3 | \$ (0.14) | \$ (2.16) | \$ 1.59 | \$ (1.74) | \$ (15.57) |
| \$75,000-\$100,000 | None | 4 | \$ (0.05) | \$ (1.87) | \$ 1.69 | \$ 0.09 | \$ (14.79) |
| \$100,00-\$150,000 | None | 5 | \$ 6.11 | \$ 4.67 | \$ 7.57 | \$ 4.47 | \$ (7.20) |
| \$150,000-\$200,000 | None | 6 | \$ 7.07 | \$ 6.12 | \$ 7.98 | \$ 13.92 | \$ (4.41) |
| \$200,000+ | None | 7 | \$ 8.70 | \$ 8.14 | \$ 9.08 | \$ 4.00 | \$ (0.89) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \$0-\$25,000 | CARE | 1 | \$ (4.98) | \$ (7.18) | \$ (2.45) | \$ (25.28) | \$ (28.54) |
| \$25,000-\$50,000 | CARE | 2 | \$ (5.07) | \$ (7.12) | \$ (2.45) | \$ (26.30) | \$ (28.13) |
| \$50,000-\$75,000 | CARE | 3 | \$ 0.54 | \$ (1.56) | \$ 3.06 | N/A | \$ (22.72) |
| \$75,000-\$100,000 | CARE | 4 | \$ 0.98 | \$ (1.52) | \$ 3.17 | N/A | \$ (23.22) |
| \$100,00-\$150,000 | CARE | 5 | \$ 4.15 | \$ 1.29 | \$ 6.00 | N/A | N/A |
| \$150,000-\$200,000 | CARE | 6 | \$ 6.50 | N/A | \$ 6.50 | N/A | N/A |
| \$200,000+ | CARE | 7 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \$0-\$25,000 | FERA | 1 | \$ (7.54) | \$ (10.56) | \$ (3.51) | \$ (35.94) | \$ (43.38) |
| \$25,000-\$50,000 | FERA | 2 | \$ (7.66) | \$ (10.45) | \$ (3.50) | \$ (38.17) | \$ (42.48) |
| \$50,000-\$75,000 | FERA | 3 | \$ 1.22 | \$ (1.64) | \$ 5.21 | N/A | \$ (33.96) |
| \$75,000-\$100,000 | FERA | 4 | \$ 1.89 | \$ (1.55) | \$ 5.40 | N/A | \$ (35.02) |
| \$100,00-\$150,000 | FERA | 5 | \$ 6.89 | \$ 2.86 | \$ 9.87 | N/A | N/A |
| \$150,000-\$200,000 | FERA | 6 | \$ 10.65 | N/A | \$ 10.65 | N/A | N/A |
| \$200,000+ | FERA | 7 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |

New rate option Counterfactual rate option Use model-calculated counterfactual rates

## Select single new rate (if applicable)

 Select single counterfactual rate (if applicable)

| TOU-DR1 |
| :---: |
| TOU-DR1 |


| Customer Average Bill Impact (\$/mo) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Income Bracket | Bill Discount |  | SCE |  | 5 |  | 6 |  | 8 |  | 9 |  | 10 |  | 13 |  | 14 |  | 15 |  | 16 |  |
| \$0-\$25,000 | None | 1 | \$ | (10.40) | \$ | (12.58) | \$ | (4.57) | \$ | (6.41) | \$ | (13.23) | \$ | (14.40) | \$ | (20.95) | \$ | (18.70) | \$ | (24.47) | \$ | (8.08) |
| \$25,000-\$50,000 | None | 2 | \$ | (11.58) | \$ | (12.58) | \$ | (4.54) | \$ | (6.51) | \$ | (13.63) | \$ | (15.44) | \$ | (20.40) | \$ | (18.35) | \$ | (25.40) | \$ | (8.01) |
| \$50,000-\$75,000 | None | 3 | \$ | (2.62) | \$ | (3.84) | \$ | 4.25 | \$ | 2.23 | \$ | (4.91) | \$ | (6.56) | \$ | (10.68) | \$ | (9.18) | \$ | (16.03) | \$ | 0.79 |
| \$75,000-\$100,000 | None | 4 | \$ | (2.28) | \$ | (3.84) | \$ | 4.28 | \$ | 2.31 | \$ | (4.77) | \$ | (6.12) | \$ | (9.92) | \$ | (8.53) | \$ | (15.46) | \$ | 0.99 |
| \$100,00-\$150,000 | None | 5 | \$ | 2.87 | \$ | 0.75 | \$ | 8.95 | \$ | 7.02 | \$ | 0.02 | \$ | (0.74) | \$ | (4.38) | \$ | (3.27) | \$ | (10.34) | \$ | 5.79 |
| \$150,000-\$200,000 | None | 6 | \$ | 3.54 | \$ | 0.75 | \$ | 9.04 | \$ | 7.21 | \$ | 0.38 | \$ | 0.01 | \$ | (3.70) | \$ | (2.52) | \$ | (9.73) | \$ | 6.02 |
| \$200,000+ | None | 7 | \$ | 4.70 | \$ | 0.75 | \$ | 9.22 | \$ | 7.62 | \$ | 0.93 | \$ | 0.95 | \$ | (2.27) | \$ | (1.58) | \$ | (8.67) | \$ | 6.18 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \$0-\$25,000 | CARE | 1 | \$ | (4.76) | N/A |  | \$ | 0.26 | \$ | (1.21) | \$ | (3.61) | \$ | (7.50) | \$ | (9.09) | \$ | (9.34) | \$ | (11.24) | \$ | (5.72) |
| \$25,000-\$50,000 | CARE | 2 | \$ | (4.57) | N/A |  | \$ | 0.27 | \$ | (1.19) | \$ | (3.59) | \$ | (7.40) | \$ | (8.86) | \$ | (9.11) | \$ | (10.90) | \$ | (5.63) |
| \$50,000-\$75,000 | CARE | 3 | \$ | (0.13) | N/A |  | \$ | 4.61 | \$ | 3.15 | \$ | 0.76 | \$ | (2.92) | \$ | (4.36) | \$ | (4.64) | \$ | (6.39) | \$ | (1.31) |
| \$75,000-\$100,000 | CARE | 4 | \$ | (0.11) | N/A |  | \$ | 4.62 | \$ | 3.16 | \$ | 0.76 | \$ | (2.83) | \$ | (4.17) | \$ | (4.61) | \$ | (6.22) | \$ | (1.31) |
| \$100,00-\$150,000 | CARE | 5 | \$ | 2.33 | N/A |  | \$ | 6.91 | \$ | 5.45 | \$ | 3.05 | \$ | (0.40) | \$ | (1.88) | \$ | (2.08) | \$ | (3.83) | \$ | 1.10 |
| \$150,000-\$200,000 | CARE | 6 | \$ | 2.63 | N/A |  | \$ | 6.93 | \$ | 5.48 | \$ | 3.09 | \$ | (0.12) | \$ | (1.67) | \$ | (1.81) | \$ | (3.56) | \$ | 1.27 |
| \$200,000+ | CARE | 7 | \$ | 3.06 | N/A |  | \$ | 6.93 | \$ | 5.51 | \$ | 3.13 | \$ | 0.09 | \$ | (1.35) | \$ | (1.61) | \$ | (3.05) | \$ | 1.46 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \$0-\$25,000 | FERA | 1 | \$ | (8.31) | N/A |  | \$ | (0.26) | \$ | (2.66) | \$ | (6.76) | \$ | (12.92) | \$ | (15.33) | \$ | (15.94) | \$ | (19.25) | \$ | (10.48) |
| \$25,000-\$50,000 | FERA | 2 | \$ | (8.11) | N/A |  | \$ | (0.23) | \$ | (2.64) | \$ | (6.74) | \$ | (12.70) | \$ | (14.72) | \$ | (15.43) | \$ | (18.43) | \$ | (10.31) |
| \$50,000-\$75,000 | FERA | 3 | \$ | (0.81) | N/A |  | \$ | 6.94 | \$ | 4.56 | \$ | 0.46 | \$ | (5.22) | \$ | (7.15) | \$ | (7.97) | \$ | (10.86) | \$ | (3.17) |
| \$75,000-\$100,000 | FERA | 4 | \$ | (0.79) | N/A |  | \$ | 6.96 | \$ | 4.58 | \$ | 0.47 | \$ | (5.04) | \$ | (6.71) | \$ | (7.92) | \$ | (10.48) | \$ | (3.17) |
| \$100,00-\$150,000 | FERA | 5 | \$ | 3.22 | N/A |  | \$ | 10.75 | \$ | 8.37 | \$ | 4.25 | \$ | (0.94) | \$ | (2.90) | \$ | (3.63) | \$ | (6.47) | \$ | 0.84 |
| \$150,000-\$200,000 | FERA | 6 | \$ | 3.69 | N/A |  | \$ | 10.77 | \$ | 8.42 | \$ | 4.31 | \$ | (0.40) | \$ | (2.45) | \$ | (3.11) | \$ | (5.89) | \$ | 1.14 |
| \$200,000+ | FERA | 7 | \$ | 4.36 | N/A |  | \$ | 10.78 | \$ | 8.49 | \$ | 4.38 | \$ | (0.01) | \$ | (1.80) | \$ | (2.75) | \$ | (4.87) | \$ | 1.47 |

## New rate option

 Counterfactual rate option Use model-calculated counterfactual rates
## Select single new rate (if applicable)

 Select single counterfactual rate (if applicable)

| TOU-D-4-9 |
| :---: |
| TOU-D-4-9 |

## APPENDIX A. 2

Bill Impact Heat Maps - Tiered Rates

## PG\&E



## New rate option Counterfactual rate option

 Use model-calculated counterfactual rates| User-selected rate across all subclasses |
| :---: |
| User-selected rate across all subclasses |
| TRUE |

## Select single new rate (if applicable) Select single counterfactual rate (if applicable)

| $E-1$ |
| :--- |
| $E-1$ |


|  |  | Customer Average Bill Impact (\$/mo) |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Income Bracket | Bill Discount |  | SDG\&E | Inland | Coastal | Desert | Mountain |
| \$0-\$25,000 | None | 1 | \$ (10.38) | \$ (12.33) | \$ (9.30) | \$ (13.50) | \$ (28.91) |
| \$25,000-\$50,000 | None | 2 | \$ (10.57) | \$ (12.96) | \$ (9.30) | \$ (13.98) | \$ (27.10) |
| \$50,000-\$75,000 | None | 3 | \$ (0.38) | \$ (2.42) | \$ 1.36 | \$ (1.99) | \$ (15.96) |
| \$75,000-\$100,000 | None | 4 | \$ (0.29) | \$ (2.13) | \$ 1.46 | \$ (0.14) | \$ (15.16) |
| \$100,00-\$150,000 | None | 5 | \$ 5.89 | \$ 4.44 | \$ 7.36 | \$ 4.23 | \$ (7.54) |
| \$150,000-\$200,000 | None | 6 | \$ 6.86 | \$ 5.90 | \$ 7.77 | \$ 13.79 | \$ (4.73) |
| \$200,000+ | None | 7 | \$ 8.50 | \$ 7.94 | \$ 8.89 | \$ 3.76 | \$ (1.17) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \$0-\$25,000 | CARE | 1 | \$ (5.14) | \$ (7.35) | \$ (2.59) | \$ (25.60) | \$ (28.89) |
| \$25,000-\$50,000 | CARE | 2 | \$ (5.22) | \$ (7.30) | \$ (2.59) | \$ (26.63) | \$ (28.48) |
| \$50,000-\$75,000 | CARE | 3 | \$ 0.39 | \$ (1.74) | \$ 2.92 | N/A | \$ (23.07) |
| \$75,000-\$100,000 | CARE | 4 | \$ 0.83 | \$ (1.69) | \$ 3.03 | N/A | \$ (23.57) |
| \$100,00-\$150,000 | CARE | 5 | \$ 3.99 | \$ 1.11 | \$ 5.86 | N/A | N/A |
| \$150,000-\$200,000 | CARE | 6 | \$ 6.37 | N/A | \$ 6.37 | N/A | N/A |
| \$200,000+ | CARE | 7 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \$0-\$25,000 | FERA | 1 | \$ (7.75) | \$ (10.79) | \$ (3.68) | \$ (36.39) | \$ (43.89) |
| \$25,000-\$50,000 | FERA | 2 | \$ (7.87) | \$ (10.69) | \$ (3.68) | \$ (38.65) | \$ (42.99) |
| \$50,000-\$75,000 | FERA | 3 | \$ 1.03 | \$ (1.85) | \$ 5.06 | N/A | \$ (34.45) |
| \$75,000-\$100,000 | FERA | 4 | \$ 1.71 | \$ (1.76) | \$ 5.25 | N/A | \$ (35.51) |
| \$100,00-\$150,000 | FERA | 5 | \$ 6.73 | \$ 2.66 | \$ 9.73 | N/A | N/A |
| \$150,000-\$200,000 | FERA | 6 | \$ 10.51 | N/A | \$ 10.51 | N/A | N/A |
| \$200,000+ | FERA | 7 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |

## New rate option

Counterfactual rate option Use model-calculated counterfactual rates

Select single new rate (if applicable) Select single counterfactual rate (if applicable)


| DR |
| :---: |
| DR |



## APPENDIX A. 3

Bill Impact Heat Maps - EV Rates

## PG\&E

| Customer Average Bill Impact (\$/mo) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Income Bracket | Bill Discount |  | PG\&E |  | P |  | Q |  | R |  | S |  | T |  | V |  | W |  | X |  | Y |  | Z |  |
| \$0-\$25,000 | None | 1 | \$ | (6.25) | \$ | (21.34) | \$ | (17.68) | \$ | (20.51) | \$ | (17.51) | \$ | 0.18 | \$ | (10.51) | \$ | (18.16) | \$ | (8.53) | \$ | (10.28) | \$ | 3.64 |
| \$25,000-\$50,000 | None | 2 | \$ | (9.90) | \$ | (21.07) | \$ | (17.66) | \$ | (20.61) | \$ | (17.33) | \$ | 0.25 | \$ | (10.61) | \$ | (18.42) | \$ | (8.54) | \$ | (10.27) | \$ | 3.66 |
| \$50,000-\$75,000 | None | 3 | \$ | (1.21) | \$ | (11.71) | \$ | (8.46) | \$ | (10.66) | \$ | (7.64) | \$ | 9.42 | \$ | (1.52) | \$ | (8.24) | \$ | 0.68 | \$ | (1.17) | \$ | 12.71 |
| \$75,000-\$100,000 | None | 4 | \$ | (0.49) | \$ | (11.25) | \$ | (8.48) | \$ | (9.56) | \$ | (6.76) | \$ | 9.48 | \$ | (1.41) | \$ | (6.69) | \$ | 0.78 | \$ | (1.16) | \$ | 12.73 |
| \$100,00-\$150,000 | None | 5 | \$ | 5.21 | \$ | (5.95) | \$ | (3.41) | \$ | (3.48) | \$ | (1.01) | \$ | 14.32 | \$ | 3.46 | \$ | (0.06) | \$ | 5.73 | \$ | 3.63 | \$ | 17.52 |
| \$150,000-\$200,000 | None | 6 | \$ | 6.37 | \$ | (4.90) | \$ | (3.20) | \$ | (2.01) | \$ | 0.23 | \$ | 14.37 | \$ | 3.59 | \$ | 2.02 | \$ | 5.96 | \$ | 3.65 | \$ | 17.47 |
| \$200,000+ | None | 7 | \$ | 7.97 | \$ | (3.59) | \$ | (2.47) | \$ | 0.24 | \$ | 2.02 | \$ | 14.48 | \$ | 3.62 | \$ | 4.45 | \$ | 6.64 | \$ | 3.71 | \$ | 17.47 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \$0-\$25,000 | CARE | 1 | \$ | (5.99) | \$ | (13.09) | \$ | (9.43) | \$ | (10.05) | \$ | (8.45) | \$ | (0.30) | \$ | (3.37) | \$ | (9.47) | \$ | (3.57) | \$ | (10.67) | \$ | (5.47) |
| \$25,000-\$50,000 | CARE | 2 | \$ | (6.32) | \$ | (13.02) | \$ | (9.42) | \$ | (9.73) | \$ | (8.24) | \$ | (0.26) | \$ | (3.38) | \$ | (9.01) | \$ | (3.49) | \$ | (10.67) | \$ | (5.55) |
| \$50,000-\$75,000 | CARE | 3 | \$ | (1.75) | \$ | (8.81) | \$ | (5.06) | \$ | (5.33) | \$ | (3.99) | \$ | 3.84 | \$ | 0.79 | \$ | (4.40) | \$ | 0.62 | \$ | (6.57) | \$ | (1.51) |
| \$75,000-\$100,000 | CARE | 4 | \$ | (1.57) | \$ | (8.79) | \$ | (4.51) | \$ | (5.20) | \$ | (3.76) | \$ | 3.86 | \$ | 0.88 | \$ | (3.90) | \$ | 0.62 | \$ | (6.58) | \$ | (1.53) |
| \$100,00-\$150,000 | CARE | 5 | \$ | 0.85 | \$ | (6.56) | \$ | (3.11) | \$ | (2.67) | \$ | (1.40) | \$ | 6.02 | \$ | 2.88 | \$ | (1.46) | \$ | 2.85 | \$ | (4.42) | \$ | 0.58 |
| \$150,000-\$200,000 | CARE | 6 | \$ | 1.35 | \$ | (6.40) | \$ | (3.34) | \$ | (2.43) | \$ | (1.21) | \$ | 6.01 | \$ | 2.86 | \$ | (0.74) | \$ | 2.87 | \$ | (4.42) | \$ | 0.71 |
| \$200,000+ | CARE | 7 | \$ | 2.09 | \$ | (5.90) | \$ | (3.34) | \$ | (1.96) | \$ | (0.87) | \$ | 6.02 | \$ | 3.03 | \$ | (0.44) | \$ | 2.95 | \$ | (4.41) | \$ | (1.46) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \$0-\$25,000 | FERA | 1 | \$ | (10.46) | \$ | (24.24) | \$ | (17.24) | \$ | (18.31) | \$ | (15.56) | \$ | (0.74) | \$ | (6.42) | \$ | (17.27) | \$ | (6.66) | \$ | (19.94) | \$ | (11.18) |
| \$25,000-\$50,000 | FERA | 2 | \$ | (10.85) |  | (24.12) | \$ | (17.22) | \$ | (17.37) | \$ | (15.02) | \$ | (0.66) | \$ | (6.44) | \$ | (15.99) | \$ | (6.51) | \$ | (19.94) | \$ | (11.88) |
| \$50,000-\$75,000 | FERA | 3 | \$ | (2.58) |  | (16.45) | \$ | (9.13) | \$ | (9.03) | \$ | (7.16) | \$ | 6.84 | \$ | 1.20 | \$ | (7.20) | \$ | 1.02 | \$ | (12.46) | \$ | (4.69) |
| \$75,000-\$100,000 | FERA | 4 | \$ | (2.30) |  | (16.41) | \$ | (7.97) | \$ | (8.71) | \$ | (6.62) | \$ | 6.90 | \$ | 1.38 | \$ | (6.08) | \$ | 1.01 | \$ | (12.46) | \$ | (4.84) |
| \$100,00-\$150,000 | FERA | 5 | \$ | 2.02 |  | (12.35) | \$ | (5.63) | \$ | (3.86) | \$ | (2.21) | \$ | 10.85 | \$ | 5.01 | \$ | (1.54) | \$ | 5.11 | \$ | (8.54) | \$ | (1.12) |
| \$150,000-\$200,000 | FERA | 6 | \$ | 2.79 |  | (12.10) | \$ | (6.16) | \$ | (3.32) | \$ | (1.80) | \$ | 10.82 | \$ | 4.98 | \$ | (0.15) | \$ | 5.15 | \$ | (8.53) | \$ | (0.17) |
| \$200,000+ | FERA | 7 | \$ | 3.89 | \$ | (11.30) | \$ | (6.16) | \$ | (2.36) | \$ | (1.10) | \$ | 10.84 | \$ | 5.30 | \$ | 0.38 | \$ | 5.32 | \$ | (8.52) | \$ | (4.00) |

# New rate option Counterfactual rate option Use model-calculated counterfactual rates 



## Select single new rate (if applicable) Select single counterfactual rate (if applicable)

| EV2-A |
| :--- |
| EV2-A |


|  |  |  | Customer Average Bill Impact (\$/mo) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Income Bracket | Bill Discount |  | SDG\&E | Inland |  | astal |  | Desert |  | ountain |
| \$0-\$25,000 | None | 1 | \$ (10.64) | \$ (12.34) | \$ | (9.89) |  | (13.43) | \$ | (20.96) |
| \$25,000-\$50,000 | None | 2 | \$ (10.77) | \$ (12.50) | \$ | (9.89) |  | (13.46) | \$ | (20.47) |
| \$50,000-\$75,000 | None | 3 | \$ (0.51) | \$ (1.94) | \$ | 0.69 |  | (2.80) | \$ | (9.74) |
| \$75,000-\$100,000 | None | 4 | \$ (0.53) | \$ (1.86) | \$ | 0.70 |  | (2.69) | \$ | (9.52) |
| \$100,00-\$150,000 | None | 5 | \$ 5.14 | \$ 3.94 | \$ | 6.29 |  | 2.79 | \$ | (3.41) |
| \$150,000-\$200,000 | None | 6 | \$ 5.40 | \$ 4.31 | \$ | 6.34 |  | 3.38 | \$ | (2.64) |
| \$200,000+ | None | 7 | \$ 5.85 | \$ 4.82 | \$ | 6.47 | \$ | 2.76 | \$ | (1.67) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \$0-\$25,000 | CARE | 1 | \$ (5.28) | \$ (6.24) | \$ | (4.20) |  | (13.50) | \$ | (14.91) |
| \$25,000-\$50,000 | CARE | 2 | \$ (5.32) | \$ (6.22) | \$ | (4.20) |  | (13.90) |  | (14.83) |
| \$50,000-\$75,000 | CARE | 3 | \$ 0.20 | \$ (0.72) | \$ | 1.29 |  | N/A | \$ | (9.36) |
| \$75,000-\$100,000 | CARE | 4 | \$ 0.38 | \$ (0.70) | \$ | 1.33 |  | J/A | \$ | (9.46) |
| \$100,00-\$150,000 | CARE | 5 | \$ 3.39 | \$ 2.15 | \$ | 4.19 |  | //A | N/ |  |
| \$150,000-\$200,000 | CARE | 6 | \$ 4.34 | N/A | \$ | 4.34 |  | //A | N/ |  |
| \$200,000+ | CARE | 7 | N/A | N/A | N/A |  |  | /A | N/ |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \$0-\$25,000 | FERA | 1 | \$ (8.01) | \$ (9.72) |  | (5.80) |  | (22.69) | \$ | (25.74) |
| \$25,000-\$50,000 | FERA | 2 | \$ (8.12) | \$ (9.71) | \$ | (5.80) |  | (23.43) |  | (25.50) |
| \$50,000-\$75,000 | FERA | 3 | \$ 0.61 | \$ (1.02) | \$ | 2.88 |  | //A |  | (16.87) |
| \$75,000-\$100,000 | FERA | 4 | \$ 0.93 | \$ (1.01) | \$ | 2.89 |  | //A |  | (17.15) |
| \$100,00-\$150,000 | FERA | 5 | \$ 5.78 | \$ 3.53 | \$ | 7.44 |  | J/A | N/ |  |
| \$150,000-\$200,000 | FERA | 6 | \$ 7.50 | N/A | \$ | 7.50 |  | N/A | N/ |  |
| \$200,000+ | FERA | 7 | N/A | N/A | N/A |  |  | //A | N/ |  |

## New rate option

Counterfactual rate option Use model-calculated counterfactual rates

Select single new rate (if applicable) Select single counterfactual rate (if applicable)


| EV-TOU-5 |
| :--- |
| EV-TOU-5 |



APPENDIX A. 4
Bill Impact Heat Maps - Electrification Rates

## PG\&E

| Customer Average Bill Impact (\$/mo) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Income Bracket | Bill Discount |  | PG\&E |  | P |  | Q |  | R |  | S |  | T |  | V |  | W |  | X |  | Y |  | Z |  |
| \$0-\$25,000 | None | 1 | \$ | (7.44) | \$ | (15.29) | \$ | (13.11) | \$ | (15.20) | \$ | (13.64) | \$ | (3.96) | \$ | (9.53) | \$ | (14.16) | \$ | (8.69) | \$ | (9.44) | \$ | (2.11) |
| \$25,000-\$50,000 | None | 2 | \$ | (9.43) | \$ | (15.21) | \$ | (13.11) | \$ | (15.23) | \$ | (13.58) | \$ | (3.95) | \$ | (9.56) | \$ | (14.26) | \$ | (8.69) | \$ | (9.44) | \$ | (2.10) |
| \$50,000-\$75,000 | None | 3 | \$ | (0.67) | \$ | (6.06) | \$ | (4.00) | \$ | (5.89) | \$ | (4.30) | \$ | 5.15 | \$ | (0.49) | \$ | (4.80) | \$ | 0.42 | \$ | (0.38) | \$ | 6.95 |
| \$75,000-\$100,000 | None | 4 | \$ | (0.36) | \$ | (5.92) | \$ | (4.01) | \$ | (5.52) | \$ | (3.99) | \$ | 5.16 | \$ | (0.46) | \$ | (4.24) | \$ | 0.44 | \$ | (0.40) | \$ | 6.96 |
| \$100,00-\$150,000 | None | 5 | \$ | 4.82 | \$ | (0.99) | \$ | 0.85 | \$ | (0.33) | \$ | 1.12 | \$ | 9.94 | \$ | 4.33 | \$ | 1.18 | \$ | 5.26 | \$ | 4.35 | \$ | 11.73 |
| \$150,000-\$200,000 | None | 6 | \$ | 5.38 | \$ | (0.67) | \$ | 0.91 | \$ | 0.15 | \$ | 1.56 | \$ | 9.95 | \$ | 4.37 | \$ | 1.93 | \$ | 5.32 | \$ | 4.32 | \$ | 11.70 |
| \$200,000+ | None | 7 | \$ | 6.16 | \$ | (0.27) | \$ | 1.14 | \$ | 0.89 | \$ | 2.19 | \$ | 9.98 | \$ | 4.37 | \$ | 2.80 | \$ | 5.52 | \$ | 4.25 | \$ | 11.70 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \$0-\$25,000 | CARE | 1 | \$ | (4.20) | \$ | (6.11) | \$ | (5.02) | \$ | (5.44) | \$ | (4.96) | \$ | (2.52) | \$ | (3.39) | \$ | (5.33) | \$ | (3.44) | \$ | (5.46) | \$ | (4.18) |
| \$25,000-\$50,000 | CARE | 2 | \$ | (4.32) | \$ | (6.10) | \$ | (5.01) | \$ | (5.38) | \$ | (4.91) | \$ | (2.52) | \$ | (3.39) | \$ | (5.23) | \$ | (3.42) | \$ | (5.46) | \$ | (4.20) |
| \$50,000-\$75,000 | CARE | 3 | \$ | (0.12) | \$ | (2.00) | \$ | (0.89) | \$ | (1.24) | \$ | (0.80) | \$ | 1.57 | \$ | 0.71 | \$ | (1.04) | \$ | 0.66 | \$ | (1.39) | \$ | (0.13) |
| \$75,000-\$100,000 | CARE | 4 | \$ | (0.07) | \$ | (2.00) | \$ | (0.79) | \$ | (1.21) | \$ | (0.76) | \$ | 1.57 | \$ | 0.74 | \$ | (0.94) | \$ | 0.66 | \$ | (1.39) | \$ | (0.13) |
| \$100,00-\$150,000 | CARE | 5 | \$ | 2.14 | \$ | 0.16 | \$ | 1.22 | \$ | 1.01 | \$ | 1.43 | \$ | 3.72 | \$ | 2.84 | \$ | 1.26 | \$ | 2.82 | \$ | 0.75 | \$ | 2.00 |
| \$150,000-\$200,000 | CARE | 6 | \$ | 2.28 | \$ | 0.18 | \$ | 1.18 | \$ | 1.05 | \$ | 1.46 | \$ | 3.72 | \$ | 2.83 | \$ | 1.40 | \$ | 2.82 | \$ | 0.75 | \$ | 2.03 |
| \$200,000+ | CARE | 7 | \$ | 2.51 | \$ | 0.25 | \$ | 1.18 | \$ | 1.15 | \$ | 1.53 | \$ | 3.72 | \$ | 2.88 | \$ | 1.47 | \$ | 2.84 | \$ | 0.75 | \$ | 1.47 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \$0-\$25,000 | FERA | 1 | \$ | (8.67) | \$ | (15.34) | \$ | (11.64) | \$ | (13.03) | \$ | (11.51) | \$ | (3.53) | \$ | (6.39) | \$ | (12.65) | \$ | (6.51) | \$ | (13.30) | \$ | (9.35) |
| \$25,000-\$50,000 | FERA | 2 | \$ | (8.98) | \$ | (15.31) | \$ | (11.63) | \$ | (12.71) | \$ | (11.32) | \$ | (3.50) | \$ | (6.40) | \$ | (12.19) | \$ | (6.46) | \$ | (13.31) | \$ | (9.67) |
| \$50,000-\$75,000 | FERA | 3 | \$ | (1.18) | \$ | (7.83) | \$ | (4.00) | \$ | (4.97) | \$ | (3.74) | \$ | 3.95 | \$ | 1.12 | \$ | (4.27) | \$ | 1.00 | \$ | (5.92) | \$ | (2.36) |
| \$75,000-\$100,000 | FERA | 4 | \$ | (1.07) | \$ | (7.82) | \$ | (3.64) | \$ | (4.86) | \$ | (3.56) | \$ | 3.97 | \$ | 1.20 | \$ | (3.87) | \$ | 1.00 | \$ | (5.91) | \$ | (2.43) |
| \$100,00-\$150,000 | FERA | 5 | \$ | 2.99 | \$ | (3.88) | \$ | (0.22) | \$ | (0.63) | \$ | 0.52 | \$ | 7.89 | \$ | 4.97 | \$ | 0.26 | \$ | 4.96 | \$ | (2.04) | \$ | 1.38 |
| \$150,000-\$200,000 | FERA | 6 | \$ | 3.41 | \$ | (3.83) | \$ | (0.38) | \$ | (0.45) | \$ | 0.66 | \$ | 7.88 | \$ | 4.96 | \$ | 0.76 | \$ | 4.98 | \$ | (2.04) | \$ | 1.82 |
| \$200,000+ | FERA | 7 | \$ | 4.01 | \$ | (3.65) | \$ | (0.38) | \$ | (0.12) | \$ | 0.90 | \$ | 7.89 | \$ | 5.11 | \$ | 0.95 | \$ | 5.03 | \$ | (2.06) | \$ | 0.04 |

## New rate option Counterfactual rate option

 Use model-calculated counterfactual rates

## Select single new rate (if applicable)

 Select single counterfactual rate (if applicable)|  |  | Customer Average Bill Impact (\$/mo) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Income Bracket | Bill Discount |  | SDG\&E | Inland |  | oastal | Desert | Mountain |
| \$0-\$25,000 | None | 1 | \$ (10.61) | \$ (12.30) | \$ | (9.87) | \$ (13.37) | \$ (20.77) |
| \$25,000-\$50,000 | None | 2 | \$ (10.74) | \$ (12.45) | \$ | (9.87) | \$ (13.40) | \$ (20.29) |
| \$50,000-\$75,000 | None | 3 | \$ (0.49) | \$ (1.91) | \$ | 0.69 | \$ (2.77) | \$ (9.59) |
| \$75,000-\$100,000 | None | 4 | \$ (0.52) | \$ (1.84) | \$ | 0.70 | \$ (2.68) | \$ (9.39) |
| \$100,00-\$150,000 | None | 5 | \$ 5.13 | \$ 3.95 | \$ | 6.28 | \$ 2.80 | \$ (3.30) |
| \$150,000-\$200,000 | None | 6 | \$ 5.39 | \$ 4.30 | \$ | 6.32 | \$ 3.29 | \$ (2.56) |
| \$200,000+ | None | 7 | \$ 5.83 | \$ 4.79 | \$ | 6.44 | \$ 2.78 | \$ (1.63) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \$0-\$25,000 | CARE | 1 | \$ (5.27) | \$ (6.21) | \$ | (4.21) | \$ (13.33) | \$ (14.71) |
| \$25,000-\$50,000 | CARE | 2 | \$ (5.31) | \$ (6.19) |  | (4.21) | \$ (13.72) | \$ (14.64) |
| \$50,000-\$75,000 | CARE | 3 | \$ 0.21 | \$ (0.69) | \$ | 1.28 | N/A | \$ (9.17) |
| \$75,000-\$100,000 | CARE | 4 | \$ 0.39 | \$ (0.68) | \$ | 1.31 | N/A | \$ (9.26) |
| \$100,00-\$150,000 | CARE | 5 | \$ 3.39 | \$ 2.18 | \$ | 4.18 | N/A | N/A |
| \$150,000-\$200,000 | CARE | 6 | \$ 4.33 | N/A | \$ | 4.33 | N/A | N/A |
| \$200,000+ | CARE | 7 | N/A | N/A | N/A |  | N/A | N/A |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \$0-\$25,000 | FERA | 1 | \$ (7.99) | \$ (9.67) |  | (5.81) | \$ (22.44) | \$ (25.43) |
| \$25,000-\$50,000 | FERA | 2 | \$ (8.09) | \$ (9.66) |  | (5.81) | \$ (23.16) | \$ (25.20) |
| \$50,000-\$75,000 | FERA | 3 | \$ 0.62 | \$ (0.99) | \$ | 2.85 | N/A | \$ (16.58) |
| \$75,000-\$100,000 | FERA | 4 | \$ 0.93 | \$ (0.98) | \$ | 2.86 | N/A | \$ (16.85) |
| \$100,00-\$150,000 | FERA | 5 | \$ 5.76 | \$ 3.55 | \$ | 7.40 | N/A | N/A |
| \$150,000-\$200,000 | FERA | 6 | \$ 7.46 | N/A | \$ | 7.46 | N/A | N/A |
| \$200,000+ | FERA | 7 | N/A | N/A | N/A |  | N/A | N/A |

## New rate option

Counterfactual rate option Use model-calculated counterfactual rates

Select single new rate (if applicable) Select single counterfactual rate (if applicable)


| TOU-ELEC |
| :--- |
| TOU-ELEC |


[^0]:    ${ }^{\mathbf{1}}$ Designing Electricity Rates for An Equitable Energy Transition, P. 7. Professor Borenstein from the Energy Institute at HAAS expresses concern that the volumetric retail rates in California are multiples above social marginal costs. Social marginal costs include the "marginal costs of generation, transmission, distribution and greenhouse gas emissions that are associated with producing an additional unit of electricity. Adding the unpriced portion of pollution damages resulting from electricity yields the social marginal cost." The portion of volumetric rates above marginal costs include additional "system costs that do not scale with usage. These include fixed costs that range from regular maintenance to wildfire mitigation to cross-subsidies for CARE [California Alternate Rates for Energy] customers and rooftop solar." These are all costs that are being recovered through high volumetric prices.
    https://www.next10.org/publications/electricity-rates.
    $\underline{2} 2019$ Annual Affordability Report, p. 36. https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/energy-division/documents/affordability-proceeding/r1807006--2019-annual-affordability-report.pdf.

[^1]:    ${ }^{3}$ Cal Advocates' estimated bill impacts from the IGFC proposal utilized a tier rate structure to better isolate the impact of implementing an income based fixed charge. Implementing the IGFC proposal with a TOU rate may provide customers with even more savings depending on the customer's ability to shift load outside of the peak hours.

[^2]:    ${ }^{4}$ Inflation figures taken from https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation calculator.htm. Utility average rates taken from annual electric true up (PG\&E) and annual consolidated (SCE and SDG\&E) advice letter filings going back to 2009 .

[^3]:    $\underline{5}$ Utility Costs and Affordability Of The Grid Of The Future An Evaluation Of Electric Costs, Rates And Equity Issues Pursuant To P.U. Code Section 913.1, dated May 2021, p. 8.
    ${ }^{6}$ Utility Costs and Affordability of The Grid Of The Future An Evaluation Of Electric Costs, Rates And Equity Issues Pursuant To P.U. Code Section 913.1, dated May 2021, p. 7.
    ${ }^{7}$ Utility average rates taken from annual electric true up (PG\&E) and annual consolidated (SCE and SDG\&E) advice letter filings going back to 2009.
    ${ }^{8}$ Utility Costs and Affordability of The Grid Of The Future An Evaluation Of Electric Costs, Rates And Equity Issues Pursuant To P.U. Code Section 913.1, dated May 2021, pp. 4-5.

[^4]:    ${ }^{9}$ The revenue requirement is the Commission approved amount of revenue that utilities are guaranteed to recover through rates. The revenue requirement consists of the utility's cost to serve customers and additional public purpose costs intended to meet the Commission's policy objectives.

[^5]:    ${ }^{10}$ Public Utilities Code § 740.12(a)(1).
    ${ }^{11}$ Governor Brown Executive Order B-48-18. Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown, "Governor Brown Takes Action to Fund Zero-Emission Vehicles, Fund New Climate Investments," January 26 2018, accessed April 13, 2021 at https://www.ca.gov/archive/gov39/2018/01/26/governor-brown-takes-actionto-increase-zero-emission-vehicles-fund-new-climate-investments/index.html.
    $\underline{12}^{12}$ According to Decision (D.) 20-08-045, p. 7, the Legislature also found that "[a]dvanced clean vehicles and fuels are needed to reduce petroleum use, to meet air quality standards, to improve public health, and to achieve greenhouse gas emissions reductions goals," and that widespread transportation electrification "requires electrical corporations to increase access to the use of electricity as a transportation fuel." corporations to increase access to the use of electricity as a transportation fuel."

[^6]:    $\underline{13}$ Application (A.) 20-10-011, Exh. PG\&E Testimony on its Commercial Day Ahead Real-Time Pricing (DAHRTP) Pilot, p. 1-Attachment A-29.
    $\underline{14}$ February 24, 2021 En Banc on Energy Rates and Costs, Presentation of David Rapson Slide 36, https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC Public Website/Content/Utilities and Industries/Energy _- Electricity and_Natural_Gas/Rates\%20En\%20Banc_PANEL\%201_Updated.pdf.
    $\underline{15}$ For example, SMUD residential fixed charge is $\$ 23.50$ for all customers. https://www.smud.org/-/media/Documents/Rate-Information/Rates/1-R.ashx. Modesto Irrigation District's fixed charge is \$30/month for all customers. https://www.mid.org/tariffs/rates/d residential.pdf. City of Riverside features fixed charges ranging from $\$ 22.06 /$ month to $\$ 72.06 /$ month depending on the size of the home.

[^7]:    This includes combined a monthly flat charge of $\$ 12.06$ and a "reliability charge" which accounts for residence size. https://riversideca.gov/utilities/sites/riversideca.gov.utilities/files/pdf/rates-electric/Electric\%20Schedule\%20D\%20-\%20Effective\%2001-1-19.pdf
    16 D.16-01-044, p. 90.
    ${ }^{17}$ I.e. determine how much of a utility's revenue requirement is assigned to each customer class (residential, small commercial, large commercial, agriculture, etc.).

[^8]:    $\underline{18}$ D.21-11-019, Conclusion of Law (COL) 31, p. 164.
    $\underline{19}$ Tool may be accessed via https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/industries-and-topics/electrical-energy/electric-costs/demand-response-dr/demand-flexibility-rulemaking.
    $\underline{20}$ As provided in the Public E3 IGFC Tool.

[^9]:    $\underline{\mathbf{2 1}}$ From the Public tool, values derived by taking the marginal customer access costs revenues for each IOU and dividing by the total billing months in compute a monthly value.
    $\underline{22}$ As defined by the NEM 2.0 decision (D.16-01-044). A more expansive list was established for purposes of developing economic development rates.
    ${ }^{23}$ California Alternative Rates for Energy (CARE).
    $\underline{24}$ Electric Program Investment Charge (EPIC).
    $\underline{25}$ D. 19-10-056, COL 31.
    $\underline{26}$ https://www.pge.com/en US/small-medium-business/your-account/your-bill/understand-your-
    bill/glossary/glossary.page "PG\&E has been permitted to issue bonds that enable it to recover more quickly certain costs related to preventing and mitigating catastrophic wildfires, while reducing the total cost to its customers. Your bill for electric service includes a fixed recovery charge called the Wildfire Hardening Charge that has been approved by the CPUC to repay those bonds. The right to recover the Wildfire Hardening Charge has been transferred to a separate entity (called the Special Purpose Entity) that issued the bonds and does not belong to PG\&E. PG\&E is collecting the Wildfire Hardening Charge on behalf of the Special Purpose Entity."

[^10]:    $\underline{27}$ Discussion with IOUs on March 13, 2023.

[^11]:    ${ }^{28}$ Data taken from the IGFC tool.

[^12]:    29 CalEnviroScreen 4.0 Report, dated October 2021, p. 8.
    https://oehha.ca.gov/calenviroscreen/report/calenviroscreen-40
    응 CalEnviroScreen is a screening methodology that can be used to help identify California communities that are disproportionately burdened by multiple sources of pollution.
    https://oehha.ca.gov/calenviroscreen/report/calenviroscreen-40

[^13]:    ${ }^{31}$ The inability to access FTB information in interim contributes to this challenge. Refer to chapter 2 for details on Cal Advocates' income verification method.

[^14]:    32 See "IOU Data" and "Haas Data" in the E3 Fixed Charge Tool.
    ${ }^{33}$ See Section C, pp. 7-14-12, for Cal Advocates' proposed IGFC methodology. See Appendix A. 1 for break out of proposed cost allocation inputs in the Tool.
    ${ }^{34}$ See Section E, pp. 20 23-24, for explanation of proposal to use funds from the CCC to cover all IGFCs for low-income customers.

[^15]:    ${ }^{35}$ Percentage of customers saving more than $\$ 10 /$ month out of total seeing bill savings is calculated by dividing the percentage in the " $>\$ 10$ decrease" row by the percentage in the "Subtotal (decrease)" row for Tables $6-87-9$. In this example shown, that would be $33 \%$ of the non-CARE middle income customers divided by the $45 \%$ subtotal for non-CARE middle-income customers to reach approximately $73 \%$.

[^16]:    ${ }^{36}$ The E3 Fixed Charge Tool calculates average monthly customer bill impacts for an average customer in each income interval aggregated from average consumption per baseline zone, net energy metering (NEM) status, and bill discount program (CARE or FERA) from 2021 data.

[^17]:    39 More information on the California Climate Credit can be found at https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/climatecredit/.

