

1373 S State St, San Jacinto Incident Investigation Report

CPUC - SAFETY AND ENFORCEMENT DIVISION
GAS SAFETY AND RELIABILITY BRANCH

Event Date: March 20, 2025

DOT No. 1426420

CPUC SED No. G20250320-3827

CPUC Report Date:	September 11, 2025, Final
Investigators:	Gordon Kuo
Date incident reported to CPUC	March 20, 2025
Utility:	Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas)
Date and Time of the Incident:	3/29/2024, 0800 Hours
Location of the Incident:	San Jacinto, CA, Los Angeles County



California Public
Utilities Commission

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Executive Summary

Summary of Incident

On March 20, 2025, at approximately 1130 hours, a subcontractor hired by SoCalGas was operating a backhoe during excavation when it struck a 1-inch diameter, 3-inch-long nipple welded to the top of an 8-inch diameter High Pressure Distribution Gas Main, SL41-17 resulting in the release of natural gas into the atmosphere. SED's investigation found that SoCalGas failed to follow California Government Code (CGC) §4216.4(a)(1) which requires excavators to determine the exact location of subsurface installations in conflict with the excavation using hand tools before using any power-driven excavation or boring equipment within the tolerance zone of subsurface installations. Therefore, SED finds SoCalGas in violation of CGC §4216.4(a)(1). In addition, SED found that SoCalGas is in violation of General Order (G.O.) 112-F, Reference Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 192, §192.605(b)(3) for failing to make known the existence of the 1-inch diameter, 3-inch-long nipple to field personnel before starting the excavation. Furthermore, SED found SoCalGas in violation of G.O. 112-F, Reference Title 49 CFR Part 192, §192.605(a) for failing to follow SoCalGas Gas Standard (GS) 184.09, Section 4.3.1.5 and 4.3.1.14 which requires SoCalGas to provide guidance while its contractors conduct excavation activities within the delineated areas of excavation.

Incident Investigation

Summary of Incident and Investigation

On March 20, 2025, at approximately 1130 hours, a SoCalGas' contractor, Teichert hired a subcontractor, Sharps Backhoe, to excavate and expose a SoCalGas' abandoned 6-inch diameter medium pressure gas pipeline (MPGP). While excavating, the Sharps Backhoe's bucket struck the 1-inch diameter, 3-inch-long nipple welded to the top of adjacent 8-inch¹ diameter High Pressure Distribution Gas Main SL41-17. This resulted in damage to SoCalGas' 1-inch diameter, 3-inch-long nipple and a release of natural gas into the atmosphere. There were no fatalities, injuries, or fire reported as the result of this incident. The incident resulted in a service interruption of 5 customers and the evacuation of four blocks. The incident was reported to both the CPUC and PHMSA due to media coverage and loss of gas over 3 million cubic feet. The DOT number for this incident is 1426420.

On March 21, 2025, SED investigator Gordon Kuo visited the site and interviewed SoCalGas and Teichert representatives. Based on interview statements, on March 19, 2025, the SoCalGas' abandoned 6-inches diameter medium pressure gas pipeline (MPGP) was potholed to confirm its exact location before starting the excavation. On March 20, 2025, Teichert's crew used jackhammers to break apart the 2-sac slurry on top of the MPGP, while a backhoe was used to help carry out chunks of 2- sac slurry out of the trench. The backhoe's bucket hitting the 1-inch diameter, 3-inch-long nipple welded to the top of SL41-17. In addition, SED investigation found that SL41-17 was within the delignated areas, but the excavators failed to determine the exact location of SL41-17 using hand tools before using any power-driven excavation or boring equipment within the tolerance zone of SL41-17.

On March 21, 2025, SoCalGas' crews excavated north and east of the damaged section, installed pressure control fittings to control the flow of gas, operated a valve at a regulating station (south of the damaged section of SL41-17). SoCalGas' crews were able to isolate the damaged section of SL41-17 and stop the flow of gas at approximately 1229 hours. SoCalGas' crews installed a larger diameter nipple, performed a dye penetration test to check for defects, performed a leak survey to check for gas leaks, and restored gas service to the affected customers at approximately 0330 hours.

During SED's field investigation, Mr. Kuo observed SoCalGas' marking of the MPGP & SL41-17 and confirmed that the marking was consistent with SoCalGas' construction maps. In addition, the construction maps did indicate the existence of the 8"x6" oversized pressure control fitting but not the 1-inch diameter, 3-inch-long nipple welded to the top of the SL41-17. According to SoCalGas & Teichert's representatives, seven (7) people were working at the site at the time of the incident

¹ **Note:** SL41-17 is 8 inches in diameter except for the 8"x6" reducing elbow at the intersection of the damage.

(Teichert – five people, SoCalGas - one Stand-by person, and Sharps Backhoe – one person). Immediately after this incident, a post-accident drug test was performed on four employees including the backhoe operator (those who performed safety-sensitive functions) and their qualification was suspended pending the test result. All employees who performed the post-accident drug test received a negative drug test result.

On April 8, 2025, SED interviewed six of the seven people who were present at the site at the time of the incident (Teichert – five, and Sharps Backhoe – one). During the interview, all six employees stated that they were not aware of the 8"x6" oversized pressure control fitting nor the 1-inch diameter, 3-inches long nipple welded to the top of SL41-17. According to Teichert and the backhoe operator, SoCalGas Stand-by was in charge of the site and directing the excavation activities within the tolerance zone. According to the backhoe's operator, he had no knowledge of the existence of the 1-inch diameter, 3-inches long nipple welded to the top of the SL41-17.

On April 15, 2025, SED received a data response to a CPUC data request from SoCalGas indicating that SoCalGas Gas Standard (GS) 192.0010, Preparation of Construction Sketches, Section 4.28 states:

“For construction purposes, list minor fittings such as abandoned nipples, when it is not obvious that they are required.”

SoCalGas stated in its response that:

“The damaged nipple is a minor fitting typically used in conjunction with pressure control fittings. In this case the AB nipple was installed near an 8"x6" oversized pressure control fitting.

SoCalGas policy 192.0010 Preparation of Construction Sketches, Section 4.28 states, “For construction purposes, list minor fittings such as abandoned nipples, when it is not obvious that they are required” Because the oversized 8"x6" pressure control fitting was near the location of the damage, it is reasonable and obvious to expect a minor fitting, such as a nipple, to be present with this installation as well.”

On June 24, 2025, SED interviewed SoCalGas' Stand-by, the seventh person who was present at the site at the time of the incident. The Stand-by stated that his assignment was to tap the MPG to determine if it was active or abandoned, have the tapping machine to perform this task, and perform his Stand-by duty due to the excavation activities near the SL41-17 (clearance between MPG (run East and West) and SL41-17 (run North and South). In addition, he stated that he was more focused on tapping the MPG at the time of the incident. Furthermore, he stated that the MPG was potholed to determine its exact location while the SL41-17 was not potholed and the separation between the two lines was approximately 12- inches at the damaged location).

SED checked the Stand-by's qualification records and found them to be valid at the time of the incident.

Fatalities / Injuries

No fatalities or injuries reported as the result of this incident.

Property Damage

\$5000 damage to the operator's property.

Utility Facilities Involved

SoCalGas' 1-inch diameter, 3-inch-long nipple welded to the top of an 8-inch diameter High Pressure Distribution Gas Main, SL41-17.

Investigators

Name	Title
1. Gordon Kuo	SED, Senior Utilities Engineer Specialist

Documents Reviewed

See Appendix B.

SED Investigation Process

Reporting Requirements

GO 112-F, CFR, Part 191, Section 191.5 requires that each operator give notice in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section of each incident as defined in § 191.3. However, Part 191, Section 191.3 defines an "incident" as "*An event that involves a release of gas from a pipeline (emphasis added), gas from an underground natural gas storage facility (UNGSF), liquefied natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas, refrigerant gas, or gas from an LNG facility, and that results in one or more of the following consequences: ...*". Since this incident involved the release of gas exceeding 3 million cubic feet, SoCalGas classified the March 20, 2025, incident as DOT reportable. This incident meets the DOT Reportable Incident requirement for reporting.

SED Investigation

On March 21, 2025, SED investigator Gordon Kuo visited the site of the incident and interviewed SoCalGas and Teichert's representatives. The MPGP was potholed on March 19, 2025, thus leading to excavation on March 20, 2025, with power tools to help excavate the area. During the excavation, jackhammers were used to break apart the 2-sac slurry on top of the MPGP, while a backhoe was being used to help carry out chunks of 2-sac slurry out of the trench. The backhoe operator, with the backhoe bucket, hit the 1-inch diameter, 3-inch-long nipple welded to the top of SL41-17.

On March 21, 2025, at 1229 hours, SoCalGas' crews were able to stop the flow of gas in the damaged section by installing pressure control fittings and closing one (1) valve (The north and east ends were controlled by excavating a pipe section and installing pressure control fittings, while the

south end was controlled by shutting off a valve at a reg station). SoCalGas' crews welded a larger diameter nipple on SL41-17, tested with dye penetrant for gas leak, and found zero gas indication. On March 21, 2025, at 0330 hours, SoCalGas' crews completed restoration of gas service to the affected customers.

Mr. Kuo observed SoCalGas' marking of the MPG& SL41-17 at the site of the incident and was able to check the construction maps provided by SoCalGas and Teichert, confirming the line locations were shown. According to SoCalGas and its contractor, 7 people were at the site at the time of the incident (Teichert – five people, SoCalGas – one Stand-by, Sharps Backhoe – one backhoe operator). As a result of this incident, 4 people were sent in for Drug and Alcohol testing (Sharps Backhoe – backhoe operator, SoCalGas – Stand-by person, and Teichert – two people) and had their qualifications suspended pending SoCalGas investigation.

SED's investigation involved interviewing witnesses including SoCalGas' Stand-by, Teichert's employees, and Sharp Backhoe's backhoe operator. In addition, SED reviewed various documents including SoCalGas's USA ticket reports, permits, qualification records, and related operation and maintenance Gas Standards and Procedures.

On April 8, 2025, SED interviewed 6 employees (Teichert – five people; Sharps Backhoe -one person).

On April 15, 2025, SED received a data response from SoCalGas, which they made an argument that because the 8"x6" oversized pressure control fitting was near the location of the damage; thus, it was reasonable to expect a minor fitting such as nipple as well.

On June 24, 2025, SED interviewed SoCalGas' Stand-by personnel who stated that he was more focused on monitoring SoCalGas' contractor tapping on SoCalGas MPG& SL41-17 was not potholed before the excavation activities.

On August 15, 2025, SED received a data request from SoCalGas, which photos and distances were provided showing the proximity of the SoCalGas utilities involved in this incident.

The purpose of this investigation was to determine whether there were probable violations of G.O. 112-F, Reference Title 49CFR Part 192, that may have caused or contributed to the incident. Furthermore, SED was interested in determining if SoCalGas was implementing corrective actions to prevent similar incidents in the future.

Incident Description

On March 20, 2025, at approximately 1130 hours, SoCalGas' contractor, Teichert, along with Sharps Backhoe, were doing excavation work for SoCalGas on a MPG which they needed to tap to confirm if the MPG was alive or abandoned. The pipe was potholed on March 19, 2025 thus leading to excavation on March 20, 2025 with power tools to help excavate the area. During the excavation, jackhammers were used to break apart the 2-sac slurry on top of the pipe, while a

backhoe was being used to help carry out chunks of 2 sac slurry out of the trench. The backhoe ended up going too close and hitting the 1-inch diameter, 3-inch-long nipple on top of the SL41-17.

Seven (7) people were working at the site at the time of the incident (Teichert – five people, SoCalGas - one Stand-by person, and Sharps Backhoe – one person). While removing debris from the hole with the help of a backhoe, the backhoe struck a 1-inch diameter, 3-inch-long nipple on top of SL41-17. This resulted in damage to the 1-inch diameter, 3-inch-long nipple and a release of natural gas into the atmosphere. There were no fatalities, injuries, or fire reported as the result of this incident. The incident resulted in a service interruption of five customers and led to evacuation around the four surrounding blocks. The incident was reported to CPUC and PHMSA due to media coverage and loss of gas over 3 million cubic feet. The DOT number for this incident is 1426420.

SoCalGas provided USA ticket A243230808. The ticket showed a renew of the ticket on March 11, 2025, 9 days before the incident. The ticket showed a request for re-marks on February 24, 2025, and a expiration date on April 8, 2025. When SED visited the site on March 21, 2025, SED observed SoCalGas' marking of both the MPG& SL41-17.



Figure 1. Line markings observed in the field.

SoCalGas requires a Stand-by when excavation activities are within 10 feet of high-pressure gas pipeline SL41-17.



Figure 2. Close-up of the damaged pipe section



Figure 3. The damaged 1-inch diameter, 3-inch-long nipple




Figure 4. A photo provided by SoCalGas showing the proximity of the MPG and SL41-17 (confidential)

On March 21, 2025, at 1229 hours, SoCalGas' crews were able to stop the flow of gas in the damaged section by installing pressure control fittings and closing one (1) valve (The north and east ends were controlled by excavating a pipe section and installing pressure control fittings, while the south end was controlled by shutting off a valve at a reg station). SoCalGas' crews welded a larger diameter nipple on SL41-17, performed a dye penetration test to check for defects, performed a leak survey to check for gas leaks, and restored gas service to the affected customers at approximately 0330 hours.

Chronology of Incident Investigation Activities

This section provides a chronology of the investigative activities undertaken after the incident occurred on March 20, 2025, and reported to CPUC on March 20, 2025.

March 20, 2025

On March 20, 2025, at approximately 1130 hours, Sharps Backhoe² was tasked with excavating and exposing SoCalGas' MPG, as part of a larger project to tap the MPG to check if it is active. While maneuvering a backhoe bucket, the backhoe operator struck the 1-inch diameter, 3-inch-long nipple

² SoCalGas hired a contractor, Teichert, who hired a subcontractor, Sharps Backhoe

welded to the top of SL41-17. SoCalGas' crews were dispatched and followed SoCalGas Gas Standards and Procedures to protect people, property, the environment, and to stop the flow of gas.

According to SoCalGas' records, SL41-17 was installed on October 31st, 1974, with MAOP of 400 psig and MOP of 385 psig. The depth of cover at the incident location was approximately 5-6 feet. SoCalGas' work order was to relocate a section of the MPG to that the City of San Jacinto can install storm drain system.

March 21, 2025

On March 21, 2025, SED investigator Gordon Kuo met with SoCalGas and Teichert's representatives, took photos of the site, the damaged facilities, and reviewed work order and records. SoCalGas' crews excavated north and east of the damaged section, installed pressure control fittings to control the flow of gas, operated a valve at a regulating station. SoCalGas' crews were able to isolate the damage section of SL41-17 and stop the flow of gas at approximately 1229 hours. SoCalGas' crews installed a larger diameter nipple, performed a dye penetration test to check for defects, performed a leak survey to check for gas leaks, and restored gas service to the affected customers at approximately 0330 hours.

SED contacted SoCalGas by email requesting further data regarding the incident and to schedule an interview with the employees that were on site at the time of the incident.

April 8, 2024

On April 8, 2025, SED interviewed six of the seven people on site (Teichert – five people and Sharps Backhoe -one person). During the interview, all six contractors stated that they were not aware of the 8"x6" oversized pressure control fitting nor the 1-inch diameter, 3-inches long nipple welded to the top of SL41-17. According to Teichert and the backhoe operator, SoCalGas Stand-by was in charge of the site and directing the excavation activities within the tolerance zone. According to the backhoe's operator, he had no knowledge of the existence of the 1-inch diameter, 3-inches long nipple welded to the top of the SL41-17.

April 15, 2025

On April 15, 2025, SED received a data response to a CPUC data request from SoCalGas indicating that SoCalGas Gas Standard (GS) 192.0010, Preparation of Construction Sketches, Section 4.28 states:

"For construction purposes, list minor fittings such as abandoned nipples, when it is not obvious that they are required."

SoCalGas stated in its response that:

"The damaged nipple is a minor fitting typically used in conjunction with pressure control fittings. In this case the AB nipple was installed near an 8"x6" oversized pressure control fitting."

SoCalGas policy 192.0010 Preparation of Construction Sketches, Section 4.28 states, “For construction purposes, list minor fittings such as abandoned nipples, when it is not obvious that they are required” Because the oversized 8”x6” pressure control fitting was near the location of the damage, it is reasonable and obvious to expect a minor fitting, such as a nipple, to be present with this installation as well.”

April 30, 2025

On April 30, 2025, SoCalGas provided a completed PHMSA Form 7100 indicating that:

- a. 13.3 million cubic feet of gas were released during this incident,
- b. The release was categorized as a Mechanical Puncture with an approximate size of 1.5 inches both in axial and circumference.
- c. The incident occurred in a Class 3 location.
- d. The total estimated costs as \$335,432.
- e. The operating pressure at the time of the incident was 369 psig, and the MAOP was 400 psig.
- f. The closest valves upstream and downstream of the damaged section of SL41-17 was approximately 854 feet.
- g. A post-accident drug test was performed on four employees including the backhoe operator (those who performed safety-sensitive functions) and their qualification was suspended pending the test result. All employees who performed the post-accident drug test received a negative drug test result.
- h. In addition, SoCalGas stated that the cause of the incident was “*improper excavation practices by the contractor, who failed to use hand tools only and did not maintain adequate distance with the backhoe bucket while excavating over the main.*”

June 24, 2025

On June 24, 2025, SED interviewed SoCalGas’ Stand-by, the seventh person who was present at the site at the time of the incident. The Stand-by stated that his assignment was to tap the MPGP to determine if it is active, had the tapping machine to perform this task, and performed his Stand-by duty due to the excavation activities near the SL41-17 (clearance between MPGP (run East and West) and SL41-17 (run North and South). In addition, he stated that he was more focused on tapping the MPGP at the time of the incident. Furthermore, he stated that the MPGP was potholed to determine its exact location while the SL41-17 was not potholed and the separation between the two lines was approximately 12- inches at the damaged location).

June 25, 2025

On June 25, 2025, SED received the entire history of USA Ticket A243230808, from DigAlert. The ticket showed a renewal of the ticket on March 11, 2025, nine days before the incident. The ticket showed a request for re-marks on February 24, 2025, and a expiration date of April 8, 2025.

August 15, 2025

On August 15, 2025, SED received another data request response from SoCalGas. Drawings and photos were provided to show the proximity of the gas lines involved. The 1-inch diameter, 3-inch-long nipple was approximately 18 inches from the 8”x6” oversized pressure control fitting. The clearance between SL41-17 and MPGP at the incident location was approximately 12 inches. In addition, at the intersection, SL41-17 also underwent a 8”x6” reducing elbow, which reduced its

diameter from 8" to 6". SoCalGas investigation concluded with the disqualification of its contractors and conducted a refresher training session with the SoCalGas Stand-by employee.

Findings and Corrective Actions

SED's Findings and Code Evaluation for SoCalGas Procedures:

- a. California Government Code (CGC) 4216.4(a)(1) states:

"Except as provided in paragraph (2), if an excavation is within the tolerance zone of a subsurface installation, the excavator shall determine the exact location of the subsurface installations in conflict with the excavation using hand tools before using any power-driven excavation or boring equipment within the tolerance zone of the subsurface installations."

SoCalGas failed to expose SL41-17 with hand tools. SL41-17 was within the tolerance zone of 24 inches on each side of the markings. While SoCalGas did pothole the MPGP, they did not pothole SL41-17 at the same location. SoCalGas underestimated how close SL41-17 was to the MPGP and allowed the use of a backhoe within the tolerance zone, leading to contact damage with the 1-inch diameter, 3-inch-long nipple on SL41-17. Therefore, SoCalGas is in violation of CGC §4216.4(a)(1) for failing to determine the exact location of the subsurface installation in conflict with the excavation using hand tools before using any power-driven excavation or boring equipment within the tolerance zone of the subsurface installations.

- b. Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 192.605(b)(3) states:

"Making construction records, maps, and operating history available to appropriate operating personnel."

SoCalGas stated in its response that:

"The damaged nipple is a minor fitting typically used in conjunction with pressure control fittings. In this case the AB nipple was installed near an 8"×6" oversized pressure control fitting."

SoCalGas policy 192.0010 Preparation of Construction Sketches, Section 4.28 states, "For construction purposes, list minor fittings such as abandoned nipples, when it is not obvious that they are required" Because the oversized 8"×6" pressure control fitting was near the location of the damage, it is reasonable and obvious to expect a minor fitting, such as a nipple, to be present with this installation as well."

All seven (7) people were working at the site at the time of the incident (Teichert – five people, SoCalGas - one Stand-by person, and Sharps Backhoe – one person) were not aware of the existence of the 1-inch diameter, 3-inch-long nipple. The nipple was not shown on the construction map. SoCalGas GSs did not state that it is reasonable to expect a minor fitting next to a pressure control fitting. SoCalGas did not provide any supporting document that its

employees or contractors should be aware of the existence of a nipple when it is known that a pressure control fitting existed nearby. Therefore, SED finds SoCalGas in violation of G.O. 112-F, Reference Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 192.605(b)(3) for failure to make accurate construction records, maps, and operating history available to appropriate operating personnel, including the existence of the nipple on its construction map.

c. Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 192.605(a) states:

“General. Each operator shall prepare and follow for each pipeline, a manual of written procedures for conducting operations and maintenance activities and for emergency response.”

SoCalGas Gas Standard 184.09, Section 4.3.1.5 states:

“Stand-by and provide guidance while potholing is taking place. Hand digging across the entire tolerance zone down to the depth of the planned excavation plus an additional 18-inches of depth is permitted in lieu of finding the exact location of the high priority subsurface installation.”

The Stand-by did not provide guidance to expose SL41-17 by hand digging. SL41-17 was at the same depth and 12 inches away from the MPG, which is within 24 inches of the tolerance zone. Therefore, SED finds SoCalGas in violation of G.O. 112-F, Reference Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 192.605(a) for failure to provide guidance to hand dig, as required by its GS.

d. SoCalGas GS 184.09, Section 4.3.1.14 states:

“Report indications and instances where Company subsurface installations are or may become endangered to the excavator’s supervisor and the project inspector of the agency responsible for the work.”

The Stand-by failed to identify the danger/potential threat of using heavy equipment too close to SoCalGas’ underground facilities and to communicate these threats with Teichert and Sharps Backhoe’s management. Therefore, SED finds SoCalGas in violation of G.O. 112-F, Reference Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 192.605(a) for failure to report/communicate these indications/instances with the excavator’s supervisor.

SED's Recommendations

1. SoCalGas should take the appropriate steps to address SED Finding 1 and Finding 3. The high-pressure Stand-by task is to ensure that the excavation does not go into SL41-17. SoCalGas should provide refresher training to those with Stand-by role to ensure that they follow the code requirements when performing the Stand-by duties.
2. SoCalGas should take the appropriate steps to address the SED Finding 2. SoCalGas should update its records and GSs to ensure that “minor fittings” such as nipples are documented in their construction maps. SoCalGas claims that this is “common knowledge,” and that was not the case when SED interviewed SoCalGas and Teichert’s employees.

3. SoCalGas should take the appropriate steps to address SED Finding 4. SoCalGas' crews should also perform tailboard meetings before construction activities began to address any potential hazards associated with the work and to ensure all employees are familiar with the work procedures and specific precautions associated within the excavation area. These tailboard meetings should require the Stand-by to go over the scope of work and address any issues such as the existence of the underground utilities within the tolerance zone.

SED's Observations

This section details one (1) observation SED made over the course of the investigation.

Observation 1:

SED investigator Gordon Kuo met with SoCalGas and Teichert's representatives, took photos of the site, the damaged facilities, and reviewed the work order and records. A post-accident drug test was performed on four employees including the backhoe operator (those who performed safety-sensitive functions) and their qualification was suspended pending the test result. All employees who performed the post-accident drug test received a negative drug test result.

SoCalGas's Corrective Actions

SoCalGas investigation concluded with the disqualification of its contractors and conducted a refresher training session with SoCalGas Stand-by employee.

Conclusion

SED investigation found that SoCalGas failed to follow California Government Code (CGC) §4216.4(a)(1) that requires excavators to determine the exact location of subsurface installations in conflict with the excavation using hand tools before using any power-driven excavation or boring equipment within the tolerance zone of subsurface installations. Therefore, SED finds SoCalGas in violation of CGC §4216.4(a)(1). In addition, SED found that SoCalGas is in violation of General Order (G.O.) 112-F, Reference Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 192, §192.605(b)(3) for failing to make known of the existence of the 1-inch diameter, 3-inch-long nipple to field personnel before starting the excavation. Furthermore, SED found SoCalGas in violation of G.O. 112-F, Reference Title 49 CFR Part 192, §192.605(a) for failing to follow SoCalGas Gas Standard (GS) 184.09, Sections 4.3.1.5 and 4.3.1.14 which requires SoCalGas to provide guidance while its contractors conduct excavation activities within the delineated areas of excavation.

Appendices

Appendix A: Glossary of terms

ACRONYM/ABBREVIATION	DEFINITION
CFR	Title 49 - Code of Federal Regulations
DOT	Department of Transportation
CGC	California Government Code
G.O.	General Order – Calif. Public Utility Commish.
GS	Gas Standard
GSRB	Gas Safety and Reliability Branch
MP	Mile Point
MPGP	Medium Pressure Gas Pipeline
OQ	Operator Qualification
PHMSA	Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
SED	Safety and Enforcement Division
SoCalGas	Southern California Gas Company

Appendix B: Documents Reviewed

1.	SoCalGas USRB Gas Incident Report to SED, GSRB 3/20/25
2.	SoCalGas CPUC RGLI-420 Final Filing, GSRB 3/21/25
3.	SoCalGas PHMSA 7100.02 Filing Form, 4/30/25
4.	SED Site Area Pictures, 3/21/2025
5.	Interview report with Teichert and Sharps Backhoe, 4/8/2025
6.	Interview report with SoCalGas High Pressure Stand-by, 6/24/25
7.	SoCalGas's Response to SED's Data Requests, 3/20/25
8.	SoCalGas's Response to SED's Data Requests, 4/15/25
9.	SoCalGas Gas Standard procedures, Prevention of Excavation Damage to Company Subsurface Installations, GS184.09
10.	USA Ticket A243230808, provided by DigAlert on 6/25/25
11.	SoCalGas's Response to SED's Data Requests, 8/15/25

Appendix C: Interviews

On April 8, 2025, SED interviewed six of the seven people who were present at the site at the time of the incident (Teichert – five, and Sharps Backhoe – one). During the interview, all six employees stated that they were not aware of the 8"x6" oversized pressure control fitting nor the 1-inch diameter, 3-inch long nipple welded to the top of SL41-17. According to Teichert and the backhoe operator, a SoCalGas Stand-by employee was in charge of the site and directing the excavation activities within the tolerance zone. According to the backhoe's operator, he had no knowledge of the existence of the 1-inch diameter, 3-inch long nipple welded to the top of the SL41-17.

On June 24, 2025, SED interviewed the SoCalGas' Stand-by, the seventh person who was present at the site at the time of the incident. The Stand-by stated that his assignment was to tap the MPG to determine if it was active or abandoned, have the tapping machine to perform this task, and perform his Stand-by duty due to the excavation activities near the SL41-17 (clearance between MPG (run East and West) and SL41-17 (run North and South). In addition, he stated that he was more focused on tapping the MPG at the time of the incident. Furthermore, he stated that the MPG was potholed to determine its exact location while SL4-17 was not potholed and the separation between the two lines was approximately 12 inches at the damaged location).