BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Order Instituting Rulemaking to Examine Electric Utility De-Energization of Power Lines in Dangerous Conditions.

Rulemaking 18-12-005

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY'S (U 338-E) CORRECTIONS TO 2023 PUBLIC SAFETY POWER SHUTOFF POST-EVENT REPORTS

ANNA VALDBERG R. OLIVIA SAMAD

Attorneys for SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY

2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Post Office Box 800 Rosemead, California 91770 Telephone: (626) 302-3477

E-mail: Olivia.Samad@sce.com

Dated: April 1, 2024

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In compliance with California Public Utilities Commission Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) Order Instituting Rulemaking Phase 1 Decision (D.) 19-05-042, Phase 2 D.20-05-051, Phase 3 D.21-06-034 and PSPS Order Instituting Investigation D.21-06-014, Southern California Edison Company (SCE) hereby submits corrections to its 2023 PSPS Post-Event Reports.

SCE provides the following link to access and download this corrected filing: on.sce.com/PSPSposteventreports.

Respectfully submitted,

ANNA VALDBERG R. OLIVIA SAMAD

/s/ R. Olivia Samad

R. Olivia Samad By:

Attorneys for SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY

> 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Post Office Box 800 Rosemead, California 91770 Telephone: (626) 392-3477

E-mail:Olivia.Samad@sce.com

Dated: April 1, 2024

Attachment A
Southern California Edison Company's Corrections to
2023 Public Safety Power Shutoff Post-Event Reports



Marissa Blunschi
Principal Manager
State Regulatory Relations
Marissa.Blunschi@edisonintl.com

April 1, 2024

Via E-Mail

Lee Palmer, Director Safety and Enforcement Division California Public Utilities Commission 505 Van Ness Avenue San Francisco, CA 94102

SUBJECT: SCE's 2023 Amended PSPS Post-Event Reports

Dear Director Palmer:

Southern California Edison (SCE) respectfully submits the attached amended post-event reports in compliance with reporting requirements regarding its proactive de-energization events during 2023 as outlined in the table below. For ease of reference, SCE has used the bookmark feature in the PDF to identify each amendment in the attached document. Actual amendments are reflected in red font and/or strikethrough. The event dates and details related to each amended report are also outlined in the table below.

Post-Event Report	Amendments
Dates	
10.29.2023	Section 1: Table 1: PSPS Event Summary
	Section 3: Table 5: Circuits De-Energized
	• Section 5:
	o Table 8: Positive Notification
	 Table 9: Breakdown of Notification Failure
	 6. Explain how the utility will correct the notification failures.
	• Section 7:
	 Table 12: Count and Nature of Complaints Received
	o Table 13: Count and Type of Claims Received
11.09.2023	• Section 1:
	 1. Brief description of the PSPS event starting from the time
	when the utility's Emergency Operation Center is activated until
	service to all customers have been restored.

601 Van Ness Avenue Suite 2030 San Francisco, California 94102 (626) 302-4879 Fax (415) 929-5544

	o Table 1: PSPS Event Summary				
	• Section 5:				
	o Table 8: Positive Notification				
	o Table 9: Breakdown of Notification Failure				
	 6. Explain how the utility will correct the notification failures. 				
	• Section 7: Table 12: Count and Nature of Complaints Received				
11.21.2023	Section 1: Table 1: PSPS Event Summary				
	• Section 3: Table 5 Circuits De-Energized				
	• Section 5:				
	 Table 8: Positive Notification 				
	 Table 9: Breakdown of Notification Failure 				
	o 6. Explain how the utility will correct the notification failures				
	• Section 7: Table 12: Count and Nature of Complaints Received				
12.09.2023	• Section 1:				
	 1. Brief description of the PSPS event starting from the time 				
	when the utility's Emergency Operation Center is activated until				
	service to all customers have been restored				
	 Table 1: PSPS Event Summary 				
	• Section 3: Table 5: Circuits De-Energized				
	Section 4: Table 6: Damage and Hazards				
	• Section 5:				
	 Table 8: Positive Notification 				
	 Table 9: Breakdown of Notification Failure 				
	 6. Explain how the utility will correct the notification failures. 				
	• Section 7:				
	 Table 12: Count and Nature of Complaints Received 				
	 Table 13: Count and Nature of Claims Received 				

This amended report has been verified by an officer of SCE in accordance with Rule 1.11 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure.

Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns.

Sincerely,

/s/ Marissa Blunschi

Marissa Blunschi

Principal Manager, State Regulatory Relations

cc: <u>ESRB_ComplianceFilings@cpuc.ca.gov</u>

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Introduction

SCE is hereby amending its Post-Event Report for the October 29, 2023, PSPS event to address certain data reporting discrepancies identified by SCE. The revisions are outlined in Table A and are in red font and/or strikethrough in sections below. These revisions are separate from those SCE submitted in its February 16, 2024, amendment. The enclosed amendments are primarily due to SCE's detailed examination of 2023 PSPS missed notification issues. Specifically, SCE is revising Total PSPS Notified, Cancelled, Critical Infrastructure Count, Customer Counts, Positive Notification counts, Breakdown of Notification Failure explanations, and count/nature of complaints/claims received. SCE discovered there was a system issue where some notification data failed to transfer from its vendor's messaging systems to SCE's Centralized Data Platform (CDP). This system issue has been addressed with changes to CDP and fixes to the integration points with the notification vendor. SCE also plans to develop data availability and transfer health checks on the vendor messaging systems so that all notification data are transferred to CDP for the upcoming 2024 season. SCE also identified and remediated anomalies in CDP programming logic to correct how missed notifications were categorized and counted for customers with multiple service accounts and multiple communication devices. The details related to the amended metrics are summarized in the table and provided in the subsequent sections below.

Table A
Summary of Changes to SCE's October 29, 2023, Post-Event Report

Item	PSPS Event ID	Metrics/Data Elements Revised	Original Post-Event Report Section & Page References
1	October 29, 2023, PSPS Event (Report submitted on December 1, 2023, and amended on February 16,	Total PSPS Notified, Cancelled, Critical Facilities and Critical Infrastructures count	• Section 1. Table 1: PSPS Event Summary (p. 5)
	2024)	Customer counts	• Section 3. Table 5 Circuits De- Energized (p. 19)
		Positive Notifications	• Section 5: Table 8: Positive Notification (p. 26)
		Breakdown of Notification Failure	 Section 5: Table 9: Breakdown of Notification Failure (pp. 27 - 32) Section 5: 6. Explain how the utility will correct the notification failures.
		Count and Nature of Complaints Received	Section 7: Table 12: Count and Nature of Complaints Received (p. 37)
		Count and Nature of Claims Received	Section 7: Table 13: Count and Type of Claims Received (p. 37)

Southern California Edison (U 338-E) Corrections to Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) Post-Event Report for October 29, 2023, PSPS Event (Originally Submitted on December 1, 2023; previously amended on February 16, 2024)

Section 1. Executive Summary

2. A table including the maximum number of customers notified and de-energized; number of counties de-energized; number of tribes de-energized; number of Medical Baseline customers de-energized; number of transmission and distribution circuits de-energized; damage/hazard count; number of critical facilities and infrastructure de-energized.

Table 1: PSPS Event Summary¹

PSPS Event S	PSPS Event Summary									
Total Customers			De-energized				Number of Circuits			
PSPS Notified	De-energized	Cancelled	MBL Customers	Number of Counties	Number of Tribes	Critical Facilities and Infrastucture	Transmission De-energized	Distribution Circuits in Scope	Distribution Circuits De-energized	Damage/Hazard Count
202274 203538	25504	179446 183935	588	5	0	660 661	0	186	41	3

Section 3. De-Energized Time, Place, Duration and Customers

3. A list of circuits de-energized, with the following information for each circuit. This information should be provided in both a PDF and excel spreadsheet.

The following table details the specified information for each circuit de-energized during this PSPS event and has also been included in the required PSPS Event Data Workbook filed with this report.

- County
- De-energization date/time
- Restoration date/time
- "All Clear" declaration date/time²
- General Order (GO) 95, Rule 21.2-D Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 classification or non-High Fire Threat District
- Total customers de-energized³

¹ "PSPS Notified" metric in Table 1 reflects the total number of unique customers that were sent a pre-event notification of potential de-energization during the PSPS event. "Cancelled" metric in Table 1 reflects the total number of unique customers that were sent a pre-event notification of potential de-energization, but not ultimately de-energized (regardless of whether those customers received a cancellation notice). (i.e., the notices were sent, but not successfully delivered). Please see Section 5 of this report regarding missed notifications and cancellation notice metrics.

² SCE understands "All Clear" declaration date/time for each circuit in scope to refer to: (1) approval by the Incident Commander to begin patrols and restoration of power for any de-energized circuit or circuit segment, or (2) a final decision to remove a circuit or circuit segment from scope after the Period of Concern is over for that circuit or segment on the monitored circuit list that was not de-energized during the PSPS event.

³ Whenever possible, SCE employs circuit-switching operations and/or sectionalization devices to minimize the number of customers in scope for proactive de-energization. As a result, some customers on a circuit in scope may briefly lose

- · Residential customers de-energized
- Commercial/Industrial customers de-energized
- Medical Baseline (MBL) customers de-energized
- AFN other than MBL customers de-energized⁴
- Other Customers
- Distribution or transmission classification

Table 5: Circuits De-Energized 5

Circuits De-Energized	l (cont.)							
County	Circuit Name	Residential Customers De-energized	Commercial / Industrial customers De-energized	Medical Baseline customers De-energized	AFN other than MBL customers De-energized	Total customers De-energized	GO 95, Tier HFTD Tier(s) 1,2,3	Other Customers
ORANGE	ARABIA	817	22	27	69 70	839	Non HFRA, T2	0
SAN BERNARDINO	CHEVELLE	2145	37	72	434 443	2182	Non HFRA, T3, T2	0
LOS ANGELES	CUTHBERT	1273	32	16	75 77	1305	T3	0
LOS ANGELES	ENERGY	653	33	24	135 136	686	T3	0
SAN BERNARDINO	FIREBIRD	1235	71	22	264 265	1306	Non HFRA, T3, T2	0
SAN BERNARDINO	HIGHBALL	1181	37	20	802 803	1218	Non HFRA, T2	0
LOS ANGELES	MILO	2022	45	20	265 264	2067	T3, T2	0
RIVERSIDE	NAYLOR	1709	38	15	1026 1024	1747	Non HFRA, T2	0

power while SCE switches them to an energized adjacent circuit or when SCE uses sectionalization devices to isolate portions of a circuit that can remain safely energized from de-energized segments of that same circuit or an adjacent circuit. The reported count of "total customers de-energized" does not include customers who experience a brief (30 minutes or less) power interruption during such switching and/or sectionalization operations, but who are not otherwise impacted by the proactive de-energization.

⁴ SCE maintains extensive data on customer populations that are included in the AFN definition referenced in CPUC decisions, with a focus on identifying AFN customers particularly vulnerable during PSPS events. In addition to AFN customers who have self-certified as sensitive (not enrolled in the MBL program), SCE identifies and tracks for PSPS reporting purposes the following categories of "AFN other than MBL customers": senior citizens (65 and older), hearing-impaired, vision-impaired (communications provided in large font or Braille), income-qualified (enrolled in CARE or FERA), and non-English speakers. SCE also reports on impacted customers that provide shelter to the homeless population, as these entities are included among critical facilities and infrastructure.

⁵ The sum of (i) residential customers de-energized, (ii) commercial/industrial customers de-energized, and (iii) other customers equals the total number of customers de-energized per circuit for this event. The count of" Residential Customers De-energized "includes sub-categories of" Medical Baseline customers De-energized "and "AFN other than MBL customers De-energized."

Section 5. Notification

3. For those customers where positive or affirmative notification was attempted, use the following table to report the accounting of the customers (which tariff and/or access and functional needs population designation), the number of notification attempts made, the timing of attempts, who made the notification attempt (utility or public safety partner) and the number of customers for whom positive notification was achieved. "Notification attempts made" and "Successful positive notification" must include the unique number of customer counts. When the actual notification attempts made is less than the number of customers that need positive notifications, the utilities must explain the reason. In addition, the utilities must explain the reason of any unsuccessful positive notifications.

Table 8: Positive Notification

Positive Not	Positive Notification							
Category	Total Number of Customers ⁶	Timing of Attempts	Notification Attempts ⁷	Successful Positive Notification ⁸	Who made the notification			
Medical Baseline	5600 5779	DAILY	5808 5805	5593 5591	SCE			
Self-Certified	296 317	DAILY	338 337	296 295	SCE			

Seven 188 Medical Baseline customers, and 22 self-certified were not successfully contacted during this event. None of these customers were de-energized.

4. If the utility fails to provide notifications according to the minimum timelines set forth in D.19-05-042 and D.21-06-034, use the following table to report a breakdown of the notification failure and an explanation of what caused the failure.

⁶ The "Total Number of Customers" metric reflects the total number of MBL and Self-Certified customers in scope for the PSPS event. Although SCE attempts to notify all MBL and Self-Certified customers in scope, only customers who are ultimately de-energized "need" positive pre-event PSPS notifications.

⁷ The "Notification Attempts" metric reflects the count of MBL and Self-Certified customers – both in scope and deenergized – whom SCE attempted to notify prior to de-energization. Notification attempts include secondary verification by Consumer Affairs and escalated contact attempts, up to and including door rings, if necessary, to confirm successful delivery of notifications to Medical Baseline and Self-Certified customers.

⁸ The "Successful Positive Notification" metric reflects the number of unique MBL and Self-Certified customers – both in scope and de-energized – who were successfully notified of the PSPS event prior to de-energization.

Table 9: Breakdown of Notification Failure

Breakdown of N	Notification Fail	ures	
Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation
	Entities who did not receive 48-to 72-hour advance notification.	7 4	System/operational failure (please see detailed explanation in Section 5-6 and Lessons Learned below) Notifications were sent outside the 48–72-hour window. Not forecast in scope within 48-72 hours. 2 notifications were sent less than 48-hours before deenergization. 2 notifications were not sent due to data processing error.
Public Safety Partners excluding Critical Facilities and Infrastructure	Entities who did not receive 1-4-hour imminent notification.	18 7	System/operational failure (please see detailed explanation in Section 5-6 and Lessons Learned below) Notifications were sent outside the 1-4 hour window. 3 notifications were sent more than 4 hours before de-energization. 2 notifications were sent less than 1 hour before de-energizations due to sudden onset of weather conditions. 2 notifications were not sent due to data processing error.
	Entities who did not receive any notifications before deenergization.	5 2	System/operational failure (please see detailed explanation in Section 5-6 and Lessons Learned below) 2 notifications were not sent due to data processing error.
	Entities who were not notified immediately before reenergization.	20 2	Notifications were sent to these entities using the most up-to-date contact information on file but were not delivered for unknown reasons. 2 notifications were not sent due to data processing error.

Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation
	Entities who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel.	109 0	System/operational failure (please see detailed explanation in Section 5–6 and Lessons Learned below)
Critical Facilities and Infrastructure	Facilities who did not receive 48- 72-hour advance notification.	75 553	System/operational failure (please see detailed explanation in Section 5-6 and Lessons Learned below) • 21 notifications were sent outside the 48-72-hour window. • 53 notifications were not sent. 1 notification was sent using the most up-to-date contact information on file but was not delivered for unknown reasons. Not forecast in scope within 48-72 hours. 473 notifications were sent less than 48-hours before deenergization. 75 notifications were not sent due to data processing error. 5 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.
	Facilities who did not receive 1-4 hour of imminent notifications.	382 454	System/operational failure (please see detailed explanation in Section 5-6 and Lessons Learned below) - 240 notifications were sent outside the 1-4-hour window. - 136 notifications were not sent. 6 notifications were sent using the most up-to-date contact information on file but were not delivered for unknown reasons.

Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation
			 30 notifications were sent more than 4 hours before de-energization. 189 notifications were sent less than 1 hour before de-energizations due to sudden onset of weather conditions. 233 notifications were not sent due to data processing error.
			2 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.
	Facilities who did not receive any notifications before de- energization.	11 28	System/operational failure (please see detailed explanation in Section 5-6 and Lessons Learned below) 12 notifications were not sent due to sudden onset of weather conditions. 11 notifications were not sent due to data processing error. 5 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.
	Facilities who were not notified at de- energization initiation.	107 154	System/operational failure (please see detailed explanation in Section 5-6 and Lessons Learned below) • 101 notifications were not sent. 6 notifications were sent using the most up-to-date contact information on file but were not delivered for unknown reasons. 102 notifications were not sent due to system/operational failure. 50 notifications were not sent due to data processing error. 2 notifications not successfully delivered due to

Notifications sent to	Notification Fail Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation
	Facilities who were not notified immediately before re- energization.	120 128	System/operational failure (please see detailed explanation in Section 5-6 and Lessons Learned below) - 8 notifications were sent after restoration was complete 111 notifications were not sent. 1 notification was sent using the most up-to-date contact information on file but was not delivered for unknown reasons. 120 notifications were not sent due to system/operational failure. 7 notifications were not sent due to data processing error. 1 notification not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.
	Facilities who were not notified when re- energization is complete.	113 136	System/operational failure (please see detailed explanation in Section 5-6 and Lessons Learned below) • 101 notifications were not sent. 12 notifications were sent using the most up-to-date contact information on file but were not delivered for unknown reasons. 125 notifications were not sent due to system/operational failure. 9 notifications were not sent due to data processing error. 2 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.
	Facilities who did not receive cancellation notification within two	130 97	System/operational failure (please see detailed explanation in Section 5-6 and Lessons Learned below.) To notifications were sent outside the 2-hour window. To notifications were not sent.

Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation
	hours of the decision to cancel.		40 notifications were sent using the most up-to-date contact information on file but were not delivered for unknown reasons. 76 notifications were sent outside the 2-hour window due to system/operational failure. 20 notifications were not sent due to system/operational failure. 1 notification was not sent due to data processing error. System/operational failure (please see detailed)
All other affected customers	Customers who did not receive 24– 48-hour advance notifications.	5200 7,818	explanation in Section 5-6 and Lessons Learned below) • 1883 notifications were sent outside the 24- 48-hour window • 2900 notifications were not sent 417 notifications were sent using the most up-to-date contact information on file but were not delivered for unknown reasons. 53 notifications were sent more than 48 hours before de-energization. Not forecast in scope within 24-48 hours. 2,007 notifications were sent less than 24 hours before de-energization. 3,778 notifications were not sent due to system/operational failure. 1,980 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.
	Customers who did not receive 1-4- hour imminent notifications.	11908 17,437	System/operational failure (please see detailed explanation in Section 5-6 and Lessons Learned below) • 8366 notifications were sent outside the 1-4-hour window. • 58 notifications were received after denergization. • 3211 notifications were not sent.

Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation
			273 notifications were sent using the most up-to-date contact information on file but were not delivered for unknown reasons. 1,025 notifications were sent more than 4 hours before de-energization. Rapidly escalating weather conditions that required immediate de-energization. 8,490 notifications were sent less than 1 hour before de-energization. 5,276 notifications were not sent due to sudden onset of weather conditions. 888 notifications were not sent due to system/operational failure. 1,758 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.
	Customers who did not receive any notifications before de- energization.	2435 2,840	System/operational failure (please see detailed explanation in Section 5-6 and Lessons Learned below) • 98 notifications were received after deenergization. • 417 notifications were not sent. 1920 notifications were sent using the most up todate contact information on file but were not delivered for unknown reasons. 516 notifications were not sent due to sudden onset of weather conditions. 2,324 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.
	Customers who were not notified at de- energization initiation.	6180 8,616	System/operational failure (please see detailed explanation in Section 5-6 and Lessons Learned below) - 4062 notifications were not sent.

Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation		
			2118 notifications were sent using the most up-to-		
			date contact information on file but were not delivered for unknown reasons.		
			4,091 notifications were not sent due to system/operational failure.		
			4,525 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.		
			System/operational failure (please see detailed explanation in Section 5-6 and Lessons Learned below)		
	Customers who were not notified immediately before re-	7452 7,843	 343 notifications were sent after reenergization. 5093 notifications were not sent. 		
			2016 notifications were sent using the most up-to- date contact information on file but were not delivered for unknown reasons.		
	energization.		5,465 notifications were not sent due to system/operational failure.		
			2,378 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.		
			System/operational failure (please see detailed explanation in Section 5-6 and Lessons Learned below)		
	Customers		 4065 notifications were not sent. 		
	who were		1845 notifications were sent using the most up-to-		
	not notified when re- energization is complete.	5910 6,223	date contact information on file but were not		
		3710 0,223	delivered for unknown reasons. 4,141 notifications were not sent due to		
			system/operational failure.		
			2,082 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.		

Breakdown of Notification Failures							
Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation				
	Customers who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel.	6896 6,668	System/operational failure (please see detailed explanation in Section 5-6 and Lessons Learned below) • 1928 notifications were sent outside the 2-hour window. • 1066 notifications were not sent. 3902 notifications were sent using the most up-to-date contact information on file, but were not delivered for unknown reasons. 1,924 notifications were sent outside the 2-hour window due to system/operational failure. 1,081 notifications were not sent due to system/operational failure. 3,663 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.				

5. Explain how the utility will correct the notification failures.

SCE acknowledges failing to notify Public Safety Partners, Critical Facilities and Infrastructure, and other customers in the notification timeframe indicated in the report. For situations where SCE did not meet the minimum notification timeframe, SCE provides the following categories of causes that resulted in missed notifications and notifications successfully delivered, but outside the minimum notification timeframe. SCE notes that included in the notification failures in Table 9 are notifications that exceed the minimum notification timelines required by D19-05-042.9

Weather

Changing weather forecasts and sudden onset of weather conditions resulted in missed notifications across all notification types and heavily impacted timing, accuracy, and feasibility of advanced warnings such as imminent notifications. While a perfect weather forecast is not attainable, SCE continues to improve its weather forecast capabilities, primarily through

See D.19-05-042, A8-A9. For example, that decision requires the IOUs to provide advance notice of anticipated de-energization to PSPs a *minimum* of 48-72 hours before de-energization. SCE has included any notifications outside that window in the counts in Table 9, even if the notification was sent *earlier* than 48-72 hours in advance.

expanding its use of machine learning and probabilistic forecasting to more weather station locations. These methods allow SCE to create more accurate weather forecasts by reducing forecast biases by leveraging historical weather station observations. SCE also re-trains its machine learning models annually to further improve machine learning forecast accuracy based on the latest weather station observations data.

System/Operational failures

SCE encountered data issues that affected the delivery of notifications sent on October 29, 2024. Initially issued notifications unfortunately did not reach customers as intended. In response, SCE promptly addressed the data issue and retransmitted all notifications to the affected customers. These notifications covered a range of updates, including initial notices, updates, and cancellations.

The root cause for customers who did not receive cancellation notifications after being removed from scope was identified as an abnormal circuit configuration present during the event. This configuration added complexity to the operational and notification processes. To prevent similar errors in future events, SCE has conducted additional integration work and training to address the operational complexities for managing abnormal circuit configurations and related notifications.

No Delivery Confirmation

As indicated on Table 9, notifications were sent but not delivered due to unknown delivery failure in some cases. SCE has since engaged its notification vendor to conduct a more thorough review and cause of the unknown delivery failure categories. SCE's vendor provided the following types of notification responses listed in the table below specifically for notifications classified by the vendor as "Not Delivered."

¹⁰ An abnormal circuit configuration is when all or part of one circuit is supplying electricity to all or part of an adjacent or nearby circuit due to equipment or substation maintenance, circuit loading, or other safety or reliability concerns.

Status	Result	Description		
Processing	Not Delivered	Sent to carrier, but their delivery status is unknown.		
Processed	Not Delivered	Sent to carrier, but their delivery status is unknown.		
Deferred	Not Delivered	The receiving server temporarily rejected the message, and the email cannot immediately be delivered. Carrier will retry.		
Busy	Not Delivered	The recipient line was busy. Notification vendor will retry once in 30 minutes. If all retries have busy status, this will be final.		
No Answer	Not Delivered	No answer from the recipient and we were unable to detect their answering machine. Notification vendor will retry once in 30 minutes.		
Bounce	Not Delivered	Not delivered. The receiving server could not or would not accept the message. Users may have settings with their email carrier which will reject future emails.		
Blocked	Not Delivered	Not delivered. Users may have settings with their email carrier which will reject future emails.		
Not Delivered	Not Delivered	Not delivered. Message delivery failed. There could be multiple reasons. This will not be retried.		
Failed	Not Delivered	Not delivered. Message failed to be delivered.		
Other	Not Delivered	Not delivered. The call cannot be completed for many reasons such as network errors, local congestion, disconnect, etc.		
Sent to Queue	Not Delivered	Initial status		

SCE continues to identify the validity and availability of customer contact information. SCE performs an annual notification test for customers in all High Fire Risk Areas to evaluate the accuracy and delivery capability of customer contact information and notification systems. This test includes notifications to approximately 1.3 million customers that reside in High Fire Risk Areas. SCE then analyzes the notification results and where notifications were unsuccessful, SCE proactively corrects and improves contact information. SCE does this through various efforts

including emergency notification enrollment at sign-up, auto-enrollment into emergency notifications for existing customers, alternative contact information enrollment, emergency contact opt-out prevention, and/or email domain correction. SCE remains committed to making all reasonable efforts to notify all customers affected during PSPS events and will continue similar notification improvement efforts to resolve missing and inaccurate customer contact information for 2024.

Invalid Contact Information

Several notifications were due to invalid contact information and SCE has taken steps to validate emergency contacts. SCE also continues to improve data quality and perform annual testing with customers in High Fire Risk Areas.

Through SCE's autoenrollment program, 99% of active premises have a designated contact for receiving emergency alert notifications. The contact verification process includes thorough validation of email address syntax, format, and structure. Additionally, SCE utilizes tools to validate and confirm the deliverability and existence of each email address not verified by internal source. As part of SCE's data management practices, we promptly remove emails that reject/bounce notifications three or more times within a 90-day period and have been verified as invalid by the tools. SCE also attempts to correct any email addresses with incorrect syntax, format, structure, or invalid domain names. In 2024, SCE will also initiate data validation for phone numbers and cleansing.

CDP functionality failures and unexpected IT malfunctions caused missed notifications across all notification types for customers. The PSPS Notification Specialists had to rely on unfamiliar and cumbersome manual processes to override system errors. This strained available staffing resources, who were not able to meet the high notification demand associated with a large complex event, as described in Section 3, while relying on manual processes.

Less complex system issues that can be quickly remediated are currently being addressed to mitigate reoccurrence in potential future PSPS events. For example, SCE improved the capacity and performance of the CDP application to meet the data demands of large PSPS events. SCE also corrected programming errors that caused circuits to be incorrectly included in event scope. Upon the completion of the 2023 PSPS season, SCE will conduct extensive examination and root cause analysis to remediate larger and more complex system issues. Additionally, SCE will conduct end-to-end stress testing of operational systems using worst-case events from prior years to validate system corrections. SCE plans to continue conducting year-round system testing and drills with increased scope, complexity and situations requiring the use of back-up processes to maintain readiness and identify potential system issues ahead of real-world activations. SCE will use these system tests and drills to validate resolution of identified issues.

For notifications sent but not received due to delivery failure, SCE is working with its notification vendors to determine what caused the delivery failures (e.g., invalid contact information, server errors, customer blocked SCE as sender) and will work to minimize these notification issues in

the future. SCE remains committed to making all reasonable efforts to provide notifications to all customers affected during PSPS events.

Section 7. Complaints and Claims

1. The number and nature of complaints received as the result of the de-energization event and claims that are filed against the utility because of de-energization. The utility must completely report all the informal and formal complaints, meaning any expression of grief, pain, or dissatisfaction, from various sources, filed either with CPUC or received by the utility as a result of the PSPS event.

There were 224 235 reported complaints and 38 claims associated with this PSPS event. SCE will include any complaints or claims related to this PSPS event received after the filing of date of this report in its annual post-season report.

Table 12: Count and Nature of Complaints Received¹¹

Count and Nature of Complaints Received				
Nature of Complaints	Number of Complaints			
PSPS Frequency/Duration Including, but not limited to complaints regarding the frequency and/or duration of PSPS events, Including delays in restoring power, scope of PSPS and dynamic of weather conditions.	16			
Safety/Health Concern Including, but not limited to complaints regarding difficulties experienced by AFN/MBL populations, traffic accidents due to non-operating traffic lights, inability to get medical help, well water or access to clean water, inability to keep property cool/warm during outage raising health concern	8 -9			
Communications/Notifications Including, but not limited to complaints regarding lack of notice, excessive notices, confusing notice, false alarm notice, problems with getting up-to-date information, inaccurate information provided, not being able to get information in the prevalent languages and/or information accessibility, complaints about website, Public Safety Partner Portal, REST/DAM sites (as applicable)	12 15			
Outreach/Assistance Including, but not limited to complaints regarding community resource centers, community crew vehicles, backup power, hotel vouchers, other assistance provided by utility to mitigate impact of PSPS	4			
General PSPS Dissatisfaction/Other Including, but not limited to complaints about being without power during PSPS event and related hardships such as food loss, income loss, inability to work/attend school, plus any PSPS-related complaints that do not fall into any other category.	184 -191			
Total	22 4 235			

¹¹ SCE conducts a quality control (QC) check of all complaints received during the PSPS season in preparation for the PSPS Post-Season report. During the QC process of 2023 PSPS complaint data, SCE identified an additional 11 complaints received during the 10.29.23 PSPS event. These complaints were miscategorized as other types of outage complaints. SCE will continue to train and coach staff to ensure complaints are categorized correctly during future PSPS events.

Table 13: Count and Nature of Claims Received

Description of Claims	Number of Claims
Food loss only	34 38
Property Damage	1
Food loss and property damage	0
Evacuation Cost	0
Business Interruption / Economic Loss	4
Unspecified	0
Total	5 43

Introduction

SCE is hereby amending its Post-Event Report for the November 09, 2023, PSPS event to address certain data reporting discrepancies identified by SCE. The revisions are outlined in Table A and are in red font and/or strikethrough in sections below. The enclosed amendments are primarily due to SCE's detailed examination of 2023 PSPS missed notification issues. Specifically, SCE is revising Total PSPS Notified, Cancelled, Critical Infrastructure Count, Customer Counts, Positive Notification counts, Breakdown of Notification Failure explanations, and count/nature of complaints received. SCE discovered there was a system issue where some notification data failed to transfer from its vendor's messaging systems to SCE's Centralized Data Platform (CDP). This system issue has been addressed with changes to CDP and fixes to the integration points with the notification vendor. SCE also plans to develop data availability and transfer health checks on the vendor messaging systems so that all notification data are transferred to CDP for the upcoming 2024 season. SCE also identified and remediated anomalies in CDP programming logic to correct how missed notifications were categorized and counted for customers with multiple service accounts and multiple communication devices. The details related to the amended metrics are summarized in the table and provided in the subsequent sections below.

<u>Table A</u>
<u>Summary of Changes to SCE's November 9, 2023, Post-Event Report</u>

Item	PSPS Event ID	Metrics/Data Elements Original Post-Event Report Section & P			
		Revised	References		
1	November 9, 2023, PSPS Event (Report submitted on November 28, 2023)	PSPS Incident Management Team (IMT) start time	 Section 1: 1. Brief description of the PSPS event starting from the time when the utility's Emergency Operation Center is activated until service to all customers have been restored. (p. 4) 		
		Total PSPS Notified, Cancelled, Critical Facilities and Critical Infrastructures count	• Section 1. Table 1: PSPS Event Summary (p. 4)		
		Positive Notifications	 Section 5: Table 8: Positive Notification (p. 23) 		
		Breakdown of Notification Failure	 Section 5: Table 9: Breakdown of Notification Failure (pp. 24-27) Section 5: 6. Explain how the utility will correct the notification failures. 		
		Count and Nature of Complaints Received	Section 7: Table 12: Count and Nature of Complaints Received (p. 32)		

Section 1. Executive Summary

1. Brief description of the PSPS event starting from the time when the utility's Emergency Operation Center is activated until service to all customers have been restored.

SCE activated its dedicated PSPS Incident Management Team (IMT) on Sunday, November 5, at 1:00 4:00 pm to manage this event and began sending advance notifications of potential PSPS to Public Safety Partners, Critical Facilities and Critical Infrastructure customers. All other customers in scope received notifications starting on November 6.

2. A table including the maximum number of customers notified and de-energized; number of counties de-energized; number of tribes de-energized; number of Medical Baseline customers de-energized; number of transmission and distribution circuits de- energized; damage/hazard count; number of critical facilities and infrastructure de-energized.

Table 1: PSPS Event Summary¹

PSPS Event Summary										
Total Customers			De-energized				Number of Circuits			
PSPS Notified	De-energized	Cancelled	MBL Customers	Number of Counties	Number of Tribes	Critical Facilities and Infrastucture	Transmission De- energized	Distribution Circuits in Scope	Distribution Circuits De-energized	Damage/Hazard Count
78686 79078	338	78364 78755	9	2	1	48	0	73	4	0

Section 5. Notification

3. For those customers where positive or affirmative notification was attempted, use the following table to report the accounting of the customers (which tariff and/or access and functional needs population designation), the number of notification attempts made, the timing of attempts, who made the notification attempt (utility or public safety partner) and the number of customers for whom positive notification was achieved. "Notification attempts made" and "Successful positive notification" must include the unique number of customer counts. When the actual notification attempts made is less than the numberof customers that need positive notifications, the utilities must explain the reason. In addition, the utilities must explain the reason and unsuccessful positive notifications.

¹ PSPS Notified" metric in Table 1 reflects the total number of unique customers that were sent a pre-event notification of potential de-energization during the PSPS event. "Cancelled" metric in Table 1 reflects the total number of unique customers that were sent a pre-event notification of potential de-energization, but not ultimately de-energized (regardless of whether those customers received a cancellation notice). For this PSPS event, 16 of the 338 de-energized customers could not be notified prior to de-energization due to lack of customer contact information or customers opting out of PSPS notifications.

Table 8: Positive Notification

Positive Notification							
Category	Total Number of Customers ²	Timing of Attempts	Notification Attempts ³	Successful Positive Notification ⁴	Who made the notification		
Medical Baseline	2251 2252	DAILY	2277 2288	2218 2211	SCE		
Self-Certified	156	DAILY	173 176	155	SCE		

33 41 Medical Baseline customers and 1 Self-Certified customer were not successfully contacted during this event. None of these customers were de-energized. that were in-scope for this activation did not receive positive confirmation of notification receipt. SCE is investigating the cause of these missed notifications.

5. If the utility fails to provide notifications according to the minimum timelines set forth in D.19-05-042 and D.21-06-034, use the following table to report a breakdown of the notification failure and an explanation of what caused the failure.

Throughout the PSPS event, SCE made significant effort to notify public safety partners, local/tribal governments, critical facilities and infrastructure, and customers in accordance with the minimum timelines set forth by the CPUC in PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines (D.19-05-042), weather and other factors permitting. Any missed notifications during the event are included in the following table.

² The "Total Number of Customers" metric reflects the total number of MBL and Self-Certified customers in scope for the PSPS event. Although SCE attempts to notify all MBL and Self-Certified customers in scope, only customers who are ultimately denergized "need" positive pre-event PSPS notifications.

³ The "Notification Attempts" metric reflects the count of MBL and Self-Certified customers – both in scope and de-energized – whom SCE attempted to notify prior to de-energization. Notification attempts include secondary verification by Consumer Affairs and escalated contact attempts, up to and including door rings, if necessary, to confirm successful delivery of notifications to Medical Baseline and Self-Certified customers.

⁴ The "Successful Positive Notification" metric reflects the number of unique MBL and Self-Certified customers – both in scope and de-energized – who were successfully notified of the PSPS event prior to de-energization.

Table 9: Breakdown of Notification Failure

Breakdown of Notification Failures						
Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation			
	Entities who did not receive 48-to 72-hour advance notification.	5 1	Notification delivered but outside the required window due to circuits entering scope late. 1 notification was not sent due to data processing error.			
Public Safety Partners excluding Critical Facilities and Infrastructure	Entities who did not receive 1–4-hour imminent notification.	5	Notification delivered but outside the required window, the cause is being investigated. 4 notifications were sent, but less than 1 hour before de-energization due to sudden onset of weather conditions. 1 notification was not sent due to data processing error.			
	Entities who did not receive any notifications before deenergization.	01	Notification was not sent due to data processing error.			
	Entities who were not notified immediately before re-energization.	9 1	9 notifications not successfully delivered due to missing/invalid contact information or other delivery failure. 1 notification was not sent due to data processing error.			
	Entities who did not receive cancellation notification within two	87 7	37 customers' notifications were sent outside the 2- hour window, due to an			

Breakdown of Notification Failures						
Notifications sent to Notification Failure Description		Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation			
	hours of the decision to cancel.		error in the manual removal of circuits in scope. 50 entities missing all clear notifications due to abnormal circuit configuration. 7 notifications were not sent due to system/operational failure.			
	Facilities who did not receive 48–72-hour advance notification.	0 6	N/A 5 notifications were sent more than 72-hours before de-energization. 1 notification not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.			
Critical Facilities and Infrastructure	Facilities who did not receive 1-4 hour of imminent notifications.	6 7	6 notifications not successfully delivered due to missing/invalid contact information or other delivery failure. 5 notifications were sent more than 4 hours before de-energization. 1 notification was sent, but less than 1 hour before de-energizations due to sudden onset of weather conditions. 1 notification not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.			
	Facilities who did not receive any	1	1 notification not successfully delivered due to missing/invalid contact			

Breakdown of Notification Failures					
Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation		
	notifications before de- energization.		information or other delivery failure.		
			1 notification not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.		
	Facilities who were not notified at de-energization initiation.	1	1 notification not successfully delivered due to missing/invalid contact information or other delivery failure. 1 notification not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information		
	Facilities who were not notified immediately before re- energization.	1	or other delivery failure. 1 notification not successfully delivered due to missing/invalid contact information or other delivery failure. 1 notification not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.		
	Facilities who were not notified when reenergization is complete.	1	1 notification not successfully delivered due to missing/invalid contact information or other delivery failure. 1 notification not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.		
	Facilities who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel.	118 125	71 78 customers' notifications were sent outside the 2-hour window due to an error in the manual removal of circuits in scope.		

Breakdown of Notifica	Breakdown of Notification Failures				
Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation		
			47 customers missing all- clear notifications due to abnormal circuit configuration.		
All other affected customers	Customers who did not receive 24–48-hour advance notifications.	1 37	1 notification not successfully delivered due to missing/invalid contact information or other delivery failure. 24 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.		
			13 notifications were sent more than 48 hours before de-energization. 198 customers' notifications were outside the 1–4-hour window, the cause is being investigated.		
	Customers who did not receive 1–4-hour imminent notifications.		1 notification not successfully delivered due to missing/invalid contact information or other delivery failure.		
		199 215	19 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.		
			178 notifications were sent more than 4 hours before de-energization.		
			18 notifications were sent but less than 1 hour before de-energization due to		

Breakdown of Notification Failures				
Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation	
			sudden onset of weather conditions.	
	Customers who did not receive any notifications before deenergization.	15 19	15 notifications not successfully delivered due to missing/invalid contact information or other delivery failure. 19 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.	
	Customers who were not notified at deenergization initiation.	25 28	25 notifications not successfully delivered due to missing/invalid contact information or other delivery failure. 28 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information	
	Customers who were not notified immediately before reenergization.	19 21	or other delivery failure. 19 notifications not successfully delivered due to missing/invalid contact information or other delivery failure. 21 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.	
	Customers who were not notified when reenergization is complete.	20 22	20 notifications not successfully delivered due to missing/invalid contact information or other delivery failure. 22 notifications not successfully delivered due to	

Breakdown of Notification Failures				
Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation	
			invalid contact information or other delivery failure.	
	Customers who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel.	7122 7782	4112 customer notifications were sent outside the 2- hour window due to an error in the manual removal of circuits in scope. 1375 notifications not successfully delivered due to missing/invalid contact information or other delivery failure. 4764 customer notifications were sent outside the 2- hour window due to system/operational failure. 1635 1639 customers missing all-clear notifications due to abnormal circuit configuration. 1379 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.	

6. Explain how the utility will correct the notification failures.

SCE acknowledges failing to notify Public Safety Partners, Critical Facilities and Infrastructure, and other customers in the notification timeframe indicated in the report. For situations where SCE did not meet the minimum notification timeframe, SCE provides the following categories of causes that resulted in missed notifications and notifications successfully delivered, but outside the minimum notification timeframe. SCE notes that included in the notification failures in Table 9 are notifications that exceed the minimum notification timelines required by D19-05-042.⁵

Weather

Changing weather forecasts and sudden onset of weather conditions resulted in missed notifications across all notification types and heavily impacted timing, accuracy, and feasibility of advanced warnings such as imminent notifications. While a perfect weather forecast is not attainable, SCE continues to improve its weather forecast capabilities, primarily through expanding its use of machine learning and probabilistic forecasting to more weather station locations. These methods allow SCE to create more accurate weather forecasts by reducing forecast biases by leveraging historical weather station observations. SCE also re-trains its machine learning models annually to further improve machine learning forecast accuracy based on the latest weather station observations data.

System/Operational failures

SCE encountered data issues that affected the delivery of notifications sent on November 7, 2024. Initially issued notifications did not reach customers as intended. In response, SCE promptly addressed the data issue and successfully retransmitted all notifications to the affected customers. These notifications covered a range of updates, including initial notices, updates, and cancellations.

The root cause for customers who did not receive cancellation notifications after being removed from scope was identified as an abnormal⁶ circuit configuration present during the event. This configuration added complexity to the operational and notification processes. To prevent similar errors in future events, SCE has conducted additional integration work and training to address the operational complexities for managing abnormal circuit configurations and related notifications.

No Delivery Confirmation

As indicated on Table 9, notifications were sent but not delivered due to unknown delivery failure in some cases. SCE has since engaged its notification vendor to conduct a more thorough review and cause of the unknown delivery failure categories. SCE's vendor provided the following types of notification responses listed in the table below specifically for notifications classified by the vendor as "Not Delivered."

See D.19-05-042, A8-A9. For example, that decision requires the IOUs to provide advance notice of anticipated deenergization to PSPs a *minimum* of 48-72 hours before de-energization. SCE has included any notifications outside that window in the counts in Table 9, even if the notification was sent *earlier* than 48-72 hours in advance.

⁶ An abnormal circuit configuration is when all or part of one circuit is supplying electricity to all or part of an adjacent or nearby circuit due to equipment or substation maintenance, circuit loading, or other safety or reliability concerns.

Status	Result	Description	
Processing	Not Delivered	Sent to carrier, but their delivery status is unknown.	
Processed	Not Delivered	Sent to carrier, but their delivery status is unknown.	
Deferred	Not Delivered	The receiving server temporarily rejected the message, and the email cannot immediately be delivered. Carrier will retry.	
Busy	Not Delivered	The recipient line was busy. Notification vendor will retry once in 30 minutes. If all retries have busy status, this will be final.	
No Answer	Not Delivered	No answer from the recipient and we were unable to detect their answering machine. Notification vendor will retry once in 30 minutes.	
Bounce	Not Delivered	Not delivered. The receiving server could not or would not accept the message. Users may have settings with their email carrier which will reject future emails.	
Blocked	Not Delivered	Not delivered. Users may have settings with their email carrier which will reject future emails.	
Not Delivered	Not Delivered	Not delivered. Message delivery failed. There could be multiple reasons. This will not be retried.	
Failed	Not Delivered	Not delivered. Message failed to be delivered.	
Other	Not Delivered	Not delivered. The call cannot be completed for many reasons such as network errors, local congestion, disconnect, etc.	
Sent to Queue	Not Delivered	Initial status	

SCE continues to identify the validity and availability of customer contact information. SCE performs an annual notification test for customers in all High Fire Risk Areas to evaluate the accuracy and delivery capability of customer contact information and notification systems. This test includes notifications to approximately 1.3 million customers that reside in High Fire Risk Areas. SCE then analyzes the notification results and where notifications were unsuccessful, SCE proactively corrects and improves contact information. SCE does this through various efforts including emergency notification enrollment at sign-up, auto-enrollment into emergency notifications for existing customers, alternative contact information enrollment, emergency contact opt-out prevention, and/or email domain correction. SCE remains committed to making all reasonable efforts to notify all

customers affected during PSPS events and will continue similar notification improvement efforts to resolve missing and inaccurate customer contact information for 2024.

Invalid Contact Information

Several notifications were due to invalid contact information and SCE has taken steps to validate emergency contacts. SCE also continues to improve data quality and perform annual testing with customers in High Fire Risk Areas.

Through SCE's autoenrollment program, 99% of active premises have a designated contact for receiving emergency alert notifications. The contact verification process includes thorough validation of email address syntax, format, and structure. Additionally, SCE utilizes tools to validate and confirm the deliverability and existence of each email address not verified by internal source. As part of SCE's data management practices, we promptly remove emails that reject/bounce notifications three or more times within a 90-day period and have been verified as invalid by the tools. SCE also attempts to correct any email addresses with incorrect syntax, format, structure, or invalid domain names. In 2024, SCE will also initiate data validation for phone numbers and cleansing.

199 customers did not receive 1–4-hour notification prior to de-energization. 198 of these customers did receive multiple notifications during the period of concern that indicated the imminent potential (i.e., 1–4-hour notification) for de-energization but were eventually de-energized outside of the time period. SCE is currently investigating the cause of the missed notifications (i.e., why additional notifications were not sent within 1-4 hours of the ultimate de-energization time). 1 customer did not receive 1–4-hour notification prior to de-energization due to missing/invalid contact information or other delivery failure.

In addition, it was not possible to provide notification for initial, imminent de-energization, de-energization, pre-re-energization, re-energization, and cancelation notice to 1465 customers due to missing/invalid contact information or other delivery failure. SCE is assessing alternative methods to obtain missing customer contact information via call center scripts, direct mailers, and other sources. While the number of customers without contact information is relatively minimal, SCE remains committed to making all reasonable efforts to provide notifications to all customers affected during PSPS events.

Finally, there were also 1635 customers and 47 critical facilities and infrastructure customers that were not provided cancelation notifications after removal from scope. The root cause was determined to be the result of an abnormal circuit configuration that was present during the event that added complexity to the operational and notification process. SCE has conducted additional integration work and training to remediate this error from occurring in future events. In addition, 4112 customers and 71 critical facilities and infrastructure customers were sent cancelation notifications late following removal from scope. These customers were added to the event because of emergent weather conditions and were inadvertently missed when removed from scope. This is a manual process, and SCE has provided additional reminders to employees regarding the appropriate procedures for this scenario to remediate this error from occurring in future events.

Section 7. Complaints and Claims

1. The number and nature of complaints received as the result of the de-energization event and claims that are filed against the utility because of de-energization. The utility must completely report all the informal and formal complaints, meaning any expression of grief, pain, or dissatisfaction, from various sources, filed either with CPUC or received by the utility as a result of the PSPS event.

There were 53 54 reported complaints and 0 claims associated with this PSPS event. SCE will include any complaints or claims related to this PSPS event received after the filing date of this report in its annual post-season report.

Table 12: Count and Nature of Complaints Received

Count and Nature of Complaints Received	Number of	
Nature of Complaints		
PSPS Frequency/Duration Including, but not limited to complaints regarding the frequency and/or duration of PSPS events, Including delays in restoring power, scope of PSPS and dynamic of weather conditions.	2 4	
Safety/Health Concern Including, but not limited to complaints regarding difficulties experienced by AFN/MBL populations, traffic accidents due to non-operating traffic lights, inability to get medical help, well water or access to clean water, inability to keep property cool/warm during outage raising health concern	3 9	
Communications/Notifications Including, but not limited to complaints regarding lack of notice, excessive notices, confusing notice, false alarm notice, problems with getting up-to-date information, inaccurate information provided, not being able to get information in the prevalent languages and/or information accessibility, complaints about website, Public Safety Partner Portal, REST/DAM sites (as applicable)	3 9	
Outreach/Assistance Including, but not limited to complaints regarding community resource centers, community crew vehicles, backup power, hotel vouchers, other assistance provided by utility to mitigate impact of PSPS	0	
General PSPS Dissatisfaction/Other Including, but not limited to complaints about being without power during PSPS event and related hardships such as food loss, income loss, inability to work/attend school, plus any PSPS-related complaints that do not fall into any other category.	32	
Total	32 54	

Introduction

SCE is hereby amending its Post-Event Report for the November 21, 2023, PSPS event to address certain data reporting discrepancies identified by SCE. The revisions are outlined in Table A and are in red font and/or strikethrough in sections below. The enclosed amendments are primarily due to SCE's detailed examination of 2023 PSPS missed notification issues. Specifically, SCE is revising Total PSPS Notified, Cancelled, Critical Infrastructure Count, Customer Counts, Positive Notification counts, Breakdown of Notification Failure explanations, and count/nature of complaints received SCE discovered there was a system issue where some notification data failed to transfer from its vendor's messaging systems to SCE's Centralized Data Platform (CDP). This system issue has been addressed with changes to CDP and fixes to the integration points with the notification vendor. SCE also plans to develop data availability and transfer health checks on the vendor messaging systems so all notification data are transferred to CDP for the upcoming 2024 season. SCE also identified and remediated anomalies in CDP programming logic to correct how missed notifications were categorized and counted for customers with multiple service accounts and multiple communication devices. The details related to the amended metrics are summarized in the table and provided in the subsequent sections below.

Table A
Summary of Changes to SCE's November 20, 2023, Post-Event Report

Item	PSPS Event ID	Metrics/Data	Original Post-Event Report Section &
		Elements Revised	Page References
1	November 20, 2023, PSPS Event (Report submitted on December 7, 2023)	Total PSPS Notified, Cancelled, Critical Facilities and Critical Infrastructures count	• Section 1. Table 1: PSPS Event Summary (p. 5)
		Customer counts	 Section 3. Table 5 Circuits De- Energized (p. 18)
		Positive Notifications	 Section 5: Table 8: Positive Notification (p. 25)
		Breakdown of Notification Failure	 Section 5: Table 9: Breakdown of Notification Failure (pp. 26-29) Section 5: 6. Explain how the utility will correct the notification failures.
		Count and Nature of Complaints Received	 Section 7: Table 12: Count and Nature of Complaints Received (p. 34)

Section 1. Executive Summary

2. A table including the maximum number of customers notified and de-energized; number of counties de-energized; number of tribes de-energized; number of Medical Baseline customers de-energized; number of transmission and distribution circuits de-energized; damage/hazard count; number of critical facilities and infrastructure de-energized.

Table 1: PSPS Event Summary¹

PSPS Event Summary										
Total Customers		De-energized			Number of Circuits					
PSPS Notified	+ De-energized	Cancelled	MBL Customers	Number of Counties	Number of Tribes	Critical Facilities and Infrastucture	Transmission	Distribution Circuits in Scope	Distribution Circuits De-energized	Damage/Hazard Count
40857 40589	2780	38277 38051	103	3	0	139	0	35	5	0

Section 3. De-Energized Time, Place, Duration and Customers

3. A list of circuits de-energized, with the following information for each circuit. This information should be provided in both a PDF and excel spreadsheet.

The following table details the specified information for each circuit de-energized during this PSPS event and has also been included in the required PSPS Event Data Workbook filed with this report.

- County
- De-energization date/time
- Restoration date/time
- "All Clear" declaration date/time²
- General Order (GO) 95, Rule 21.2-D Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 classification or non-High Fire Threat District
- Total customers de-energized³
- Residential customers de-energized
- Commercial/Industrial customers de-energized
- Medical Baseline (MBL) customers de-energized

¹ PSPS Notified" metric in Table 1 reflects the total number of unique customers that were sent a pre-event notification of potential de-energization during the PSPS event. "Cancelled" metric in Table 1 reflects the total number of unique customers that were sent a pre-event notification of potential de-energization, but not de-energized (regardless of whether those customers received a cancellation notice). Please see Section 5 of this report regarding missed notifications and cancellation notice metrics.

² SCE understands "All Clear" declaration date/time for each circuit in scope to refer to: (1) approval by the Incident Commander to begin patrols and restoration of power for any de-energized circuit or circuit segment, or (2) a final decision to remove a circuit or circuit segment from scope after the Period of Concern is over for that circuit or segment on the monitored circuit list that was not de-energized during the PSPS event.

³ Whenever possible, SCE employs circuit-switching operations and/or sectionalization devices to minimize the number of customers in scope for proactive de-energization. As a result, some customers on a circuit in scope may briefly lose power while SCE switches them to an energized adjacent circuit or when SCE uses sectionalization devices to isolate portions of a circuit that can remain safely energized from de-energized segments of that same circuit or an adjacent circuit. The reported count of "total customers de-energized" does not include customers who experience a brief (30 minutes or less) power interruption during such switching and/or sectionalization operations, but who are not otherwise impacted by the proactive de-energization.

- AFN other than MBL customers de-energized⁴
- Other Customers
- Distribution or transmission classification

Table 5: Circuits De-Energized 5

Circuits De-	Circuits De-Energized (cont.)							
County	Circuit Name	Residential Customers De-energized	Commercial / Industrial customers De-energized	Medical Baseline customers De-energized	AFN other than MBL customers De- energized	Total customers De-energized	GO 95, Tier HFTD Tier(s) 1,2,3	Other Customers
VENTURA	BRENNAN_1, 2, 4	440	27	17	42	467	ТЗ	0
VENTURA	MORGANSTEIN_1, 2, 3	1698	73	78	147- 148	1771	Т3	0
LOS ANGELES	NICHOLAS_6	185	9	5	7	194	T2,T3	0
LOS ANGELES	SERRA_1, 2, 3	224	62	3	16	286	ТЗ	0
ORANGE	TAIWAN_2, 5	11	51	0	0	62	Non HFRA, T2, T3	0

Section 5. Notification

3. For those customers where positive or affirmative notification attempted, use the following table to report the accounting of the customers (which tariff and/or access and functional needs population designation), the number of notification attempts made, the timing of attempts, who made the notification attempt (utility or public safety partner) and the number of customers for whom positive notification was achieved. "Notification attempts made" and "Successful positive notification" must include the unique number of customer counts. When the actual notification attempts made is less than the number of customers that need positive notifications, the utilities must explain the reason. In addition, the utilities must explain the reason of any unsuccessful positive notifications.

⁴ SCE maintains extensive data on customer populations that are included in the AFN definition referenced in CPUC decisions, with a focus on identifying AFN customers particularly vulnerable during PSPS events. In addition to AFN customers who have self-certified as sensitive (not enrolled in the MBL program), SCE identifies and tracks for PSPS reporting purposes the following categories of "AFN other than MBL customers": senior citizens (65 and older), hearing-impaired, vision-impaired (communications provided in large font or Braille), income-qualified (enrolled in CARE or FERA), and non-English speakers. SCE also reports on impacted customers that provide shelter to the homeless population, as these entities are included among critical facilities and infrastructure.

⁵ The sum of (i) residential customers de-energized, (ii) commercial/industrial customers de-energized, and (iii) other customers equals the total number of customers de-energized per circuit for this event. The count of' Residential Customers De-energized "includes sub-categories of" Medical Baseline customers De-energized "and "AFN other than MBL customers De-energized."

Table 8: Positive Notification

Positive l	Positive Notification						
Category	Total Number of Customers ⁶	Timing of Attempts	Notification Attemnts ⁷	Successful Positive Notification ⁸	Who made the notification		
Medical Baseline	987 1043	DAILY	1018	986	SCE		
Self- Certified	66 68	DAILY	73	66	SCE		

One 57 Medical Baseline customers and 2 Self-Certified customers were not successfully contacted during this event. None of these customers were de-energized. in scope could not be contacted during this event, but this customer was not de-energized.

5. If the utility fails to provide notifications according to the minimum timelines set forth in D.19-05-042 and D.21-06-034, use the following table to report a breakdown of the notification failure and an explanation of what caused the failure.

Throughout the PSPS event, SCE made significant effort to notify public safety partners, local/tribal governments, critical facilities and infrastructure, and customers in accordance with the minimum timelines set forth by the CPUC in PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines (D.19-05-042), weather and other factors permitting. Any missed notifications during the event are included in the following table.

Table 9: Breakdown of Notification Failure

Breakdown of Notification Failures			
Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation
Public Safety Partners excluding Critical	Entities who did not receive 48-to 72-hour advance notification.	24 6	Not forecast in scope within 48-72 hours. Notifications were sent but less than 48 hours before de-energization.

⁶ The "Total Number of Customers" metric reflects the total number of MBL and Self-Certified customers in scope for the PSPS event. Although SCE attempts to notify all MBL and Self-Certified customers in scope, only customers who are ultimately de-energized "need" positive pre-event PSPS notifications.

⁷ The "Notification Attempts" metric reflects the count of MBL and Self-Certified customers – both in scope and deenergized – whom SCE attempted to notify prior to de-energization. Notification attempts include automated notification, secondary verification by Consumer Affairs and escalated contact attempts, up to and including door rings, if necessary, to confirm successful delivery of notifications to Medical Baseline and Self-Certified customers.

⁸ The "Successful Positive Notification" metric reflects the number of unique MBL and Self-Certified customers – both in scope and de-energized – who were successfully notified of the PSPS event prior to de-energization.

Breakdown of Noti	Breakdown of Notification Failures			
Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation	
Facilities and Infrastructure			Not forecast in scope within 48-72 hours. 5 notifications were sent but less than 48 hours before de-energization. 1 notification was not sent	
	Entities who did not receive 1–4-hour imminent notification.	72	due to data processing error. Rapidly escalating weather conditions that required immediate de energization. Notifications were sent, but less than 1 hour before deenergization due to sudden onset of weather conditions.	
	Entities who did not receive any notifications before de-energization.	31	Rapidly escalating weather conditions that required immediate de energization. 1 notification was not sent due to sudden onset of weather conditions.	
	Entities who were not notified immediately before re-energization.	29 2	Notifications were sent to these entities using the most up-to-date contact information on file but were not delivered for unknown reasons. 2 notifications were not sent due to data processing error.	
	Entities who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel.	0		
Critical Facilities and Infrastructure	Facilities who did not receive 48-72-hour advance notification.	71	Not forecast in scope within 48-72 hours. Notifications were sent but less than 48 hours before de-energization.	

Breakdown of Noti	Breakdown of Notification Failures			
Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation	
			68 were missed to due rapidly escalating weather conditions that required immediate deenergization. Notifications were sent, but less than 1 hour before deenergization.	
	Facilities who did not receive 1-4 hour of imminent notifications.	73	5 notifications were not sent due to sudden onset of weather conditions; customers were de-energized before notifications could be sent.	
			68 notifications were sent more than 4-hours before deenergization.	
			5 notifications were not sent due to sudden onset of weather conditions.	
	Facilities who did not receive any notifications before de-energization.	0		
	Facilities who were not notified at deenergization initiation.	40	Notifications were sent using the most up-to-date contact information on file but was not delivered for unknown reasons.	
	Facilities who were not notified immediately before re- energization.	17 0	Notifications were sent using the most up to date contact information on file but was not delivered for unknown reasons.	
	Facilities who were not notified when re- energization is complete.	0		
	Facilities who did not receive cancellation	48 16	32 notifications were sent outside the 2 hour window due to system/operational	

Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation
	notification within two hours of the decision to cancel.		failure. 16 notifications were sent using the most up to date contact information on file but was not delivered for unknown reasons. 16 notifications were not sent due to data processing error.
All other affected customers	Customers who did not receive 24–48-hour advance notifications.	33 276	1 notification was not sent due to anomalies between operational data systems throughout the course of an event. 32 notification was sent using the most up to date contact information on file but was not delivered for unknown reasons. 8 notifications were sent more than 48 hours before deenergization. Not forecast in scope within 24-48 hours. 5 notifications were sent but less than 24 hours before de-energization. 2 notifications were not sent due to data processing error. 261 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.
	Customers who did not receive 1-4-hour imminent notifications.	2122 2315	89 notifications were sent using the most up to date contact information on file but was not delivered for unknown reasons.

Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation
			1994 were missed to due rapidly escalating weather conditions that required immediate de-energization. Notifications were sent, but less than 1 hour before deenergization. 39 notifications were not sent due to sudden onset of weather conditions. customers were de-energized before notifications could be sent. 1974 notifications were sent more than 4 hours before de-
			energization. 19 notifications were sent, but less than 1 hour before deenergization due to sudden onset of weather conditions. 44 notifications were not sent due to sudden onset of weather conditions.
			278 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.
	Customers who did not		197 notifications were sent using the most up-to-date contact information on file but were not delivered for unknown reasons.
receive any notifications before de-energization.	198 253	1 notification was not sent due to anomalies between operational data systems throughout the course of an event.	

Breakdown of Noti	fication Failures		
Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation
			1 notification was not sent due to data processing error. 252 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.
	Customers who were not notified at deenergization initiation.	405 383	404 notifications were sent using the most up-to-date contact information on file but were not delivered for unknown reasons. 1 notification was not sent due to anomalies between operational data systems throughout the course of an event. 1 notification was not sent due to data processing error. 382 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.
	Customers who were not notified immediately before re-energization.	348 322	347 notifications were sent using the most up to date contact information on file but were not delivered for unknown reasons. 1 notification was not sent due to anomalies between operational data systems throughout the course of an event. 1 notification was not sent due to data processing error. 321 notifications not successfully delivered due to

Breakdown of Noti	Breakdown of Notification Failures				
Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation		
			invalid contact information or other delivery failure.		
	Customers who were not notified when reenergization is complete.	255 262	255 notifications were sent using the most up-to-date contact information on file but were not delivered for unknown reasons. 262 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.		
	Customers who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel.	528 506	528 notifications were sent using the most up-to-date contact information on file but were not delivered for unknown reasons. 8 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure. 498 notifications were not sent due to data processing error.		

6. Explain how the utility will correct the notification failures.

SCE acknowledges failing to notify Public Safety Partners, Critical Facilities and Infrastructure, and other customers in the notification timeframe indicated in the report. For situations where SCE did not meet the minimum notification timeframe, SCE provides the following categories of causes that resulted in missed notifications and notifications successfully delivered, but outside the minimum notification timeframe. SCE notes that included in the notification failures in Table 9 are notifications that exceed the minimum notification timelines required by D19-05-042.9

Weather

See D.19-05-042, A8-A9. For example, that decision requires the IOUs to provide advance notice of anticipated de-energization to PSPs a *minimum* of 48-72 hours before de-energization. SCE has included any notifications outside that window in the counts in Table 9, even if the notification was sent *earlier* than 48-72 hours in advance.

Changing weather forecasts and sudden onset of weather conditions resulted in missed notifications across all notification types and heavily impacted timing, accuracy, and feasibility of advanced warnings such as imminent notifications. While a perfect weather forecast is not attainable, SCE continues to improve its weather forecast capabilities, primarily through expanding its use of machine learning and probabilistic forecasting to more weather station locations. These methods allow SCE to create more accurate weather forecasts by reducing forecast biases by leveraging historical weather station observations. SCE also re-trains its machine learning models annually to further improve machine learning forecast accuracy based on the latest weather station observations data.

No Delivery Confirmation

As indicated on Table 9, notifications were sent but not delivered due to unknown delivery failure in some cases. SCE has since engaged its notification vendor to conduct a more thorough review and cause of the unknown delivery failure categories. SCE's vendor provided the following types of notification responses listed in the table below specifically for notifications classified by the vendor as "Not Delivered."

Status	Result	Description
Processing	Not Delivered	Sent to carrier, but their delivery status is unknown.
Processed	Not Delivered	Sent to carrier, but their delivery status is unknown.
Deferred	Not Delivered	The receiving server temporarily rejected the message, and the email cannot immediately be delivered. Carrier will retry.
Busy	Not Delivered	The recipient line was busy. Notification vendor will retry once in 30 minutes. If all retries have busy status, this will be final.
No Answer	Not Delivered	No answer from the recipient and we were unable to detect their answering machine. Notification vendor will retry once in 30 minutes.
Bounce	Not Delivered	Not delivered. The receiving server could not or would not accept the message. Users may have settings with their email carrier which will reject future emails.
Blocked	Not Delivered	Not delivered. Users may have settings with their email carrier which will reject future emails.
Not Delivered	Not Delivered	Not delivered. Message delivery failed. There could be multiple reasons. This will not be retried.

Failed	Not Delivered	Not delivered. Message failed to be delivered.
Other	Not Delivered	Not delivered. The call cannot be completed for many reasons such as network errors, local congestion, disconnect, etc.
Sent to Queue	Not Delivered	Initial status

SCE continues to identify the validity and availability of customer contact information. SCE performs an annual notification test for customers in all High Fire Risk Areas to evaluate the accuracy and delivery capability of customer contact information and notification systems. This test includes notifications to approximately 1.3 million customers that reside in High Fire Risk Areas. SCE then analyzes the notification results and where notifications were unsuccessful, SCE proactively corrects and improves contact information. SCE does this through various efforts including emergency notification enrollment at sign-up, auto-enrollment into emergency notifications for existing customers, alternative contact information enrollment, emergency contact opt-out prevention, and/or email domain correction. SCE remains committed to making all reasonable efforts to notify all customers affected during PSPS events and will continue similar notification improvement efforts to resolve missing and inaccurate customer contact information for 2024.

Invalid Contact Information

Several notifications were due to invalid contact information and SCE has taken steps to validate emergency contacts. SCE also continues to improve data quality and perform annual testing with customers in High Fire Risk Areas.

Through SCE's autoenrollment program, 99% of active premises have a designated contact for receiving emergency alert notifications. The contact verification process includes thorough validation of email address syntax, format, and structure. Additionally, SCE utilizes tools to validate and confirm the deliverability and existence of each email address not verified by internal source. As part of SCE's data management practices, we promptly remove emails that reject/bounce notifications three or more times within a 90-day period and have been verified as invalid by the tools. SCE also attempts to correct any email addresses with incorrect syntax, format, structure, or invalid domain names. In 2024, SCE will also initiate data validation for phone numbers and cleansing.

Fast-changing weather conditions complicated notification release timing for imminent (1-4 hour) notifications. SCE uses real time weather conditions to determine when these notifications are to be sent. For some circuits in this event, conditions held near threshold for long periods of time before ultimately exceeding thresholds and required near-immediate de-energization. In some cases, SCE triggered multiple expected shutoff notifications for these circuits over this near-threshold period but did not meet the imminent notification window of 1-4 hours prior to de-energization in some instances.

System functionality failures and source system data issues caused some missed notifications for this event. Upon conclusion of the 2023 PSPS season, SCE will conduct an extensive examination and root cause analysis to remediate larger and more complex system issues. Additionally, SCE will conduct end-to-end stress testing of operational systems using worst-case events from prior years to validate system corrections. SCE plans to continue conducting year-round system testing and drills with increased scope, complexity and situations requiring the use of back-up processes to maintain readiness and identify potential system issues ahead of real-world activations. SCE will use these system tests and drills to validate resolution of identified issues.

For notifications sent but undelivered, SCE is working with its notification vendors to determine what caused the delivery failures (e.g., invalid contact information, server errors, customer blocked SCE as sender) and will work to minimize these notification issues in the future. SCE remains committed to making all reasonable efforts to provide notifications to all impacted customers and public safety partners during PSPS events.

Section 7. Complaints and Claims

1. The number and nature of complaints received as the result of the de-energization event and claims that are filed against the utility because of de-energization. The utility must completely report all the informal and formal complaints, meaning any expression of grief, pain, or dissatisfaction, from various sources, filed either with CPUC or received by the utility as a result of the PSPS event.

There was 53 57 reported complaints and 7 claims associated with this PSPS event. SCE will include any complaints or claims related to this PSPS event received after the filing date of this report in its annual post-season report.

Table 12: Count and Nature of Complaints Received

Count and Nature of Complaints Received	
Nature of Complaints	Number of Complaints
PSPS Frequency/Duration Including, but not limited to complaints regarding the frequency and/or duration of PSPS events, Including delays in restoring power, scope of PSPS and dynamic of weather conditions.	3 4
Safety/Health Concern Including, but not limited to complaints regarding difficulties experienced by AFN/MBL populations, traffic accidents due to non-operating traffic lights, inability to get medical help, well water or access to clean water, inability to keep property cool/warm during outage raising health concern	4
Communications/Notifications Including, but not limited to complaints regarding lack of notice, excessive notices, confusing notice, false alarm notice, problems with getting up-to-date information, inaccurate information provided, not being able to get information in the prevalent languages and/or information accessibility, complaints about website, Public Safety Partner Portal, REST/DAM sites (as applicable)	3 4
Outreach/Assistance Including, but not limited to complaints regarding community resource centers, community crew vehicles, backup power, hotel vouchers, other assistance provided by utility to mitigate impact of PSPS	0
General PSPS Dissatisfaction/Other Including, but not limited to complaints about being without power during PSPS event and related hardships such as food loss, income loss, inability to work/attend school, plus any PSPS-related complaints that do not fall into any other category.	43 45
Total	53 57

Introduction

SCE is hereby amending its Post-Event Report for the December 09, 2023, PSPS event to address certain data reporting discrepancies identified by SCE. The revisions are outlined in Table A and are in red font and/or strikethrough in sections below. The enclosed amendments are primarily due to SCE's detailed examination of 2023 PSPS missed notification issues. Specifically, SCE is revising Total PSPS Notified, Cancelled, Critical Infrastructure Count, Customer Counts, Positive Notification counts, Breakdown of Notification Failure explanations, damages, and count/nature of complaints received. SCE discovered there was a system issue where some notification data failed to transfer from its vendor's messaging systems to SCE's Centralized Data Platform (CDP). This system issue has been addressed with changes to CDP and fixes to the integration points with the notification vendor. SCE also plans to develop data availability and transfer health checks on the vendor messaging systems so that all notification data are transferred to CDP for the upcoming 2024 season. SCE also identified and remediated anomalies in CDP programming logic to correct how missed notifications were categorized and counted for customers with multiple service accounts and multiple communication devices. The details related to the amended metrics are summarized in the table and provided in the subsequent sections below.

Table A
Summary of Changes to SCE's December 9, 2023, Post-Event Report

Item	PSPS Event ID	Metrics/Data Elements Revised	Original Post-Event Report Section &
		•	Page References
1	December 9, 2023, PSPS Event (Report submitted on January 9, 2024)	PSPS Incident Management Team (IMT) start time	• Section 1: 1. Brief description of the PSPS event starting from the time when the utility's Emergency Operation Center is activated until service to all customers have been restored. (p. 4)
		Total PSPS Notified, Cancelled, Critical Facilities and Critical Infrastructures, Distribution Circuits in Scope, and Damages count	• Section 1. Table 1: PSPS Event Summary (p. 5)
		Customer counts	• Section 3. Table 5 Circuits De-Energized (p. 19)
		Damages	Section 4: Table 6: Damage and Hazards
		Positive Notifications	• Section 5: Table 8: Positive Notification (p. 25)
		Breakdown of Notification Failure	 Section 5: Table 9: Breakdown of Notification Failure (pp. 26- 29) Section 5: 6. Explain how the utility will correct the notification failures.
		Count and Nature of Complaints Received	Section 7: Table 12: Count and Nature of Complaints Received (p. 35)
		Count and Nature of Claims Received	Section 7: Table 13: Count and Nature of Claims Received (p. 35)

Section 1. Executive Summary

1. Brief description of the PSPS event starting from the time when the utility's Emergency Operation Center is activated until service to all customers have been restored.

In response to this forecasted fire weather, SCE activated its dedicated PSPS Incident Management Team (IMT) on December 5, 2023, at 1:37 pm 12:00pm to manage this event and began sending advance notifications of potential PSPS to Public Safety Partners, Critical Facilities and Infrastructure customers, and other customers in scope. On December 6, 2023, SCE's meteorologists identified additional fire weather concerns for Orange and Riverside counties, which extended the initial Period of Concern to December 10, 2023.

2. A table including the maximum number of customers notified and de-energized; number of counties de-energized; number of tribes de-energized; number of Medical Baseline customers de-energized; number of transmission and distribution circuits de-energized; damage/hazard count; number of critical facilities and infrastructure de-energized.

Table 1: PSPS Event Summary¹

PSPS Event Su	PSPS Event Summary									
Total Customers			De-energized			Number of Circuits				
PSPS Notified	De-energized	Cancelled	MBL Customers	Number of Counties	Number of Tribes	Critical Facilities and Infrastucture	Transmission	Distribution Circuits in Scope	Distribution Circuits De-energized	Damage/Hazard Count
120213 120514	5311	115308 115639	162	5	1	258	0	146 145	20	43

¹ PSPS Notified" metric in Table 1 reflects the total number of unique customers that were sent a pre-event notification of potential de-energization during the PSPS event. "Cancelled" metric in Table 1 reflects the total number of unique customers that were sent a pre-event notification of potential de-energization, but not ultimately de-energized (regardless of whether those customers received a cancellation notice). Please see Section 5 of this report regarding missed notifications and cancellation notice metrics.

Section 3. De-Energized Time, Place, Duration and Customers

3. A list of circuits de-energized, with the following information for each circuit. This information should be provided in both a PDF and excel spreadsheet.

The following table details the specified information for each circuit de-energized during this PSPS event and has also been included in the required PSPS Event Data Workbook filed with this report.²

- County
- De-energization date/time
- Restoration date/time
- "All Clear" declaration date/time³
- General Order (GO) 95, Rule 21.2-D Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 classification or non-High Fire Threat District
- Total customers de-energized⁴
- Residential customers de-energized
- Commercial/Industrial customers de-energized
- Medical Baseline (MBL) customers de-energized
- AFN other than MBL customers de-energized⁵
- Other Customers

² In accordance with the Commission's post-event reporting template, Table 5 below reflects de-energization data at the circuit level (rather than segment level) and shows first de-energization date/time and final restoration date/time for each circuit. During this event, SCE deployed segmentation to limit de-energization to specific circuit segments in the areas of concern. In addition, on 2 circuits (Rejada and Steel), SCE temporarily restored power to customers during extended breaks in fire weather conditions, meaning that impacted customers on these circuits were not continuously de-energized between first de-energization date/time and final restoration date/time.

³ SCE understands "All Clear" declaration date/time for each circuit in scope to refer to: (1) approval by the Incident Commander to begin patrols and restoration of power for any de-energized circuit or circuit segment, or (2) a final decision to remove a circuit or circuit segment from scope after the Period of Concern is over for that circuit or segment on the monitored circuit list that was not de-energized during the PSPS event.

⁴ Whenever possible, SCE employs circuit-switching operations and/or sectionalization devices to minimize the number of customers in scope for proactive de-energization. As a result, some customers on a circuit in scope may briefly lose power while SCE switches them to an energized adjacent circuit or when SCE uses sectionalization devices to isolate portions of a circuit that can remain safely energized from de-energized segments of that same circuit or an adjacent circuit. The reported count of "total customers de-energized" does not include customers who experience a brief (30 minutes or less) power interruption during such switching and/or sectionalization operations, but who are not otherwise impacted by the proactive de-energization.

⁵ SCE maintains extensive data on customer populations that are included in the AFN definition referenced in CPUC decisions, with a focus on identifying AFN customers particularly vulnerable during PSPS events. In addition to AFN customers who have self-certified as sensitive (not enrolled in the MBL program), SCE identifies and tracks for PSPS reporting purposes the following categories of "AFN other than MBL customers": senior citizens (65 and older), hearing-impaired, vision-impaired (communications provided in large font or Braille), income-qualified (enrolled in CARE or FERA), and non-English speakers. SCE also reports on impacted customers that provide shelter to the homeless population, as these entities are included among critical facilities and infrastructure.

• Distribution or transmission classification

Table 5: Circuits De-Energized (Continued in Attachment C) ⁶

Circuits De-Ene	rgized (cont.)							
County	Circuit Name	Residential Customers De-energized	Commercial / Industrial customers De-energized	Medical Baseline customers De-energized	AFN other than MBL customers De-energized	Total customers De-energized	GO 95, Tier HFTD Tier(s) 1,2,3	Other Customers
SAN BERNARDINO	FIREBIRD	466	69	8	102 103	535	Non HFRA, T3, T2	0
LOS ANGELES	HILLFIELD	1595	24	37	608 613	1619	ТЗ	0
VENTURA	MORGANSTEIN	1698	73	79	149 151	1771	Т3	0

Section 4. Damage and Hazards to Overhead Facilities

2. A table showing circuit name and structure identifier (if applicable) for each damage or hazard, county that each damage or hazard is located in, whether the damage or hazard is in a High Fire Threat District (HFTD) or non-HFTD and the type of damage/hazard.⁷

Table 6: Damage and Hazards

Damage and Hazards	amage and Hazards						
Circuit Name	County	Structure Identifier	Tier 2/3 or Non-HFTD	Type and Description of Damage			
Anton	Ventura	1449761E	Tier 3	Broken primary tap			
Energy	Los Angeles	1408068E	Tier 3	Damaged hardware			
Energy	Los Angeles	2101235E	Tier 3	Broken crossarm			
Firebird	San Bernardino	2206361E	Tier 2	Broken primary tap			

Section 5. Notification

3. For those customers where positive or affirmative notification was attempted, use the following table to report the accounting of the customers (which tariff and/or access and functional needs population designation), the number of notification attempts made, the timing of attempts, who made the notification attempt (utility or public safety partner) and the number of customers for whom positive notification was achieved. "Notification attempts made" and "Successful positive notification" must include the unique number of customer counts. When the actual notification attempts made is less than the numberof customers that need positive notifications, the utilities must explain the reason. In addition, the utilities must explain the reason any unsuccessful positive notifications.

⁶ The sum of (i) residential customers de-energized, (ii) commercial/industrial customers de-energized, and (iii) other customers equals the total number of customers de-energized per circuit for this event. The count of Residential Customers De-energized "includes sub-categories of" Medical Baseline customers De-energized "and "AFN other than MBL customers De-energized."

⁷ Hazards are conditions discovered during restoration patrolling or operations that might have caused damages or posed an electrical arcing or ignition risk had PSPS not been executed.

Table 8: Positive Notification8

Positive Notification					
Category	Total Number of Customers	Timing of Attempts	Notification Attempts	Successful Positive Notification	Who made the notification
Medical Baseline	3225 3540	DAILY	3307 3309	3225	SCE
Self Certified	227 255	DAILY	259	227 228	SCE

315 Medical Baseline customers and 27 Self-Certified customers were not successfully contacted during this event. None of these customers were de-energized.

5. If the utility fails to provide notifications according to the minimum timelines set forth in D.19-05-042 and D.21-06-034, use the following table to report a breakdown of the notification failure and an explanation of what caused the failure.

Throughout the PSPS event, SCE made significant effort to notify public safety partners, local/tribal governments, critical facilities and infrastructure, and customers in accordance with the minimum timelines set forth by the CPUC in PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines (D.19-05-042), weather and other factors permitting. Any missed notifications during the event are included in the following table.

Table 9: Breakdown of Notification Failure

Breakdown of Notification Failures						
Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation			
Public Safety Partners excluding Critical Facilities and Infrastructure	Entities who did not receive 48-to 72-hour advance notification.	4 8	1 notification was sent to an entity using the most up-to-date contact information on file but was not delivered for unknown reasons. Not forecast in scope within 48-72 hours. 4 notifications			

⁸ The "Total Number of Customers" metric reflects the total number of MBL and Self-Certified customers in scope for the PSPS event. Although SCE attempts to notify all MBL and Self-Certified customers in scope, only customers who are ultimately de-energized "need" positive pre-event PSPS notifications.

The "Notification Attempts" metric reflects the count of MBL and Self-Certified customers – both in scope and deenergized – whom SCE attempted to notify prior to de-energization. Notification attempts include automated notification, secondary verification by Consumer Affairs and escalated contact attempts, up to and including door rings, if necessary, to confirm successful delivery of notifications to Medical Baseline and Self-Certified customers.

The "Successful Positive Notification" metric reflects the number of unique MBL and Self-Certified customers – both in scope and de-energized – who were successfully notified of the PSPS event prior to de-energization.

Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation
			were sent but less than 48 hours before de-energization. 4 notifications were not sent due to data processing error.
	Entities who did not receive 1–4-hour imminent notification.	87	Missed due to rapidly escalating weather conditions that required immediate de- energization. Notifications were sent, but less than 1 hour before de- energization. 1 notification was sent more than 4-hours before de- energization. 1 notification was sent but less than 1 hour before de- energization due to sudden onset of weather conditions. 5 notifications were not sent due to data processing error.
	Entities who did not receive any notifications before de-energization.	27 4	Not forecasted in scope prior to de-energization. Rapidly escalating weather conditions required immediate deenergization. 4 notifications were not sent due to sudden onset of weather conditions.
	Entities who were not notified immediately before re-energization.	34 4	System/operational failure (please see detailed explanation in Section 5-6 and Lessons Learned below) 4 notifications were not sent due to system/operational failure.
	Entities who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel.	0	

Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation
Critical	Facilities who did not receive 48–72-hour advance notification.	30 130	11 notifications were sent using the most up-to-date contact information on file but were not delivered for unknown reasons. 19 not forecast in scope within 48-72 hours. 5 notifications were sent more than 72-hours before deenergization. Not forecast in scope within 48-72 hours. 104 notifications were sent but less than 48 hours before de-energization. 21 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.
Facilities and Infrastructure	Facilities who did not receive 1-4 hour of imminent notifications.	110	2 notifications were sent using the most up-to-date contact information on file but were not delivered for unknown reasons. 5 notifications were sent more than 4-hours before deenergization. 108 notifications missed due to rapidly escalating weather conditions that required immediate deenergization. Notifications were sent, but less than 1 hour before deenergization. 83 notifications were sent but less than 1 hour before deenergization due to sudden onset of weather conditions.

Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation
			21 notifications were not sen due to data processing error.
			1 notification not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.
	Facilities who did not receive any notifications before de-energization.	2	Notifications were sent using the most up to-date contact information on file but were not delivered for unknown reasons. 2 notifications not successful delivered due to invalid contact information or other
	Facilities who were not notified at de-energization initiation.	2	delivery failure. Notifications were sent using the most up-to-date contact information on file but were not delivered for unknown reasons. 2 notifications not successful
			delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.
			2 notifications were sent using the most up-to-date contact information on file but were not delivered for unknown reasons.
	Facilities who were not notified immediately before re- energization.	7	2 notifications not successful delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.
			5 notifications were not sent due to system/operational failure (please see detailed explanation in Section 5-6 an Lessons Learned below)

Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation
	Facilities who were not notified when reenergization is complete.	2	Notifications were sent using the most up to date contact information on file but were not delivered for unknown reasons. 2 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.
	Facilities who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel.	98 78	Notifications were sent using the most up-to-date contact information on file but were not delivered for unknown reasons. 47 notifications were sent outside the 2-hour window due to system/operational failure. 29 notifications were not sent due to data processing error. 2 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.
All other affected customers	Customers who did not receive 24–48-hour advance notifications.	428 822	127 notifications were sent using the most up to date contact information on file but were not delivered for unknown reasons. 301 customers not forecasted in scope at 24 hours. Notifications were sent but less than 24 hours before deenergization. 6 notifications were sent more than 48-hours before deenergization. 49 customers not forecasted in scope at 24-48 hours.

Breakdown of Notification Failures			
Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation
			Notifications were sent but less than 24 hours before deenergization. 362 notifications were not sent due to data processing error. 405 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure. 122 notifications were sent using the most up-to-date
	Customers who did not receive 1–4-hour	2407 2811	contact information on file but were not delivered for unknown reasons. 2285 notifications missed due to rapidly escalating weather conditions that required immediate de energization. Notifications were sent, but less than 1 hour before deenergization.
	imminent notifications.		more than 4-hours before deenergization. 2194 notifications were sent, but less than 1 hour before deenergization due to sudden onset of weather conditions. 82 notifications were not sent due to data processing error. 484 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or
	Customers who did not receive any notifications before de-energization.	410 457	other delivery failure. 396 notifications were sent using the most up-to-date contact information on file but

Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation
			were not delivered for unknown reasons.
			14 customers not forecasted is scope prior to de-energization Rapidly escalating weather conditions required immediate de-energization.
			12 notifications were not sent due to sudden onset of weather conditions.
			445 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information o other delivery failure.
	Customers who were not notified at de-energization	591 605	591 notifications were sent using the most up-to-date contact information on file buwere not delivered for unknown reasons.
	initiation.		605 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information of other delivery failure.
			574 notifications were sent using the most up-to-date contact information on file by were not delivered for unknown reasons.
Customers who were not notified immediately before re-energization.	620 631	46-60 notifications missed du to system/operational failure (Please see detailed explanation in Section 5-6 and Lessons Learned below)	
		571 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information o other delivery failure.	
	Customers who were not notified when re- energization is complete.	456 501	456 notifications were sent using the most up to date contact information on file by

Breakdown of Notification Failures			
Notifications sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Counts	Explanation
			were not delivered for unknown reasons. 1 notification was not sent due to data processing error. 500 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.
	Customers who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel.	2317 2217	other delivery failure. 2203 notifications were sent using the most up-to-date contact information on file but were not delivered for unknown reasons. 114 124 notifications were sent outside the 2-hour window due to system/operational failure. (Please see detailed explanation in Section 5-6 and Lessons Learned below) 17 notifications were not sent due to data processing error. 2076 notifications not successfully delivered due to invalid contact information or other delivery failure.

6. Explain how the utility will correct the notification failures.

SCE acknowledges failing to notify Public Safety Partners, Critical Facilities and Infrastructure, and other customers in the notification timeframe indicated in the report. For situations where SCE did not meet the minimum notification timeframe, SCE provides the following categories of causes that resulted in missed notifications and notifications successfully delivered, but outside the minimum notification timeframe. SCE notes that included in the notification failures in Table 9 are notifications that exceed the minimum notification timelines required by D19-05-042.9

See D.19-05-042, A8-A9. For example, that decision requires the IOUs to provide advance notice of anticipated de-energization to PSPs a minimum of 48-72 hours before de-energization. SCE has included any notifications

Weather

Changing weather forecasts and sudden onset of weather conditions resulted in missed notifications across all notification types and heavily impacted timing, accuracy, and feasibility of advanced warnings such as imminent notifications. While a perfect weather forecast is not attainable, SCE continues to improve its weather forecast capabilities, primarily through expanding its use of machine learning and probabilistic forecasting to more weather station locations. These methods allow SCE to create more accurate weather forecasts by reducing forecast biases by leveraging historical weather station observations. SCE also re-trains its machine learning models annually to further improve machine learning forecast accuracy based on the latest weather station observations data.

System/Operational failures

SCE encountered system/operational issues that affected the delivery of notifications sent on December 9, 2024. The root cause for customers who did not receive cancellation notifications after being removed from scope was identified as an abnormal circuit configuration present during the event. This configuration added complexity to the operational and notification processes. To prevent similar errors in future events, SCE has conducted additional integration work and training to address the operational complexities for managing abnormal circuit configurations and related notifications.

No Delivery Confirmation

As indicated on Table 9, notifications were sent but not delivered due to unknown delivery failure in some cases. SCE has since engaged its notification vendor to conduct a more thorough review and cause of the unknown delivery failure categories. SCE's vendor provided the following types of notification responses listed in the table below specifically for notifications classified by the vendor as "Not Delivered."

outside that window in the counts in Table 9, even if the notification was sent *earlier* than 48-72 hours in advance.

¹⁰ An abnormal circuit configuration is when all or part of one circuit is supplying electricity to all or part of an adjacent or nearby circuit due to equipment or substation maintenance, circuit loading, or other safety or reliability concerns.

Status	Result	Description
Processing	Not Delivered	Sent to carrier, but their delivery status is unknown.
Processed	Not Delivered	Sent to carrier, but their delivery status is unknown.
Deferred	Not Delivered	The receiving server temporarily rejected the message, and the email cannot immediately be delivered. Carrier will retry.
Busy	Not Delivered	The recipient line was busy. Notification vendor will retry once in 30 minutes. If all retries have busy status, this will be final.
No Answer	Not Delivered	No answer from the recipient and we were unable to detect their answering machine. Notification vendor will retry once in 30 minutes.
Bounce	Not Delivered	Not delivered. The receiving server could not or would not accept the message. Users may have settings with their email carrier which will reject future emails.
Blocked	Not Delivered	Not delivered. Users may have settings with their email carrier which will reject future emails.
Not Delivered	Not Delivered	Not delivered. Message delivery failed. There could be multiple reasons. This will not be retried.
Failed	Not Delivered	Not delivered. Message failed to be delivered.
Other	Not Delivered	Not delivered. The call cannot be completed for many reasons such as network errors, local congestion, disconnect, etc.
Sent to Queue	Not Delivered	Initial status

SCE continues to identify the validity and availability of customer contact information. SCE performs an annual notification test for customers in all High Fire Risk Areas to evaluate the accuracy and delivery capability of customer contact information and notification systems. This test includes notifications to approximately 1.3 million customers that reside in High Fire Risk Areas. SCE then analyzes the notification results and where notifications were unsuccessful, SCE proactively corrects and improves contact information. SCE does this through various efforts including emergency notification enrollment at sign-up, auto-enrollment into emergency notifications for existing customers, alternative contact information enrollment, emergency

contact opt-out prevention, and/or email domain correction. SCE remains committed to making all reasonable efforts to notify all customers affected during PSPS events and will continue similar notification improvement efforts to resolve missing and inaccurate customer contact information for 2024.

Invalid Contact Information

Several notifications were due to invalid contact information and SCE has taken steps to validate emergency contacts. SCE also continues to improve data quality and perform annual testing with customers in High Fire Risk Areas.

Through SCE's autoenrollment program, 99% of active premises have a designated contact for receiving emergency alert notifications. The contact verification process includes thorough validation of email address syntax, format, and structure. Additionally, SCE utilizes tools to validate and confirm the deliverability and existence of each email address not verified by internal source. As part of SCE's data management practices, we promptly remove emails that reject/bounce notifications three or more times within a 90-day period and have been verified as invalid by the tools. SCE also attempts to correct any email addresses with incorrect syntax, format, structure, or invalid domain names. In 2024, SCE will also initiate data validation for phone numbers and cleansing.

Evolving weather conditions complicated notification release timing for advance notifications (48-72-hour, 24-48 hour) and imminent notifications (1-4 hour). SCE uses real-time weather conditions to determine when these notifications should be sent. SCE continues to explore opportunities to expand its machine learning weather forecast capabilities to improve forecast accuracy however, there are times where unforeseen circumstances prevent on-time notifications.

Missed notifications due to system and operational issues will be reviewed to determine root causes and make corrections to improve notification accuracy. See Section 11: Lessons Learned for additional details.

For notifications sent but undelivered, SCE is working with its notification vendors to determine what caused the delivery failures (e.g., invalid contact information, server errors, customer blocked SCE as sender) and will work to minimize these notification issues in the future. SCE remains committed to making all reasonable efforts to provide notifications to all impacted customers and public safety partners during PSPS events.

Section 7. Complaints and Claims

1. The number and nature of complaints received as the result of the de-energization event and claims that are filed against the utility because of de-energization. The utility must completely report all the informal and formal complaints, meaning any expression of grief, pain, or dissatisfaction, from various sources, filed either with CPUC or received by the utility as a result of the PSPS event.

There were 66 70 reported complaints and one claim associated with this PSPS event. SCE will include any complaints or claims related to this PSPS event received after the filing date of this report in its annual post-season report (which will also provide additional details on the complaints).

Table 12: Count and Nature of Complaints Received

Nature of Complaints	
PSPS Frequency/Duration Including, but not limited to complaints regarding the frequency and/or duration of PSPS events, Including delays in restoring power, scope of PSPS and dynamic of weather conditions.	6 8
Safety/Health Concern Including, but not limited to complaints regarding difficulties experienced by AFN/MBL populations, traffic accidents due to non-operating traffic lights, inability to get medical help, well water or access to clean water, inability to keep property cool/warm during outage raising health concern	2 4
Communications/Notifications Including, but not limited to complaints regarding lack of notice, excessive notices, confusing notice, false alarm notice, problems with getting up-to-date information, inaccurate information provided, not being able to get information in the prevalent languages and/or information accessibility, complaints about website, Public Safety Partner Portal, REST/DAM sites (as applicable)	3 2
Outreach/Assistance Including, but not limited to complaints regarding community resource centers, community crew vehicles, backup power, hotel vouchers, other assistance provided by utility to mitigate impact of PSPS	1
General PSPS Dissatisfaction/Other Including, but not limited to complaints about being without power during PSPS event and related hardships such as food loss, income loss, inability to work/attend school, plus any PSPS-related complaints that do not fall into any other category.	54 55
Total	66 70

Table 13: Count and Type of Claims Received

Count and Type of Claims Received		
Description of Claims	Number of Clai	ms
Food loss only	1 6	
Property Damage	0	
Food loss and property damage	0	
Evacuation Cost	0	
Business Interruption / Economic Loss	0	
Unspecified	0	
	Total 46	

SCE PSPS Post Event Report October 29, 2023, to December 09, 2023

Officer Verification

I am an officer of the applicant corporation herein and am authorized to make this verification on its behalf. I am informed and believe that the matters stated in the foregoing document are true.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 29th day of March 2024 in La Canada, California.

Shinjini Menon

Shinjini Menon

Vice President,

Asset Management & Wildfire Safety