

NERC E-ISAC Physical Security Briefing

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- Voluntary and informal (NERC and Regions)
- Nineteen entities in six different Regions visited, as of August 2016
- Discuss plans and challenges for implementation of CIP-014-02
- Provides opportunity for collaborative discussion regarding the requirements
- Focus on security plan effectiveness

A1 Is the bold lettering intentional? If so, it's acceptable. Author, 3/14/2017



- Common Theme:
 - Timelines for implementing security and resiliency measures
 - Third-party reviewer Can third-party participate in R4 and R5
 - Scope of security plans
 - Defining characteristics of the assets identified as required by R1
 - What data and security plan information will be requested
 - Insider threat concerns
 - Confidentiality of CIP-014 sites and information
 - Multiple owners of critical sub stations
 - Tiered approach



- Number of assets critical under the standard
 - Per Region
 - Q4 2015 Q1 2016
- Defining characteristics of the assets identified as critical
 - Per Region
 - Q4 2015 Q1 2016
- Scope of security plans
 - By Q4 2016
 - Information obtained guided self-certs, off-site audits, audits
 - Consider compliance monitoring schedule



- Threat Assessment Tools and Methods
 - Industry history
 - Company/Substation history and Incidents
 - Fusion Centers(State, Federal and local)
 - Design Basis Threat (DBT) E-ISAC
 - OE-417 Electric Disturbance Events Report



- Vulnerabilities Assessment Considerations
 - Security gaps physical/human
 - Substation design
 - Policy and procedures
 - Geographic challenges





- Security Plans should address identified threats and vulnerabilities
- Two-part plan security response and security measures



Detection and response

Slide 7

A2 What is this arrow pointing to? Author, 3/14/2017



- Common physical security characteristics observed:
 - Substations located near or adjacent to other sectors (i.e., natural gas pipelines)
 - Substations located in high crime areas
 - Substations located in remote rural areas with limited law enforcement support
 - Geographical challenges in implementing physical security measures
 - Support of other critical infrastructure or national assets
 - Proximity of the facility to unique threats
 - Proximity of roadways and highways for easy vehicular access and egress
 - Multiple transmission lines entering into a substation
 - Substation located close to other substations not owned by critical substation owner



- Some of the security countermeasures being implemented:
 - Intrusion detection systems
 - Video surveillance and analytics
 - Thermal cameras
 - Anti-climb/anti-cut fencing
 - Ballistic resistant fencing
 - Ballistic panels or walls
 - Transformer detection technology
 - Additional lighting
 - Vehicle barriers/bollards/crash gates
 - Use of natural environment
 - Gun shot detection



- Criminal Element
- Law Enforcement Response





R4 Threat and Vulnerabilities Assessment

• Geographic Challenges





- Quarterly report to the Board of Trustees on progress and review of industry implantation of CIP-014-2
- Number of assets critical under CIP-014-2
- Defining characteristics of assets identified as critical





- Scope of security plans (security measures and response)
- Timeline for implementation of security measures
- Industry's progress in implementation of CIP-014-02





CIP-014-02 Visits by Regions



Number of Entities Visited by Regions



Number of Outreach/Workshops Visited by Regions





Break-ins/attempted break-ins	Unauthorized personnel attempting to enter or actually entering a restricted area, secured protected site, or nonpublic area; impersonation of authorized personnel (e.g., police/security officers, janitors, or other personnel)
Misrepresentation	Presenting false information or misusing insignia, documents, identification, etc., to misrepresent affiliation as a means of concealing possible illegal activity
Theft, loss, or diversion	Stealing or diverting something associated with a facility/infrastructure or secured protected site (e.g., badges, uniforms, identification, emergency vehicles, technology, or documents), which are proprietary to the facility/infrastructure or secured protected site
Sabotage, tampering or vandalism	Damaging, manipulating, defacing, or destroying part of a facility/infrastructure or secured protected site
Expressed or implied threat	Communicating a spoken or written threat to commit a crime that will result in death or bodily injury to another person(s), or to damage or compromise a facility/infrastructure or secured protected site.



Aviation activity	Unknown UAS flying or hovering over power plants, substations, or transmission lines
Eliciting information	Questioning individuals or otherwise soliciting information at a level beyond mere curiosity about a public or private event; about the particular facets of a facility or building, and its purpose, operations, security procedures, etc. in a manner that would arouse suspicion of terrorism or other criminality in a reasonable person.
Observation, surveillance	Demonstrating unusual or prolonged interest in facilities , buildings, or infrastructure beyond mere casual (e.g., tourists) or professional (e.g., engineers) interest and doing so in a manner that would arouse suspicion of terrorism or other criminality in a reasonable person. Examples include observation through binoculars, taking notes, attempting to mark off or measure distances, etc.
Materials acquisition, storage by an employee or employee's associates	Acquisition/storage of unusual quantities of materials, such as cell phones, pagers, radio control toy servos, or controllers, fuel, chemicals, toxic materials, timers, or other triggering devices in a manner that would arouse suspicion of terrorism or other criminality in a reasonable person



Trend Analysis



27%: Current 2017 Q1 percentage of physical security incidents involving surveillance



- Daily, Weekly, Monthly, Semi-Annual reports
- Incident specific & topical Physical and Cyber Bulletins
- Industry sourced reports and analysis
- Discussion with other entities
- Situation reports during ongoing events and incidents



- Partners
- The E-ISAC works very closely with Government and Crosssector partners
 - Government
 - Department of Energy (DOE)
 - National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC)
 - National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC)
 - Other Federal agencies (i.e., FBI, DOD,)
 - Cross Sector Partners
 - Other ISACs/ISAOs
 - Private partners



- 2017 Physical Security Analysis Team Roadmap
 - Analytical products/case studies
 - o Regional trend analysis capability
 - o One each Quarter
 - 1st Quarter: Environmental Protest
 - Training
 - o DBT
 - National Improvised Explosives Familiarization
 - Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
 - Topics/Discussions
 - o UAS
 - o Insider Threat
 - Regional Outreach Visits
 - o SERC and RF



- Submit voluntary reporting:
 - E-ISAC portal
 - Email: <u>operations@eisac.com</u>
 - Call us: 202-400-3001
- What to share?
 - Detailed information located in Engaging the E-ISAC document
 - $\,\circ\,$ Located in the public document library

Reporting^{A4}

A3 Please refrain from using photos of slides. The fonts are skewed due to resizing, and the formatting is not NERC Style Guide. Author, 3/14/2017

A4 There was no slide title. I just made this up based on the slide content. Feel free to change. Author, 3/14/2017





Questions and Answers

