BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Order Instituting Rulemaking Regarding Policies, Procedures and Rules for Regulation of Physical Security for the Electric Supply Facilities of Electrical Corporations Consistent with Public Utilities Code Section 364 and to Establish Standards for Disaster and Emergency Preparedness Plans for Electrical Corporations and Regulated Water Companies Pursuant to Public Utilities Code Section 768.6.

R.15-06-009 (Filed June 11, 2015)

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY (U 39E) ANNUAL REPORT IN COMPLIANCE WITH DECISION 19-01-018, ORDERING PARAGRAPH 31

COMPLIANCE PERIOD: APRIL 1, 2020 - MARCH 31, 2021

PUBLIC VERSION

GRANT GUERRA

Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street, B30A San Francisco, CA 94105 Telephone: (415) 973-3728 Facsimile: (415) 973-5520

E-mail: grant.guerra@pge.com

Attorney for PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

Dated: March 31, 2021

BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Order Instituting Rulemaking Regarding Policies, Procedures and Rules for Regulation of Physical Security for the Electric Supply Facilities of Electrical Corporations Consistent with Public Utilities Code Section 364 and to Establish Standards for Disaster and Emergency Preparedness Plans for Electrical Corporations and Regulated Water Companies Pursuant to Public Utilities Code Section 768.6.

R.15-06-009 (Filed June 11, 2015)

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY (U 39E) ANNUAL REPORT IN COMPLIANCE WITH DECISION 19-01-018, ORDERING PARAGRAPH 31

COMPLIANCE PERIOD: APRIL 1, 2020 - MARCH 31, 2021

PUBLIC VERSION

Pursuant to the California Public Utility Commission's (CPUC's) D.19-01-018, Ordering Paragraph 31, relating to Physical Security for Electric Supply Facilities, PG&E hereby submits this annual report on Physical Security Incidents. This report documents physical security incidents which occurred during the compliance period April 1, 2020 through March 31, 2021. However, the information reported between March 15, 2021 and March 31, 2021, is provisional, based on information known to PG&E by the date of this report. Incidents may have occurred during this period. PG&E will submit an updated report only if there is any new information to report during the reporting period from March 15, 2021 to March 31, 2021

PG&E is providing this redacted version of the report for the public to be posted on the Commission's web site. The confidential portion of this report will be made available to the appropriate staff at the Commission and will be further detailed with an in-person meeting to ensure compliance with the Phase I Decision mandates.

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Discussion section of this report is comprised of three sections which address the

reporting requirements described in the CPUC's D.19-01-018, Ordering Paragraph 31. Section A provides a short summary of what the OE-417 report is and how many were submitted to the U.S. Department of Energy during the reporting period described in this report. To support the third section of the report, PG&E is submitting one confidential attachment which contains all twenty (20) of the OE-417 reports submitted to the Commission between April 1, 2020 through March 31, 2021, and subject to the qualifier referenced earlier. Section B consists of a description of any physical security incidents resulting in a utility insurance claim, providing a description of the incident including location, impact on infrastructure, and amount of claim. The physical security incidents that occurred in the compliance period did not exceed the large self-insurance retentions that PG&E maintains. Section 3 includes significant changes to the Security Plan Reports, including any new facilities that are covered by the plan, or any major upgrades made to previously identified facilities. Since the Security Plan Report is not yet due, PG&E has no significant changes to report.

II. BACKGROUND

As a result of the April 2013 rifle attack combined with the August 2014 burglary taking place in PG&E's Metcalf Substation, which is located south of San Jose, the CPUC made changes to the Public Utility Code § 364(a) addressing the vulnerability of electrical supply facilities to physical security threats. Since the approval of Senate Bill (SB) 699 in September 2014 the Commission issued an Order Instituting a Rulemaking to establish policies, procedures and rules for the regulation of physical security risks to the electric supply facilities of electric utilities consistent with the Public Utility Code § 364 (Phase I). SB 699 amended Public Utility Code § 364 and required the Commission to develop rules for addressing physical security risks to the distribution systems of electrical corporations. As a result, SB 699 language amended the Public Utility Code § 364 with new and pertinent codes.

The Commission held its initial prehearing conference on October 2015 which through Commission rulings, workshops and other regulatory considerations culminated into the Phase I Physical Security Decision in D.19-01-018 dated January 10, 2019 ("Decision").

Among other things, the Decision ordered the utilities to provide to the Director of the Safety and Enforcement Division and the Director of the Energy Division copies of all OE-417 reports submitted to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) within two weeks of filing with the U.S. DOE. Pursuant to Ordering Paragraph 31, the Decision ordered all CPUC jurisdictional utilities to submit an annual report by March 31 each year, starting on March 31, 2020.

III. DISCUSSION

The Discussion section of this report includes three subsections which address the report requirements set forth in D.19-01-018.

A. OE-417 Reports Submitted With This Annual Report.

According to the DOE – Office of Electricity, the Electric Emergency Incident Disturbance Report (Form OE-417) provides the DOE information on electric incidents and emergencies on electric power system. The Form OE-417 is a mandatory emergency form which is completed by entities within the electric power industry. The DOE uses the data to fulfill its overall national security and other energy management responsibilities, and for analytical purposes. In addition, the filing of the Form OE-417 allows the DOE to quickly respond to energy emergencies. PG&E submitted twenty (20) OE-417 reports to the Commission during the compliance period between April 1, 2020 through March 31, 2021 and subject to the qualifier referenced earlier.

There are the alert types on Form OE-417:

- 1. Emergency Alert File within 1-hour
- 2. Normal Report File within 6-hours
- 3. System Report File within 1-Business days

There are various criteria that fall under each of the alerts above, for example, one of the criteria for Emergency Alert is Cyber event that causes interruptions of electrical system operations. Depending on the d criteria, additional information needs to be provided by the entity completing the form such as:

- Incident and Disturbance Data
 - Geographic Area Affected
 - Date/Time of Incident Began and Ended
 - Estimate of Amount of Demand Involved
 - Estimate of Number of Customers Affected
- Type of Emergency
 - o Cause
 - o Impact
 - Action Taken
- Narrative Description
 - Name of Official to be Contacted
 - Description off the incident
 - Name of Assets Impacted

A final report is submitted within 72-hours of the incident. In the event of an incident or disturbance that meets any of the criteria for alerts, no exclusions for electric utilities are allowed and all items on Form OE-417 must be completed.

The OE-417 reports in this report are based on the final documents submitted to the CPUC and DOE.

B. Utility Insurance Information

PG&E maintains first-party property insurance to limit financial exposure for unforeseeable losses of its assets due to catastrophes such as fires, earthquakes, floods, or catastrophic operational losses. The Company also maintains liability insurance to protect against third-party claims. PG&E maintains large self-insured retentions under many of its insurance programs. The Company's current self-insured retentions for liability insurance are \$10 million (non-wildfire) and \$60 million (wildfire). PG&E's current self-insured retentions for property insurance are \$250K for losses at the General Office Complex, and \$50 million

for losses at all other locations (except for loss caused by equipment breakdown which is

subject to a \$10 million self-insured retention).

During the compliance period of April 1, 2020 through March 31, 2021, PG&E did

not experience any physical security incidents that resulted in a submission of an insurance

claim to PG&E's insurers. The physical security incidents that occurred in the compliance

period did not exceed the large self-insurance retentions that PG&E maintains.

C. Changes to Security Plan Reports

To meet the reporting requirement introduced in SB 699 in Public Utility Code § 590,

these annual reports are required to include any significant changes to the Security Plan

Reports (including new facilities covered by the Plan or major mitigation upgrades at

previously identified facilities). In recognition that the first Security Assessment Plan Report

is due on July 10, 2021, PG&E does not have an update to provide in this annual report.

Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Grant Guerra

Grant Guerra

Pacific Gas and Electric Company

77 Beale Street, B30A San Francisco, CA 94105

Telephone: (415) 973-3728 Facsimile: (415) 973-5520

E-Mail: grant.guerra@pge.com

Attorney for

Pacific Gas and Electric Company

March 31, 2021

5

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY ATTACHMENT A TO PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY'S ANNUAL REPORT IN COMPLIANCE WITH DECISION D.19-01-018, ORDERING PARAGRAPH 31

Item No.	Report Name	Date of Incident	Time of Incident		Time of Incident		Cause	Impact	Action Taken	Incident Description	Estimate of Number of Customers	Comments	Insurance Claims	Monetary Value of	Date OE-417 Report	Report Receiver
4	¥			Ended	Ended			•			Affected	*	Y/N)	Claim	Submitted	_
	OE417_Form_PGAE_Island Event 04_05_20 Final	4/5/2020	15:46	4/5/2020	17:35	Stanslaus County	Weather of natural disaster	or Electrical system separation (islanding)		Rain and lightning were reported in the vicinity of PG&E facilities. Substation serving 6814 distribution customers islanded. All lines were returned to normal by 17:35, returning system to normal and ending the island condition.	6814		N	N/A	4/8/2020	Peterson, Randol and Bout
	OE417_Form_PGAE_Island Event Final_04_24_20	4/24/2020	21:00	4/24/2020	21:33	Placer and Nevada	Operator action(s)	Electrical system separation (islanding)		While performing the transmission switching transformer banks were de-energized and created an island due to work procedure error. The island rapidly became unstabl and collapsed, thereby ending the island condition. All customers were restored by 0:13 on April 25th.	945		N	N/A	4/30/2020	Peterson, Rando and Palmer
	OE417_Form_PGAE_Loss_Monitor_Control_071420_Final	7/14/2020	14:16	7/14/2020	14:53	Counties PG&E System Wide	Other	Loss or degradation of control center monitoring or communication systems	Other	During a scheduled clearance on PG&E's data network data was interrupted due to complex factors. PG&E's GCC monitoring and control of the transmission grid capabilities were restored at 1453.	i -		N	N/A	7/23/2020	Peterson, Rando and Palmer
	OE417_Form_PGAE_Firm_Load_Shed_081420_Final_Corrected	8/14/2020	18:36	8/14/2020	20:42	Various counties in California	issued an	Loss of electric service to more than 50,000 for 1 hour or more	Load shedding of 100 MW or more implemented under emergency operational policy (manually or automatically	At 1836 and 1850, the CAISO issued an Operating instruction for PG&E to shed firm load due to operating reserve defliciency for CAISO in the Western Interconnection. RC West Indi sissed an Integy firmergency Activation t	220,000		N	N/A	8/19/2020	Peterson, Rando and Palmer
	OE417_Form_PGAE_Firm_Load_Shed_081520_Final (Corrected)	8/15/2020	18:25	8/15/2020	19:44		issued an	to more than 50,000 for 1 hour or more	Shed Firm Load Load shedding of 100 MW or more implemented under emergency operational policy (manually or	At 1825, the CAISO issued an Operating instruction for PG&E to shed firm load due to operating reserve deficiency for CAISO in the Western interconnection. RC West had issued an Intergy Energency Activation Level 3 (ECAI). At 127, PG&E she da approximately 429 MW of firm load. At 1843, CAISO provided approval to PG&E to begin restoration all firm load that has been de-energized. At 1848, CAISO terminated the Stage 3 System Emergency Notice effective. At 1844, PG&E's Grid Control Center re-engerized all impacted substation. Prior to the EEA3 activation, PG&E's demand response program issued a Base Interruptible Program (BIP) Event	220,000		N	N/A	8/24/2020	Peterson, Rando and Palmer
	OE417, Form. PGAE Loss of Electric Service <u>8</u> , 16, 2020, Final	8/16/2020	3:44	8/17/2020	14:18	Territory	natural	or Loss of electric service to more than 50,000 for 1 hour or more	Repaired or	Beginning August 16, 2020, there were lightning events system-wide, resulting in the loss of more than 3,0000 customers for more than 1 hour starting at approximately 03.44FST. There were numerous instances during this lightning event, when the number of customers without electric service exceeded 50,000 for more than 1 hour. August 16, 2000 08.49 FST. 140.72 FST 140.74	124,266	Weather or natura disaster was lightening storm. Restoration in progress.	i N	N/A	8/24/2020	Peterson, Rando and Palmer
	OE417_Form_PGAE_Island_08_17_2020_Final	8/17/2020	8:21	8/17/2020	9:01	Yuba County	Weather of natural disaster	r Electrical system separation (islanding)	Other	At 09:01 on August 17, 2020 a transmission line islanded. At 09:01 on August 17, 2020 the transmission line was de-energized, thereby terminating the island. Please note that the island formed involved only generators and their auxiliary loads. There was no customer load impacted by this island.	2 (Generator Auxilla	ry Caused by lightning. Terminated the island.	N	N/A	8/24/2020	Peterson, Rand and Palmer
	OE417_Form_PGAE_Loss of Electric Service_PSPS_09_07_20_Final	9/7/2020	22:40	9/9/2020	17:24	Various counties in California	Public Safety Power Shutoff	Loss of electric service to more than 50,000 for 1 hour or more	Other	On September 7, 2000 at 21:26, the process to de-energize multiple transmission lines began for a Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) event due to high fire danger. These interruptions resulted in the loss of more than 150,000 outsomers from certain 1 hours for an interruption streament of the process of	172,000	de-energized transmission lines and transmission level substations	N	N/A	9/15/2020	Peterson, Randolph, and Palmer
	OE417_Form_PGAE_Island_09_15_20_Final	9/15/2020	15:37	9/15/2020	15:53	Caribou	Transmissi on equipmen failure (no including substation or switchyard)	ot n		At 15:37 on September 15, 2020, a circuit breaker tripped creating an island condition. The island consisted of a generator serving customer load. At 15:53 on September 15, 2020, the generator was forced offline, thereby de-energizing the transmission lines, terminating the island. At 15:54 on September 15, 2020, the transmission lines were re-energized, thereby restoring all the customers.	4350	Electrical Island terminated	N	N/A	9/23/2020	Peterson, Rando and Palmer

Item No.	Report Name	Date of Incident	Time of	Date of Incident	Time of	County/ Geographic	Cause	Impact	Action Taken	Incident Description	Estimate of Number of Customers	Comments		Monetary Value of	Date OE-417 Report	Report Receiver
WO.	9			Ended							Affected			Claim		
10	OE417_Form_PGAE_Island_09_22_20_Final	9/22/2020	10:02	9/22/2020	12:57	Caribou	Failure at high voltage substation or switchyard	Electrical system separation (islanding)	Other	At 1002 on September 22, 2000, two circuit breakers tripped creating 2 separate islands. Ist Islands September 22, 2000 1002 - September 22, 2000 1002 The Island consisted of a generator serving customer load. There were 2 transmission lines as part of the Island. The circuit breaker was brought back into service, then the generator was paralleled to the grid ending the Island.	11,011	Electrical island terminated. 1st island affected 4350 customers. 2nd island 6661 customers.	N	N/A	9/29/2020	Peterson, Randolph, and Palmer
										2nd island: September 22, 2000 10:02 - September 22, 2000 12:57 The island consisted of a generator serving outstomer load. There were 2 transmission lines as part of the island. The circuit breaker was brought back into service, then the generator was parafleled to the grief ending the island.						
11	Ob417 Form_PGAE_Loss_of_Electric Service_PSPS_09_27_20_Final_2	9/27/2020	18:27	9/28/2020	15:17	counties in	Public Safety Power Shutoff	Loss of electric service to more than 50,000 for 1 hour or more	restored	On September 27, 2020 at 6405, the process to de-energize multiple transmission lines began for PG&ES 1-Public Safety Power Standford (1975) event due to bely fire danger. These interruptions resulted in the focus of electric service to more than 5,000 cautaments from other ball to sustain a gappounismately 270. The speember 27th. Overall, the system-wide number of customers impacted by the PSPS events and other system outages (this includes transmission assets impacted by fire events) was approximately 102,267 customers. The number of customers without electric service dropped below 50,000 at approximately 15.27 on September 28th.	102,267	Local Fire - Glass Fire/Calistoga, Napa/Sonoma Counties; Transmission lines may have access issues due to fire	N	N/A	10/7/2020	Peterson, Randolph, and Palmer
12	OE417_Form_PGAE_PSPS_10_15_2020_final	10/15/2020	15:06	10/15/2020	15:40		Public Safety Power Shutoff	The number of customers out of service fell below 50,000 in 35 minutes.	Repaired or restored	(n. October 15th, a. 15.37, more than 50,000 outcomen lost power due to weather and implementation of PGB15 Public Safety Power Shutoff. Customers out of power disrapped below 50,000 within one hour. This initial report was submitted but did not meet the 1 hour threshold.	51,569		N	N/A	10/26/2020	Peterson, Randolp, and Palmer
13	0E417_Form_PGAE_10_25_2000_PSPS_Final	10/25/2020	14:32	10/27/2020	18:00	Various counties in California		to more than 50,000		On October 25, 2000 at 10:0, the process to de-energize multiple transmission lines began for PG&St Public Safety Power Shutch [5P59] event due to high fire dauger. These interruptions resulted in the loss of electric service to more thin 5,000 customers for more than 1 hour stating at approximately 14.3:20 or October 25th. Overall, the system-wide number of customers impacted by the PSPS events and other system outages (this includes transmission assets impacted by fire events) was approximately 370,000 customers. The number of customers without electric service dropped below 50,000 at approximately 18:00 on October 27th.	370,000		N	N/A	10/30/2020	Peterson, Randolp, and Palmer
	OE417_Form_PGAE_Island_12_17_20_Final	12/17/2020	8:07	12/17/2020	8:32	area,		Electrical system separation (islanding)		A10807 on December 17, 2003, a transmission line but remained open-ended creating an island consisting of a generator serving customer load. At 08:32, the generator servined	17,000	Cause under investigation; Island was terminated	N	N/A	12/24/2020	Peterson, Randolp, and Bout
	OB417_Form_PGAE_Event_12_25_2000_Freal	12/25/2020		12/25/2020		Northern California		None	None	At ADS in December 28th, following loss of potential Indication on a transmission line, the operator set at F. Lineman to investigate. T-Line reported secondary and communications were shall been cut. The switch will be manually operated until repairs can be made. Findings from Corporate Security. Corporate Security interviewed the T-Lineman that who was sent to Nerris St substation. The T-Lineman believes that the damage was most likely attempted copper theft. Based on the physical orderine, the T-Lineman believes that once to secure accessed the box, the support realized the topper was scalably an allow material ones viaulated on the physical orderine, the T-Lineman believes that come to support and the security orderines are supported to the security of the security or the security or the security orderines are supported by the security orderines are supported by the security or the security		Probable attempted copper theft	N	N/A	1/6/2021	Peterson, Randolph, and Palmer
16	OE417 Form PGAE_01_01_2021 Tesla Vandalism Event Final	1/1/2021	7:04	1/1/2021	7:04	Alameda County	Vandalism	Damage or destruction of a facility	Mitigation implemented.	ActON, on January 1, 2022. PG&E Corporate Security rooffield the Grid Control Center that an unknown person broke into a substation by digging under the fence near the waveflows looted at the substation. The perspectant of their dows under the unbustation is perspectant of their dows under the unbustation is perspectant of their dows under add rooted through the three gates with PSE fets ubstatemently stealing a rental car/hruck. No damage to substation operating equipment reported. Initial information suggests vehicle their was the likely motive of the suspect.		Damage to Substation parameter fence and vehicle; Additional security personnel posted at Substation.	N :	N/A	1/7/2021	Peterson, Randolp, and Bout
	OE417_Form_PGAE_Island_01_02_21_Final	1/2/2021				Butte County		Electrical system separation (islanding)	restored	At 10.2 for January 2, 2002, a transformer bank relayed and tested OK, but remained open-ended on the low side resulting in an Island of a generator serving customer load As abustation typed us to over frequency, terminating the Island. The transmission line was restored. The faulted transformer bank will be inspected by Substation Maintenance (visual and oil sample test.)		Transformer bank fault. Island was terminated and transformer bank will be inspected.	N	N/A	1/11/2021	Peterson, Randolp, and Bout
18	OE417 Form_PGAE_Wind_Event_01_19_21_Final	1/19/2021	2:48	1/20/2021	11:41	counties in	natural	Loss of electric service to more than 50,000 for 1 hour or more		On January 13, 2021, high winds sturk PG&E's service territory, leading to multiple transmission and distribution outages and thereby resulting in the loss of more than 300,000 catheres from ere than 1 hour stating at approximately 02-88 PST. The peak number of customers without electric service was approximately 124,888. The number of customers without electric service dropped below 50,000 at approximately 11-11 PST on January 20th. The majority of transmission assets have been returned to service.	124,888	The majority of transmission assets have been returned to service.		N/A	1/26/2021	Peterson, Randolp, and Bout
19	0E417_Form_PGAE_Wind_Event_01_36_21_Final	1/26/2021	20:49	1/28/2021	21:14	counties in	natural	Loss of electric service to more than 50,000 for 1 hour or more		On January 2004, an atmospheric five arrived in RGEE's service territory, leading to multiple transmission and distribution outages and thereby resulting in the loss of more than one to make the proposition of the loss of more than one hour starting at approximately 20-89 PST. The pask number of customers without electric service was approximately 255,715. The number of customers without electric service dropped below 50,000 at approximately 21-14 PST on January 28th. The majority of transmission assets have been returned to service.	255715	Atmospheric River (snow and rain). The majority of transmission assets have been returned to service.		N/A	2/3/2021	Peterson, Randolp, and Bout
20	OE417_Form_PGAE Island_03-06-2021_Final	3/6/2021	3:21	3/6/2021		County,		Electrical system separation (islanding)		On March 6, 2021 at 08-21, a transmission line tested olary, but the line remained open creating two islands. The first island consisted of a generator serving its own load. The second island consisted of generators serving the load at two substations. This second island also included of Filine generators. The generator paralleled to the PG&E system ending the first island condition. Separation of the generators terminated the second island.	24000		N	N/A	3/16/2021	Peterson, Randolp, and Bout