Policy and Planning Division Safety Data Request:

Responses and Key Staff Takeaways

The Policy and Planning Division (PPD) is implementing a new data collection and management effort to better inform decision makers, agency-wide program staff, and members of the public on how utilities perform in key areas identified in a Synapse report prepared for the Western Interstate Energy Board. These areas include, e.g., customer satisfaction, system efficiency, and safety.

PPD staff is compiling these data into reports. The goal of these reports is to measure performance in key areas to give policy makers an additional tool to better inform decision-making and to make utility service activities more transparent. PPD does not plan to make recommendations in these reports, but intends that the reports will support better data-driven decision making across utility sectors.

> **Please note: the safety-related data sought in this request is informed by the Synapse report, and is independent of the safety metrics development underway in S-MAP Phase II, A.15-05-002 and consolidated proceedings. The fact that PPD staff is requesting certain safety-related data is not intended to prejudge any issues in S-MAP Phase II or any other proceeding. PPD staff may amend the safety-related data sought in future years.**

Question 1: Records and Information Management Training – Percentage of employees trained, and training interval (e.g., annual, biennial).

PG&E

Training interval: annual.

2016: 25,755 employees, 97.1%.

SCE

Training interval: biennial. 2016 was an off cycle year, so responses were provided for 2015 and 2017.

2015: 14,647 employees, 95.90%

2017: 12,088 employees, 99.56%

SDG&E/SoCalGas

"During the requested period of 2016, SDG&E and SoCalGas were developing a new Records/Information Management web-based training. Consequently, neither utility deployed a formal records management training course to all employees. Training has resumed in 2017."

Question 2: Workplace Violence Prevention/Active Shooter Training -- Total number and percentage of employees trained annually.

PG&E

Active Shooter Training: 24,942 employees, 92.6%

Workplace Violence Prevention Training: 402 employees, 1.5%.

Workplace Violence Training for new managers: 326 employees

SCE

Training interval: biennial. 2016 was an off cycle year, so responses were provided for 2015 and 2017.

2015: 14,273 employees, 96.27%

2017: 12,100 employees, 99.70%

SDG&E/SoCalGas

SDG&E: 1,477 employees, 34.34%

SoCalGas: 2,684 employees, 31.95%

Question 3: T&D Overhead Wires Down -- Number of instances where an electric transmission or primary distribution conductor is broken and falls from its intended position to rest on the ground or a foreign object; excludes down secondary distribution wires and "Major Event Days" (typically due to severe storm events) as defined by the IEEE.

PG&E

Transmission: 44

Distribution: 3,255

Total T&D: 3,299

SCE

Total T&D: 1,056

SDG&E/SoCalGas

Wires down events that resulted in an unplanned electric outage to customers:

Transmission: 0

Distribution: 106

Question 4: Fire Ignitions -- The number of powerline-involved fire incidents annually reportable to the CPUC per Decision 14-02-015. A reportable fire incident includes all of the following: 1) Ignition is associated with IOU powerlines; and 2) something other than IOU facilities burned; and 3) the resulting fire traveled more than one meter from the ignition point. Provide origination date and zip code for each incident.

PG&E

In 2016, there were 362 powerline-involved fire ignitions.

Suspected causes:

Wire to wire contact: 2
Contact from objects, including, e.g., balloons, vehicles, vegetation, and animals: 198
Contamination: 3
Equipment/facility failure: 143
Vandalism/theft: 3
Unknown: 10
Other: 3

SCE

In 2016, there were 96 powerline-involved fire ignitions.

Suspected causes:

Contact between third party attachment and supply lines: 1
Wire to wire contact: 1
Contact from objects, including, e.g., balloons, vehicles, vegetation, and animals: 47
Equipment/facility failure: 40
Unknown: 6
Other: 1

SDG&E/SoCalGas

In 2016, there were 30 powerline-involved fire ignitions.

Suspected causes:

Contact between third party attachment and supply lines: 1
Contact from objects, including, e.g., balloons, vehicles, vegetation, and animals: 12
Equipment/facility failure: 13

Wind/equipment/facility failure: 1
Vandalism/theft: 1
Unknown/unclassified: 2

Question 5: Emergency Response Time (electric) -- Percent of electric emergency responses within 60 minutes.

PG&E

8,544 requests for assistance from first responders. Responses within 60 minutes: 98.29% (goal: 97.5%)

SCE

"Emergency responses" defined as 911 calls. Responses within 60 minutes: 77%

SDG&E/SoCalGas

Priority 1 electric orders: 2,125. Responses within 60 minutes: 72.4%

Question 6: Dig-In Reductions (gas) -- The number of third party gas dig-ins per thousand USA tags/tickets.[1]

PG&E

2.02

SCE

6.3

SDG&E/SoCalGas

SoCalGas: 4.45

SDG&E: 3.23

[1] The gas safety statistics provided by SCE for Questions 6, 7, and 8 reflect their propane operation on Catalina Island.

Question 7: Emergency Response Time (gas) -- Average minutes for gas emergency response.

PG&E

20.02 minutes

SCE

16.6 minutes

SDG&E/SoCalGas

SoCalGas: 23.2 minutes

SDG&E: 36.4 minutes

Question 8: Leak Repair Performance (gas) -- Average days for repair of minor and non-hazardous leaks.

PG&E

Gas distribution: 294 days

Gas transmission: 327 days

SCE

28 days

SDG&E/SoCalGas

SoCalGas

Minor: 1,061.83 days

Non-hazardous 102.44 days

Combined average: 818.83 days

SDG&E

Minor: 179.20 days

Non-hazardous: 48.71 days

Combined average: 55.23 days

Key staff takeaways from responses:

For each of the three IOUs, half of the powerline-involved fire ignitions in 2016 resulted from contact with objects including vehicles, vegetation, balloons, and animals. Although there probably isn't much that could be done to prevent the powerline-involved fires caused by birds dropping snakes on powerlines (e.g., PG&E, May 2, 2016), are there other engineering changes that could help prevent contact? For example, when contact with vegetation is the cause, was the vegetation around the pole properly managed? Does California's prolonged drought create new vegetation risk from trees located at greater distances from utility poles and lines? Are utility poles more likely to be struck by cars when the poles are located near corners? Does reflecting striping make poles more visible to drivers?

For each of the three IOUs, equipment/facility failure is a major cause of powerline-involved fire ignitions. Are there patterns or opportunities for improvement in equipment maintenance or replacement intervals that are evident from the equipment/facility failures?

The three IOUs exhibit great variability in their response times to electrical emergencies. Is it possible to quantify the public safety impact of longer response times?

The three IOUs differ in the frequency of Records and Information Management Training and Workplace Violence/Active Shooter Training and the number of employees trained. Is there an ideal training interval, and do all employees need to be trained?

The three IOUs exhibit great variability with respect to the average time to repair minor and non-hazardous gas leaks. Is there an ideal repair interval for minor and non-hazardous leaks?