CPUC Safety En Banc on Safety Management Systems - 5 Pitfalls from 5 Big Accidents



My "Why"

"The burden of these catastrophes is uniquely and unfairly borne by the victims, their families, and their friends. This was the case for the Texas City victims—men and women who were providing a livelihood for themselves and their families.

These victims were fathers and mothers, husbands and wives, sons and daughters, and friends".

Baker Report [extract]



CPUC Safety En Banc on Safety Management System 5 Pitfalls from 5 Big Accidents

Framework/ System

Organization & Structure

Policies & Procedures

Compliance

Safety Culture

APJ 1173 NPLEMENTATION





July 6, 1988



5

The remains of Piper Alpha

167 Died Total loss of facility Occidental pull out of UK Insured loss \$3.4 Billion Public Enquiry led by Lord Cullen Fundamental change in regulation



Pitfall #1 - No system to quantitatively assess risk to make better decisions



The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster The Hon Lord Cullen "...the witnesses' reliance on merely a qualitative opinion showed, in my view, a dangerously superficial approach to a major hazard." –



EPARTMENT OF ENERGY

The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster.



Avoid Pitfall #1 - Quantitatively assess risk to feed into a process to make better decisions

- System to continually identify hazards, and quantify the risks.
- **Decision process** that includes definitions of risk acceptance/tolerability criteria

UNDERSTAND the hazards and risks

If management actually decides to do nothing, it is based on a defensible, repeatable and robust process.









Figure 2.2 Overview of primary hydrocarbon flows to and from the Longford operating units



- Longford Gas Plant Fire September 25, 1998
- Large fire
- 2 workers died, 8 workers injured
- Businesses severely impacted
- One billion dollar class action
- Esso blamed the workers
- Royal Commission severely criticized Esso's management system (OIMS)





Pitfall #2-Unclear Systems and Procedures

The Esso Longford Gas Plant Accident



Report of the Longford Royal Commission

aryl Michael Dawson, AC KBE CB - Chairman Mr Brian John Brooks, BE FIEAust FAIP FAIE FIE - Commissioner "OIMS, together with all the supporting manuals, comprised a complex management system.

- difficult to comprehend both by management and operations personnel
- Procedures were deficient "

Royal Commission Report Dawson, 1999:2000



Avoid Pitfall #2 - Simple but detailed systems and procedures

- Clear
- Detailed
- Who, what, when and WHY!
- Very beneficial for workers define exactly what to do
- Also USEFUL for auditing clear, unambiguous requirements

Exxon's OIMS and compliance with OIMS – is MUCH MUCH better today





JANUARY 2007

THE REPORT OF THE BP U.S. REFINERIES INDEPENDENT SAFETY REVIEW PANEL



Texas City March, 23, 2005

- Texas City explosion and fire
- 15 died
- 180 severely injured
- BP Commissioned the Baker report
- Large "process safety" accident



Personal safety V Process safety

- Personal safety killing or injuring one at a time
- Process safety release of toxic or flammable fluid kill or injure many. Onsite or offsite
- Process can have catastrophic effects multiple fatalities, severe economic loss, widespread property damage, and disastrous environmental impacts.
- Generally, managing personal safety will not help with process safety risks



Pitfall #3 – Poor process safety management due to focus on personal safety

Examples of Process Safety findings from Baker Report:

- 1. Poor process safety knowledge and competence.
- 2. Training inadequate.
- 3. Risk assessment and analysis system **inadequate** identification and **rigorous analysis** of those hazards
- 4. Delayed implementation of good engineering practices to improve process safety
- 5. Corporate SMS did not translate corporate expectations into measurable criteria (KPIs) for management of process risk

"The findings above, together with other information that the Panel obtained during its examination, lead the Panel to conclude that material deficiencies in process safety performance exist at BP's five U.S. refineries"



Avoid Pitfall #3 – Build-in process safety to policies, systems, standards and procedures

Examples of building-in process safety:

- Organizational structure
- Policies
- Procedures, e.g. management of change, learning, inspection, testing, maintenance, contractor management
- Process risk assessments and threat management
- Training, skills and competence Board down
- Key performance indicators leading and lagging
- Tools, e.g. Hazop, quantitative risk analysis, consequence models
- Standards design, hazard assessment, materials, valve specs,



Avoid Pitfall #3 - Build in process safety to policies, systems, standards and procedures

Examples of building in process safety:

- Key performance indicators leading (and lagging) API 754, HSG 254 (UK HSE)
- Training, skills and competence Board down
- Process risk assessments and threat management using appropriate tools, e.g.
 - Bow-tie diagrams
 - Hazop
 - quantitative risk analysis
 - consequence models



April 20, 2010

11 workers were killed,

17 were injured.

Initial large environmental impact

Cost \$65Bn (Jan 16 '18)

(Testified as an expert for BP)





Adapted from James Reason (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1997).



Pitfall #4 - Failure to learn from elsewhere

- Critical Factors and Performance standards
- Required elsewhere in BP, e.g. North Sea
- Required of all operators in other parts of the world, e.g. Australia and UK



Avoid Pitfall #4 - Build a learning and teaching system, and cast the net wide

- 1. Learn from accidents, incidents, near misses **ANYWHERE**
- 2. Find out what is being done elsewhere best practices, best technology
- 3. Incorporate the lessons in the way the company works: Processes, procedures and standards need updating
- 4. Teach people (properly) who need to know who's daily job is to prevent major accidents that can be a lot of people!



Could the cause of all accidents be procedures?

- Missing procedures
- Poor procedures
- People not following procedures slips, lapses and deliberate violations

BUT.....











15,000 people sought treatment 6 Workers were injured

Immediate cause of pipe failure - corrosion





Figure 14. Photo of the burned remains of the fire truck that was consumed by the fire. A firefighter was in the cab when the light gas oil ignited. The fire truck was positioned in the cold zone approximately 65 feet from the leak location.



Pitfall #5 - Failure to build a culture of safety

Some Chemical Safety Board (CSB) Findings:

- 1. Refinery ignored Chevron corporate in-house experts
- 2. Continued operation of a unit despite hazardous leaks
- 3. Decreasing willingness to use Stop Work Authority
- 4. Substandard equipment maintenance practices
- 5. Normalization of deviance

Weaknesses in Process Safety culture



Organizations tend to forget about accidents

RICHMOND REFINERY: not building, or not maintaining, a solid safety culture – particularly a process safety culture.



PROCEDURES + PEOPLE

Framework/ System

Organization & Structure Policies & Procedures

Compliance

PITFALLS

Safety Culture

APJ 1173 NPLEMENTATION



API RP 1173 Covers Culture – but what is it?

The product of individual and group values, attitudes, competencies and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization's health and safety programs (HSE, 2002).

Translated it's "**the way we do things around here"**



Avoid Pitfall #5 - Build a strong culture of safety

- 1. "Tone from the top" Board and leadership. Set CLEAR expectations.
- 2. "Walk the talk" at all levels of leadership and management
- Organize for personal safety and process safety get the right people in the right positions and make sure they are doing the right things
- 4. Stamp out normalization of deviance
- 5. Discipline Culture is about doing the right thing particularly when nobody is looking.



Summary How to avoid the five pitfalls

- 1. Use quantitative risk assessment to make better, informed decisions [Piper Alpha]
- 2. Simple but detailed systems, policies, standards and procedures + WHY [Longford]
- 3. Build-in process safety to policies, systems, procedures and standards [Texas City]
- 4. Build a learning and teaching system and cast the net wide [Deepwater Horizon]
- 5. Build a strong culture of safety [Richmond Refinery]



As with all Major Accidents

"The burden of these catastrophes is uniquely and unfairly borne by the victims, their families, and their friends. This was the case for the Texas City victims—men and women who were providing a livelihood for themselves and their families. These victims were fathers and mothers, husbands and wives, sons and daughters, and friends".

Please have a POWERFUL "why" – it'll help you become a safer company

5 Pitfalls from 5 Big Accidents



ACCIDENT DEFINITION - BOW-TIE

